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# West Europe Report

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12 April 1984

## WEST EUROPE REPORT

## CONTENTS

## POLITICAL

## CYPRUS

- Denktas Proposals for Cyprus Issue Summit  
(Sedat Ergin; CUMHURIYET, 18 Mar 84)..... 1

## FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

- Few Foreigners Elect Government's Return Premium  
(HANDELSBLATT, 12 Mar 84)..... 5

## FRANCE

- Communist Youth Movement (MJCF) Congress Opening Statement  
(Jean-Pierre Vaudon, Jean-Paul Debest; L'HUMANITE,  
9 Mar 84)..... 8
- Organizations, Foreign Youth Movements at MJCF Congress  
(L'HUMANITE, 9 Mar 84)..... 16
- Communist Youth (MJCF) To Build School in Nicaragua  
(Rudy Vigier Interview; L'HUMANITE, 27 Feb 84)..... 18

## GREECE

- Backgrounds of ND Party 'Rebels'  
(TO VIMA TIS KYRIAKIS, 29 Jan 84)..... 20
- Wide-Ranging Talk by ND's Mitsotakis  
(MESIMVRINI, 23 Feb 84)..... 23
- Analysis of KKE Political Aspirations  
(Giannis Loulis; MESIMVRINI, 27 Feb 84)..... 28

Text of Bill on Unification of Security Corps (ETHNOS, 26 Jan 84).....	32
NETHERLANDS	
Dissident Communists Organize Separate Group (Hubert Smeets; NRC HANDELSBLAD, 27 Feb 84).....	85
NORWAY	
Grass Roots Unrest From Coalition Partners Over Willoch Policies (ARBEIDERBLADET, various dates; AFTENPOSTEN 6 Mar 84).....	89
Statoil Concerns Center Congresses, by Gunnar A. Johansen Economic Policy Questioned, by Steinar Moe Joint-Party Program Appeal Attacked, Editorial Concern Over New Conservatives' Chairman	
MILITARY	
SWEDEN	
Sipri Peace Researcher Agrell: Subs Part of USSR Power Display (Per Knudsen; INFORMATION, 13 Mar 84).....	93
ECONOMIC	
FRANCE	
Fabius on European Industrial Cooperation, Research (Laurent Fabius Interview; L'UNITE, 9 Mar 84).....	99
GREECE	
Backgrounds of Economic Chamber Technocrats (Nikos Roussis; TO VIMA TIS KYRIAKIS, 15 Jan 84)....	106
Aircraft Industry Strike Threatens Production Shutdown (I VRADYNI, 18 Feb 84).....	108



## SPAIN

Commentary Attacks Stagnant Economic Policy (ABC, 7 Mar 84).....	111
Regional Overview of National Economic Crisis (DIARIO 16, 9 Mar 84).....	113
Review of Dire Situation in Construction Industry (YA, 10 Mar 84).....	115
Strikes, Unemployment Cripple Construction Industry (EL ALCAZAR, 7 Mar 84).....	117
INI President on Integrated Role of Public Sector (Enrique Moya; ABC, 5 Mar 84).....	121
Sagunto Closure Envisaged Over Labor Unrest (ABC, 5 Mar 84).....	124

## SWEDEN

Reducing State Debt Would Require Basic Economic Reforms (Nils-Eric Sandberg Editorial; DAGENS NYHETER, 1 Mar 84).....	126
'Hidden Unemployment' Becoming Serious Problem for Palme (Lilian Ohrstrom; DAGENS NYHETER, 9 Mar 84).....	129
Reduction in Number Seeking Jobs Aids Unemployment Rate (Lilian Ohrstrom; DAGENS NYHETER, 10 Mar 84).....	132
Gains From Devaluation Continuing To Improve Export Figures (Bjorn Anders Olson; DAGENS NYHETER, 10 Mar 84) .....	134

## TURKEY

Review of Recent Economic Legislation (CUMHURIYET, 18 Mar 84).....	136
Businessman Cakir on Industry as Economic Prerequisite (Yilmaz Cakir Interview; CUMHURIYET, 18 Mar 84).....	138
Assessment of Prospects for 1984 Exports (Editorial; DUNYA, 17 Mar 84).....	142
Giritligil on Plight of Aggregate Corporations (Safter Giritligil Interview; DUNYA, 17 Mar 84).....	144
Unavailability of Credit Stymies Housing Project (CUMHURIYET, 18 Mar 84).....	147

ENERGY

GREECE

Briefs

New Thasos Oil Search

149

OCEAN/POLAR ISSUES

SWEDEN

Fishermen Demand Government Control of Baltic White Zone  
(GNISTAN, 8 Mar 84; DAGENS NYHETER, 13 Mar 84).....

150

Soviet Pressure Stopped Inspections,  
by Christer Lundgren  
Overfishing of Cod Cited,  
by Peter Sandberg

## DENKTAS PROPOSALS FOR CYPRUS ISSUE SUMMIT

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 18 Mar 84 pp 1,14

[Report by Sedat Ergin]

[Text] New York--President Rauf Denktas of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus [TRNC] called on the United States "to act impartially" on the Cyprus issue during a meeting two days ago with U.S. State Department Counselor Edward Derwinski.

The meeting was held at the TRNC mission on the tenth floor of the Turkish House, across from the UN headquarters, approximately 24 hours after Denktas' had met with UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar. Derwinski and Richard Haas, the U.S. State Department Coordinator of Cyprus Affairs, came to New York from Washington for a day after their request for a meeting was given an affirmative response. Haas, who had torn a few muscles while running, came to the meeting on crutches.

According to what was learned, Denktas did most of the talking during the meeting and briefed the two senior State Department officials about his meeting with De Cuellar. Denktas made it known to the other side--as he had told De Cuellar previously--that he would not retreat from his position in his 2 January proposal on Varosia.

Denktas had responded to De Cuellar's explicitly stated expectation of a "gesture of good will" by insisting that he would not discuss the issue of reopening Varosia to Greek Cypriot settlement under UN supervision until the Greek Cypriot administration agrees to sit at the negotiating table.

The TRNC President expressed the same view to the representatives of the U.S. State Department and stated that he is prepared to meet Greek Cypriot leader Spyros Kyprianou at a summit conference "without preconditions." Denktas thus made it clear that he would not consider a unilateral move on Varosia before such a summit.

Denktas later emphasized that the Cyprus issue is not related, "directly or indirectly", to the assistance to be provided to Turkey by the United States and its allies and that as long as such a link is maintained it will be impossible to resolve the Cyprus problem.

Denktas also explained that the U.S. insistence on establishing a link between Cyprus and assistance to Turkey will serve no purpose other than emboldening the Greek Cypriots in continuing their intransigent stance.

Noting that the violation of the rights and the freedoms of the Turkish Cypriots is at the root of the Cyprus problem, Denktas added that the United States can contribute to peace only "by remaining completely impartial" in the Turkish Cypriots' struggle to lead human lives.

Derwinski, who listened to Denktas for most of the time, stated that the United States supports the efforts of the UN Secretary General, thus implying that the United States sides with De Cuellar in his expectation for a gesture of good will.

Responding to Denktas' remarks to the effect that the United States should remain impartial, Derwinski said: "We remain impartial before the Turkish as well as Greek Cypriots." He also drew attention, however, to the existence of the Greek lobby in the U.S. Congress and problems caused by that factor.

Reports to the effect that Greece will send arms to the Greek sector of Cyprus were also discussed at the meeting. According to the information we have obtained, when Denktas referred to these reports, Derwinski stated that "Greece has assured the United States that it has no such intentions."

It was learned that this assurance was given to the United States by the Greek Deputy Foreign Minister. Denktas had broached the same issue at his meeting with De Cuellar, and the UN Secretary General had expressed his sensitivity on this issue and had responded by saying that Greece had assured him that the said reports "were not true."

Can the Greek Cypriots Take the Problem to the UN General Assembly?

Another issue that was taken up at the meeting that lasted nearly one hour was the Greek Cypriot threat to raise the Cyprus issue before the UN General Assembly again in May if the Turkish side does not make a concession on Varosia. When Derwinski stated that such a development would result in an even bigger impasse, Denktas countered with a trump card of his own and recalled that the extension of the term of the UN Peace Force in Cyprus will be up for voting at the General Assembly in June. Denktas made it clear to the other side that if the Greek Cypriots obtain another resolution from the General Assembly, the Turkish Cypriot side could block the extension of the term of stay of the UN Peace Force.

Denktas-De Cuellar Meeting

No "progress" was made toward overcoming the current bottleneck in the Cyprus problem in the meeting that was described as "constructive and useful" by both the UN Secretary General and the TRNC President. Denktas told De Cuellar that any progress will primarily be contingent upon a change in the stance of the Greek Cypriot administration.

## Denktas Takes Initiative

According to our information, contrary to all expectations it was Denktas who brought up the Varosia issue at the meeting with De Cuellar. Denktas, who was aware of De Cuellar's thoughts in advance, raised the issue himself as a negotiating tactic and reiterated the offer he had announced on 2 January. Denktas reminded the Secretary General that the issue of reopening Varosia to Greek Cypriot settlement under UN supervision could be discussed with the resumption of the intercommunal talks and that the Turkish Cypriot side will not wait for a final solution for the implementation of an agreement that can be reached on this issue.

Denktas, who "underscored" the fact that he will not retreat from his position on Varosia, let the Secretary General know about his sensitivity about Varosia before the meeting. During a meeting the day before with James Holger, the UN Secretary General's Special Representative in Cyprus, Denktas had referred to reports that De Cuellar would bring new proposals in connection with Varosia and had emphasized that he had come to New York to discuss the Cyprus issue in all its aspects and not just Varosia.

With this advance message, Denktas sought to curb De Cuellar's initiative on Varosia. Indeed, during the meeting the Secretary General did not go over the status of Varosia in detail. Even so, he asked Denktas to help him in his initiative to realize a summit meeting and stated that a "gesture of good will" on the part of Denktas would be helpful in that regard.

According to the information obtained, while expressing his expectation for a gesture of good will, De Cuellar also said that a unilateral move by the Turkish Cypriot side will not only mitigate the adverse international reaction caused by the Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence, but also it will hold back the Greek Cypriots from taking the Cyprus problem to the UN General Assembly.

In response to this expression of expectation, Denktas "refrained himself from any commitments" and said: "We do not have a presidency system. I am not in a position to say anything on my own. When I return to Cyprus, I will discuss the issue with the government and party leaders and see what their views are." Thus, while throwing the ball in the court of the TRNC government and political parties, Denktas was indirectly telling De Cuellar that the Turkish Cypriot side could not show any flexibility without any preconditions.

During the meeting, Denktas also responded to De Cuellar's expectation that decision be withheld on the issue of a Turkish Cypriot national flag and anthem. Noting that many federated states have their own flags and national anthems, Denktas said that several examples can be cited on this issue.

It was learned that although the UN Secretary General expressed his expectation for a gesture on the issue of Varosia during the meeting, he offered no concrete guarantees in return. At the end of the meeting, Denktas told De Cuellar that he will inform the Secretary General of the results of his talks with the TRNC government and political parties. Denktas and De Cuellar left the meeting after agreeing to maintain contacts.

Following his meeting with Denktas, De Cuellar will shift the focus of his contacts on the Cyprus problem to the meeting he will hold tomorrow with the Greek Cypriot Foreign Minister, George Iacovou. It is reported that the Secretary General will convey Denktas' views to Iacovou, who is expected to arrive in New York today for his meeting with De Cuellar.

9588

CSO: 3554/193

## FEW FOREIGNERS ELECT GOVERNMENT'S RETURN PREMIUM

Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 12 Mar 84 p 3

[Text] Duesseldorf, 11 Mar--There are currently contradictory reports in circulation on the success of the Federal Government's return program for foreign workers. That is no wonder, for whereas the return premium of DM10,500 is scarcely sought, applications for the reimbursement of employee contributions to annuity insurance have almost tripled.

"So far, the Federal Government is getting off lightly," is the comment of Peter Gemaehlich, press speaker at the Federal Labor Institute in Nuremberg. He estimates at 4,300 the number of applications for return assistance that had been received at the labor offices by mid-February. Of these, 80 percent are Turks, he declares. "After 2,500 applications in January, scarcely 2,000 applied last month, although in the meantime it was mainly Turks who fairly stormed the information centers. The offer is obviously not interesting enough."

## No Interest on the Part of Spaniards and Yugoslavs

Besides, only those Yugoslavs, Portuguese, Spaniards, Tunisians, Moroccans, Koreans or Turks who were affected by unemployment or persistent short-term work after 31 October 1983 because of plant shutdowns can take advantage of the DM10,500 plus DML,500 per child. The Federal Government expects 20,000 applications, or about 100,000 repatriates with return premiums, ridiculously few in view of the 3.3 million foreigners from these countries who live here. Just a fraction seems to be interested in the offer.

The premium is interesting only in combination with other allowances such as the settlement of enterprise pensions, the premature payment of private premium savings agreements and in particular the employee portion of the contributions to statutory annuity insurance, as is also foreseen in the law in support of repatriation. After an 8-year stay, a foreigner can take about DM16,000 out of annuity insurance alone. Because of bilateral agreements, however, Yugoslavs and Spaniards have no right to reimbursement of contributions.



The Land Insurance Institute for statutory annuity insurance in Wuerzburg has registered a veritable flood of applications since January. This office is responsible for reimbursing Portuguese for their contributions. The number of applications has tripled since the return assistance went into effect, and 3,000 were presented in February alone, even though employees in the insurance office advised interested Portuguese against it.

"Most of the Portuguese who are willing to return home have already been in Germany for a very long time and just about have their pensions paid for," explains Guenther Himrich, responsible for the payments of the Land Insurance Institute. "In part, therefore, they have substantial repayment claims." On the average, DM20,000 was transferred home per claimant last year. He attributes the fact that the Portuguese prefer to receive a lump-sum payment of their future pension to their fear of political changes in the FRG. "They would rather have their sparrow in the hand representing reimbursement than two in the bush representing a pension." Another factor may well be the fact that in their homeland the pension would be paid out in inferior Portuguese currency, whereas the reimbursement of contributions can be brought back home in hard German marks.

#### Earlier Pension Recipients Than Their Countrymen

Foreign-exchange problems also play an important role in the case of the Turks, who are first in the number of applications with 25,000. Through the assistance, the number of applications jumped from 2,900 per month to more than 8,000 in February alone. The trend continues to be upward.

Thanks to a corresponding loosening of the quite strict Turkish foreign-exchange regulations, the Turks can deposit the refunded sums into a foreign-exchange account in Turkey. In Turkey itself, however, they can avail themselves of this currency only after converting it into national currency at an unfavorable rate. For this reason, many purchase material assets in the FRG, which can then be brought into Turkey with no great difficulties or costs. However, since the return premium and contributions cannot be paid out until after returning to their native country, some have already resorted to conveyance contracts with credit sharks, who exploit their plight shamelessly. The Land Insurance Institute in Bayreuth has already paid out DM108.4 million to Turks, who are also permitted to use this money to pay into the annuity insurance program in their homeland. Then, for example, they have the advantage over their countrymen who stayed home of an earlier pension start.

In the eyes of the critics, the return help can become downright blackmail when an enterprise decides to pay an additional premium. That was precisely the way that the Duisburg works of the Mannesmann steel firm made headlines. The plant had given about 1,000 Turkish workers the option of choosing between leaving the country within a month with return assistance and an additional premium of not less than DM70,000 or becoming unemployed. More than 900 accepted the offer.



Applications are multiplying in the Federal Miners Association as well. There is still no accurate overview. But it is said that 700 Turks at Bergbau AG Lippe and another 600 at BAG Westphalia are already seriously interested in returning home.

Thus with careful addition, the number of applications for reimbursement of contributions already amounts to more than 30,000. Most of them should be approved, whereas of the somewhat over 4,000 applications for the return premium, almost 30 percent had to be turned down. To the extent that the Federal Government is providing funds, then the return aid is a flop. In the case of the reimbursements, on the other hand, the estimated number of 55,000 disbursements for an estimated DM700 million is near at hand. Is that what the Federal Government wanted--to start a limited repatriation boom itself costing the government little and, although a heavy drain on the statutory annuity insurance in the short term, providing relief in pension payments in the long term? Was it just a matter of putting an end to the uncertainty of those foreigners willing to return but still waiting?

The expectations of foreigners, at least, ought not to be permanently broken. Meanwhile, the Federal Labor Ministry can expect more than just demands for an extension of the time periods of the return program. The last application has to be presented by the end of June and the last bag must have left the country by the end of September.

#### Already Thoughts in Bonn on Changes

Meanwhile, Theo Waigel, chairman of the CSU Land group in the Bundestag also demanded an increase in the return premium. The Federal Labor Ministry as well seems to be in favor of extending the allowed time in exceptional cases. "A later departure could be approved when family members are still in the midst of their education," was the word in that regard. The precondition, however, is timely application. But apparently there is already intensive thinking about postponing this date and expanding the entitled circle of persons.

9746

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## COMMUNIST YOUTH MOVEMENT (MJCF) CONGRESS OPENING STATEMENT

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 9 Mar 84 pp 6-7

[Article by Jean-Pierre Vaudon and Jean-Paul Debest]

[Excerpt] We are publishing below the main passages in the opening statement delivered by Jacques Perreux, national secretary of the Communist Youth Movement.

"Egotists, conformists, the alienated, materialists (base materialists implied), the spoiled, individualists, the apathetic, amorphous or cynical, 'cool cats,' punks, drug addicts or starving young cadres, marginal individuals or technocrats, the apolitical or rightist--do you recognize yourself? No? It is nonetheless about you, about us, about the young people in our country that these terms are used. Not a week passes that they do not take our pulse, look deep into our eyes, test us and psychoanalyze us. And in the final analysis, the problem is understood, the diagnosis and the verdict are not subject to appeal, the young aren't what they once were, and are not worth much.

But what is this way of studying us, testing us, as if we were animals in a laboratory or the last surviving natives in the forest of Fontainebleau? Why do they fix on us in order to publicly show such condescension, paternalism, indeed mistrust? What are these ready-made images they attach to you?

And what about this chitchat which rubs elbows with racism? And who do they take themselves for, these employers who find us lazy, these upstarts who call you pushy and these oldsters pushing 70 who loll about on the fringes of political life and term us indifferent and incapable of great ideals?

If one were to listen to them, it would tell the other generations that there is nothing good about youth. Nothing to be expected of it. Neither of the future it represents nor the questions it poses. Skills? Advancement? More humane work? These would only be pretexts to avoid work.

Change schools? But this would be useless, since the young of today reject all institutions.

The result of politicians' schemes? Of general staffs which decide everything? But the young people of today no longer believe in anything. Good citizens, do not look further, and above all, ask no questions about society, about what isn't working--it is the young people who are degenerating! (...)

Are the secondary school students who filled out the AVANT-GARDE questionnaire conformists? Listen to them. Jean-Paul is in the second year: 'There must be more apprenticeships in enterprises, and modernization of the tools of labor in the workshop.' Franck. 'Schools should teach us the vocations of the present day.' (...)

Is Marion, a young office employee, indifferent? 'We should feel more useful in our jobs, which should be less repetitive and less chopped up, so that we could follow a matter from beginning to end.' (...)

Are the 3,000 young people in Belfort who collected 20 million for Upper Volta individualistic and egotistical? Is that true of the students who have departed for Cuba or Nazareth?

What about the 1,000 secondary school students from Paul-Eluard to Saint-Denis who participated together in demonstrating solidarity with Nicaragua?

Is Dominique Dejour, a doctor who has been caring for the people for 14 months now, an egotist? Is Pierre Grosjean, who was assassinated by Reagan's mercenaries in the village where he was providing aid?

Are the 500,000 who marched for peace in Vincennes egocentric? (...)

And yet, there is almost never any mention of them on television or the radio or in the majority of the major newspapers. Is there fear of contagion?

Is there fear that this will not fit into the black-and-white definition established?

And please don't tell us that everyone acts, but it is easier to get into the news in this country if one sets fire to a vehicle or mugs someone in the subway than if one engages in a struggle. (...)

I do not say there are no problems. It is not the Communist Youth Movement of France which can be criticized for neglecting phenomena such as drugs or delinquency. We were frequently accused of every bad thing 5 years ago, when we appealed for a reaction to these destructive traps. (...)

We for our part are not seeking to embellish reality, but are seeking a way to change it. (...)

#### Putting An End to the Dull Life

It is also too easy to say that young people are not interested in anything when one is not interested in them. Or to speak of their despair, the evils in their lives, without wondering "who is listening to them?" Or where can they be heard?

We see clearly and feel that many things are possible and need doing. That is what millions of us were trying to say when we participated in driving the right wing out in 1981.

This was in order to put an end to the dull and monotonous life, the wasted life. It was to put an end to the law of victory for the richest, to the mistrust and racism directed against the young, the 'children should be seen and not heard' syndrome, to the monopoly on our life by a few.

It was also in order to put an end to those who praised Pinochet! Those who sent the paratroopers to Kolwezi, who supported the shah of Iran, South Africa and Bokassa and refused aid to Nicaragua. Yes, we paid dear, very dear, for their reign, and we do not want them to come back, for this would be worse still. (...)

To speak the truth, in desiring all of this, we are seeking another life, a life which really allows enjoyment of the benefits of our era. A life which creates relations among us which are richer, more diversified, more human. In which one can have recourse to imagination, to a spirit of initiative, in which everything is not decided once and for all in advance. We want to play our role in adventure, decision and happiness, to be more comfortable, to be masters of our fate without fearing criticism, without keeping silent about our boldest dreams. Finally, what we are seeking is a society in which we can take our place. Our place as young people, in which our ideas, our questions are heard. Our own place, as individuals. This society cannot be that which we know today, with its injustices and its exploiters. It must be changed to permit each individual to choose, to choose his life, to develop all his capabilities, his intelligence and his talent. A society which invents and innovates, which is constantly seeking, thanks to the participation of its members. In other words, a society in which life is not standardized, a society in which men live in a spirit of cooperation, solidarity and tolerance. (...)

We want a society which is self-administered by independent, free and responsible men and women. A society in which the young are not mistrusted. A society in which one is not suspect simply because he is 20. A society in which it is no longer said 'too bad you are too young,' but instead, 'what good luck for society!' (...)

#### Peace in a More Human World

We want a world liberated from hunger and underdevelopment. The right to life! To work! To housing! To health! To culture! To education! We are ready to take immediate action! Young doctors, teachers, technicians and nurses--we are ready to participate in cooperative action.

We are ready to organize in our high schools, our university faculties, our towns and our enterprises, with major contributions to assist in the achievement of irrigation, school equipment and hospital projects.

We cannot envisage our happiness in a world torn by drama or violence.

We find ourselves quite naturally on the side of all those struggling for a more human world. And first and foremost all of those men and women, whoever they may be, from New York to Moscow, from Rome to Berlin, who are demonstrating for peace and disarmament. (...)

I know that it is popular to insult the pacifists throughout the world, to call them irresponsible, lazy or traitorous. For our part we believe that they are the hope and the logic of mankind. It is those who put their political ideas above the interests of peace who are irresponsible. It is those who let Hitler rearm and prepare for World War II who were traitors in the past, and today it is those who howl with the wolves. (...)

#### Youthful Whims

It is this desire for a new world designed for peace and friendship and not for hatred and death, for happiness rather than hunger, poverty and disease, designed for freedom and independence and not for subjection to military force which leads us to appeal to all those men and women who share these convictions, this thirst for life, and whatever their ideas may be, moreover, to prepare with us for the 12th World Youth and Student Festival which is to be held in Moscow in 1985. (...)

That we seek to understand, that we pursue our search, that we proceed by elimination to live happily--is this too much to ask for our country? (...)

What we want is not a youthful whim which will pass as we grow older. Our future and that of the country are merged: the two are linked and develop together--why then is life thus? Some say 'but this is the price of progress in the sciences and technology.' It is said for example that 'if one robot can do the work of 10 men, inevitably those 10 will be unemployed.' It is true that robots replace men, that is their purpose. But do they necessarily mean unemployment? Let us see. (...)

No, there is still a great deal to be done. And to speak of overstaffing in a world which suffers from hunger and so many needs is simplistic and monumental stupidity. And if robots alone can produce such wealth, well then, this means that one can work less time for the same wages.

But above all, if they replace men, cannot these men be used for other tasks? First of all, because alongside robot technology, new professions are developing, such as all those involved in maintenance, training or organization of the work, the vocations pertaining to analysis, automation, etc.

And also, new sectors need these workers liberated by technology. These include chemistry, biotechnology and bio-industry, communications and energy. Thus robots can do the harder work, the more painful tasks, and shorten work time, but do not steal men's jobs. Naturally, it is necessary to adapt and retrain. But that is all right, and young people will not cease to demand it. (...)

If there is no explanation for our situation, then, if it is dictated neither by oil or progress, what remains as possible? (...)"

Jacques Perreux then pointed out that a small minority of the population in France is for its part profiting from the current situation. It includes in particular the 110,000 families which control 150 trillion, representing 20

percent of the national income, 68 percent of enterprise stock, 48 percent of the businesses, 45 percent of the housing facilities and 20 percent of the forests. In passing, he mentioned the Peugeot brothers, Francois Michelin, the Seydoux family, Simone Veil and her Giscard loan; for them, inflation and the need for money are but empty phrases. "Long live the crisis" is their favorite slogan. And Jacques Perreux went on to say:

#### A Vast Monopoly

"For them, the world is a vast monopoly. Let us ask ourselves why the only countries without unemployment are those where these people do not make the law? Are we jealous because some miracle exempted them from the crisis? Or because they manage better? No! This money produced by our work and our country are like two great linked vessels--everything we do not have flows toward them. Communicating vessels, when they get their money from the work of others. (...)

The richer they are, the less there is for us. And thus the barkers who peddle the crisis and want to make us believe that we are all in the same boat--they have another think coming! There is nothing on our faces to mark us as suckers! Enough of this! A choice must be made between them and us! It is high time that the money flowed a little in the other direction, is it not? Toward jobs, toward skills, schools, housing, health, sports and culture. (...)

And these are the same men who are spoiling our world for us. Hunger, poverty, illiteracy--it is they who are mainly responsible." Jacques Perreux then listed the responsibilities which fall to imperialism for the maintenance of poverty in the countries of the Third World. And this while some of these countries have on their territory or in their subsoil vast wealth. He recalled the role of the multinational companies, which take juicy profits out of the countries where they establish their businesses, subsequently re-exporting to other places, leaving only a few crumbs and a completely disorganized economy, incapable of feeding the population.

"The shortage of grains could provide the United States with power such as it has never known. It gives it the power of life and death over the fate of the less fortunate. Food is a weapon. Now it is one of our main tools in the course of our negotiations.

I believe this needs no further commentary.

#### Made in the USA

The rights of man? Ah--I see it coming: in the East, man has no rights! In the West, man has every right. Unemployment, poverty and slums--these have nothing to do with the rights of man!

In which country are there lines hundreds of yards long made up of people who want food?



In Poland, yes, it is true, in front of certain stores, but this is in order to buy this or that product for which there are supply or production difficulties.

On the other hand, in the United States, a country of abundance where food is so readily obtained, where dollars are given away and no one even waits for the change in advertising campaigns--well in that country, there are 22 million Americans lining up because they have not a single dollar, indeed, not even a few cents in their pockets. They line up at the soup kitchens in each city, in lines hundreds of yards long you never see on television.

In what country must you reveal your political opinions in order to obtain a visa? In the United States. While worrying about whether you have a venereal disease, they ask you if you do not suffer from that other illness, doubtless equally contagious--being a communist. If you say yes, there is an investigation and most frequently you are denied a visa. And note that the concept of communism in the United States is very broad. So it was that the widow of President Allende, the Italian actor Dario Fo, Nobel Prize for literature winner Gabriel Garcia Marquez, the Irish Republican Deputy Owen Carron, and Anne-Marie Matheos were refused visas. In what country has the Conference of Mayors reported that hunger is the No 1 problem in the cities? It is again the United States. In what country do the government employees handling classified information have to submit to lie detector tests? It is in the United States that they are questioned with the aid of an apparatus which classifies a subject who becomes emotional or perspires as a potential suspect. One cannot halt progress! Which is the city and the country where a curfew was ordered last year? It was Detroit, in the United States, where those under 20 years of age were forbidden to go out at night, after the Chrysler plant had brutally dismissed 20,000 workers. I will wager with you that if you pick up your telephone and ask the television personalities in what country this occurred they will answer in chorus: 'Gulag! Gulag! Gulag!'

Then before you hang up, tell them this: It looked like it, it tasted and smelled like it, but the answer is the United States! Yes, definitely, these ready-made ideas are suspect, for they can trick us. (...)

What about women? The United States is one of the few countries where the law provides that women have fewer rights than men. And freedoms? When employers can no longer prevent the organization of a union in an enterprise, there will be only one, and all the workers must join it within the month, on pain of dismissal. A nation of free thought? The communists are legally regarded as spies and are persecuted. In some states, doctors have been forced to resign from hospital staffs because they admitted they were not believers. Prayer is imposed in the public schools, as is the daily pledge of allegiance to the flag, and, hands on their hearts, all the students sing the national anthem, thanking America for the freedom which provides its benefits to everyone. One can understand why Americans have such great need to let off steam on Saturday night. The country where the merits of each individual are recognized? NASA dismisses its scholars as soon as it no longer needs them. The nation of the new way of life? This is one of the few where it is usual for personnel dismissed from their jobs to sleep in

their cars, where workers pay out a third of their wages to invest in the enterprise, instead of the owner, and where unions allow new employees to be taken on at wages reduced by half. It may be the country of Colombo and Travolta, but it is not in any case a vanguard nation.

What To Do?

No, it is not the young people who believe that change is not happening fast enough who can want to live like that. This does not lead us to reject this country or this people. Particularly since the men, women and young people are fighting there for more freedom. And also, it is possible to adore and enjoy seeing American films, listening to rock music, skating, drinking Coca-Cola, wearing blue jeans, dancing the Smurf, if one wants, without, therefore, inevitably being Americanized. We have our own personality, culture and ideas, which come from our own history, and we do not want, at a time when we are rejecting the standardized life and defending regional cultures, to see them disappear. We are neither Americans nor Soviets nor Germans. We are French. (...)

Now that we see what is happening to us, then, what must we do? Act. (...)

In truth, we do not have much choice. Not to act is to let them--the big-wigs, the capitalists--act and make the law. What possibilities remain for us? Bemoaning our lot, retreating within the Walkman earphones, suffering, suffering all day long and all life long and seeking a few minutes of respite in music in the evening.

Or, would it not be better to refuse to suffer, to abandon one's rights, dignity and hopes, deciding that one is capable of creating the life one wants to have oneself and of making oneself respected? To act is to know that one has only one life and that no one will waste it for us. (...)

For if we struggle, it is not just to stir ourselves up and to make noise, but to win and to obtain satisfaction. (...)

Will we be alone in wanting to change our lives? No! Millions of young people also aspire to this and can join with those who are already fighting, the millions of workers. (...)

Socialism French-Style

Indeed, they sometimes fail to understand us very well, and they find the questions which we sometimes regard as important as secondary, and vice versa, but just because we are different does not mean we cannot understand each other. The owners would be only too happy if we failed. (...)

We are told to stay out of politics, above all--we could be burned. It is true that when one sees Giscard or Chirac gathering young people together not to talk about them, but to announce their next political schemes, it does not make politics very attractive.



Just like these people who wake up just before the elections to talk about youth. It is also true that observing certain confrontations which appear to be totally unrelated to our problems, one tends to be indifferent. (...)

They are the only politicians who do not complain about the youth of today, which is not as good as that of the past, just as they are the only ones to discuss our problems seriously. No, in our view, they are not like the others. They do not tell us to vote for them and let them take care of things. On the contrary, they are always telling us to act and assume our responsibilities.

Visibly, moreover, in the eyes of others as well as ourselves, this is not a party exactly like the others. One need only listen to their irritation as soon as the subject comes up. Visibly, these people are a nuisance. (...) Why is there such an uproar about these people who are so uninteresting, and whose ideas are so outdated? Might not it be because basically, they are first of all men and women, like everyone else? (...)

Basically, they are a little bit like us: they disturb right-thinking society, small and larger habits. For the value of money, they substitute that of men and their needs.

With regard to the habit of expecting the general staffs to do everything, they assign the main role to the people. And like the young people, they are thinking of another society, based on human values, new relations, breaking out of the yoke of the law of the richest. This is what they call socialism French-style, or self-managing socialism. (...)

The JC [Communist Youth] and the UEC [Union of Communist Students] are available to help young people to profit from the potential offered by our era. (...)

We do not engage in politics in the way one enters into orders, nor as experts. We are young people like all the others, as can be seen every day in our 1530 circles. Ours is a house of slamming doors: people come, people go, each one serving as a function of what he wants. (...)

5157

CSO: 3519/246

## ORGANIZATIONS, FOREIGN YOUTH MOVEMENTS AT MJCF CONGRESS

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 9 Mar 84 p 7

[Text] Some 20 French organizations are participating in the work of the Congress. The PCF [French Communist Party] is represented by Georges Marchais, secretary general, Gisele Moreau, Rene Le Guen, Jean-Claude Gayssot, all members of the Political Bureau, Marcel Zaidner, a member of the Central Committee, Francois Asensi, secretary of the Seine-Saint-Denis federation, and Jacques Isabet, the mayor of Pantin.

The CGT [General Confederation of Labor] is represented by Rene Lomet, secretary of the confederation, and its Central Youth Confederation (CCJ). We should also mention the National Union of French Students (UNEF), the Union of Higher Professional Schools (UGE), the Federation of University Residents (FRUF), the Pioneers of France, the Movement of Socialist Youth, Youth Vacation Activities (LVJ), the French Teaching League, the National Environmental Struggle Movement, the National Committee of Youth and Popular Education Associations (CNA-JEP), the ANECR and Tourism and Labor.

## International Representatives

Representatives came from Afghanistan (Democratic Youth), South Africa (ANC [African National Congress of South Africa]), Algeria (National Union of Algerian Youth), Angola (JMPLA [Youth Movement of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola]), Argentina (Communist Youth), Belgium (Communist Youth), Brazil (Communist Youth), Bulgaria (Komsomol Dimitrov), Chile (Communist Youth), China (Communist Youth League), Congo (UJSC [Union of Congolese Socialist Youth]), Korea (Socialist Union of Working Youth), Cuba (Union of Young Communists), Denmark (DKU), Spain (Union of Communist Youth), Ethiopia (REYA), and Finland (Democratic Youth League).

There are also representatives from Greece (KNE Communist Youth), Grenada (New Jewel Movement), Guatemala (URNG [Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity]), Great Britain (two delegates from Greenham Common), Upper Volta (CDR [Committee for the Defense of the Revolution] Youth), Hungary (Communist Youth), Iran (Tudeh Youth), Italy (Communist Youth Federation), Japan (League of Democratic Youth), Laos (Revolutionary People's Youth), Lebanon (UJDL), Mexico (PSUM [Unified Socialist Party of Mexico]), Nicaragua (Sandinist Youth), Namibia (SWAPO [South-West African People's Organization]), Palestine (PLO), Poland (Federation of Socialist Union of Polish Youth) and Portugal (Communist Youth).

Representatives are also participating from the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic (POLISARIO Front [Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro] Youth), the GDR (FDJ [Free German Youth]), FRG (German Socialist Workers Youth, the JUSO and the Greens), Romania (Communist Youth), El Salvador (Farabundo Marti Front), Czechoslovakia (Socialist Youth Union), Turkey (IGD), Uruguay (Communist Youth), USSR (Leninist Komsomol) and the USA (National Union of Communist Youth Organizations).

Representatives have also come from Vietnam (Ho Chi Minh Youth), Yemen (Socialist Youth), Yugoslavia (Socialist Youth Union), the World Federation of Democratic Youth and the Pan-African Youth Movement.

Messages were sent from Cambodia (Kampuchean Youth), Mongolia (Communist Youth), Madagascar (AKFM [Congress Party for Malagasy Independence]), Israel (Communist Youth League) and Italy (COMISO Peace Committee).

5157

CSO: 3519/246

## COMMUNIST YOUTH (MJCF) TO BUILD SCHOOL IN NICARAGUA

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 27 Feb 84 p 5

[Interview with Rudy Vigier, member of the National Bureau of the French Communist Youth Movement (MJCF), by Jean-Paul Debest; date and place not given]

[Text] On 11 March, the concluding day of its congress, the French Communist Youth Movement will officially launch its campaign on the theme "A School for Nicaragua." We talked with Rudy Vigier, a member of the National Bureau of the MJCF, about the preparations for and implementation of this project, for which he has just completed arrangements with the secretary general of the Nicaraguan Ministry of Education and the Sandinist Youth Movement.

[Question] Since the revolution occurred in 1979, the communist youth have been expressing their solidarity with Nicaragua. Already this year, two students from the UEC [Union of Communist Students] have been taking part in the first literacy campaign. Subsequently, several major solicitation campaigns have been carried out, the last of them on the theme "1,000 Pencils and 1,000 Notebooks for Nicaragua." Moreover, Dominique Dejour, a member of the JC [Communist Youth], has been there serving as a doctor for a year. You are undertaking a new solidarity campaign, then.

Rudy Vigier: It is a totally unprecedented program which we will carry out this year. For 4 months, the young French communists, about 100 in all, will work in teams building six classrooms in the La Paz de Oriente region in the province of Carazo, which is to the south of Managua and toward the Pacific Ocean.

When I say build, this is truly what is involved. Working on the site for 8 or 9 hours a day in teams of 10 or so, the young boys and girls, half of them professionals and half without special training, will work for a month constructing a two-classroom building in each of three rural communities--El Mojon, El Recodero and La Enramara.

There is no hotel there, but the students will be lodged separately by the peasants, sharing all aspects of their life during the length of their stay.

[Question] Why is the JC undertaking this project now?

Rudy Vigier: First of all, because the Nicaraguan people need it. "Health and education are the two decisive issues in attempting to bring a country

like Nicaragua out of underdevelopment," the secretary general of the Ministry of Education, with whom I met last week, told me.

I will mention only a few figures pertaining to the priority given education. In 1979, before the revolution, 500,000 young people were enrolled in school. Currently, there are more than a million. Then there were 2,800 schools, while there are now more than 6,000 and building is continuing. The literacy rate was 50 percent, while now only 12 percent cannot read and write. That having been said, the needs remain vast. Our project comes within the program drafted by the country's authorities. In October, thanks to us, 200 students will begin the school year in "their" classroom.

Thus this project represents the ever-increasing desire of the young people to do something concrete. This is true in the various aspects of their lives, including jobs, wages and training, and it holds true for international solidarity. During the day and evening solidarity with Nicaragua sessions, many young people often ask us: "But what can we do to help them?"

Nothing is more concrete than building schoolrooms. And in addition, what an adventure!

After we publicized this campaign, we received tens of telephone calls from JC federations and circles asking us about the practical procedures.

[Question] Such a venture requires funds. How will you raise them?

Rudy Vigier: In fact, we are already doing this. For some years, Nicaragua has been one aspect of the JC activities. Each solidarity undertaking involves a collection. For example, following his last trip to France, Dominique Dejour took back with him more than 12,000 francs.

The official date for the launching of the campaign is 11 March. Throughout the Paris region the 1,500 delegates will interrupt the morning session of the Congress. In the markets, on the buses, and at stands selling L'HUMANITE DIMANCHE, they will speak to the workers. By means of exhibits, collections of pictures and animated illustrations, they will publicize the stamp we have issued on this occasion. The circles will carry out the same work throughout the country.

At the reception with which the Congress will conclude, we will present the Sandinist Youth delegates with a first check representing the proceeds of this collection. For an exceptional project, there will be an exceptional launching.

Subsequently, each JC organization will plan as many opportunities as possible for expressing solidarity with the Nicaraguan people.

5157

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## BACKGROUNDS OF ND PARTY 'REBELS'

Athens TO VIMA TIS KYRIAKIS in Greek 29 Jan 84 p 2

[Passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] Who are the famous "renovating" ND deputies who are often found in the forefront of current events?

The "trusted circle" of the "renovating" ND deputies is made up of the following:

- /1. Avramidis, Alexandros/ (1927). Former merchant marine captain, Ph.D. from ASOEE [Supreme School of Economic and Commercial Sciences]. Did postgraduate work in nautical technology in France. Deputy from Kilkis since 1974. Deputy minister of nation defense (1978-1981). Son of former general and EK [Center Union Party] deputy Khr. Avramidis, who was minister in the rebel government of St. Stefanopoulos. Father of one son and one daughter.
- /2. Anastasopoulos, Nikos/ (1944). Gynecologist. EREN [National Radical Youth Union] member as a medical student. President of the Obstetrics and Gynecological Society and "unrepentantly pro-Rallis." Married. Deputy from Messinia since 1974.
- /3. Andrianopoulos, Andreas/ (1946). Studied political science in Athens and comparative government at the universities of Ken [transliteration, probably Caen] and Cambridge. Nephew of ERE [National Radical Union] minister G. Andrianopoulos. Deputy from Piraeus since 1974 and "theoretician" of the group. Since 1976 successively deputy minister for government services, deputy minister of foreign affairs, and minister of civilization and sciences. In disagreement.
- /4. Vrettakos, Dimitrios/ (1933). Studied law in Athens. Son of a political family in Laconia with far-right "militant lineage." Deputy from the Athens Second District in 1974 and 1981, and from 1977 to 1981 general director of the National Foundation "Vasileys Pavlos." Father of one son and one daughter.
- /5. Gatsos, Theofilos/ (1930). Studied medicine at Salonica. Deputy from Pella in 1981. Father of four sons.



/6. Giatrakos, Konstandinos/ (1936). Economist. Studied at Paris and MIT. Scion of a political family. Deputy from Laconia in 1974 on the "EK-ND" ticket, and after the 1977 elections part of the "expansion." Economic advisor at the Greek Embassy in Washington until 1981. Deputy from Messinia in 1981 and father of two sons.

/7. Evert, Miltiadis/ (1939). Economist. Studied at ASOEE and did postgraduate studies in England. Member of EREN. Was economic advisor to the Bank of Commerce and the shipyards at Elefsina. Deputy from the Athens First District since 1974. Father of two girls. Since 1976 successively deputy minister of finance, minister of industry, and minister of finance. Son of police chief Angelos Evert.

/8. Kalandzakos, Aristeidis/ (1928). Studied law at Athens and the University of Tubingen where he took his doctorate. Studied political science and economics at the universities in Paris and Nancy. Nephew of deputy and "toparch" of Messinia Al. Kalandzakos. Married and the father of a daughter. Deputy from Messinia since 1958, elected continuously. Deputy minister of finance during the Kanellopoulos government (April 1967), deputy minister of coordination (1976-1981), and minister of commerce (1980-1981). The only formerly "pro-Averof" member of the group.

/9. Kaltetziotis, Nikos/ (1942). Civil engineer. Cadre of EREN at the Polytechnic. Son of deputy from Arkadia Kon. Kaltetziotis. Deputy from Arkadia since 1974 and deputy minister of education (1980-1981). Has two daughters.

/10. Kondogiannopoulos, Vasilis/ (1942). Studied law at Athens and Paris. Son of right-wing deputy from Ileia Nik. Kondogiannopoulos. "Longest-lived" deputy minister of education (1976-1981). Deputy from Ileia since 1974. Father of a daughter and among the primary "theoreticians"--along with A. Andrianopoulos--of the "renewal" of the Greek Right.

/11. Livanos, Dionysis/ (1934). Studied political science and economics at the Pandeios Supreme School of Political Sciences and at Salonica University, and law and political science at Oxford. Nephew of former prime minister P. Kanellopoulos. Publisher and director of the right-wing newspaper NIKI (1962-1967). In August 1974 became secretary general of the Ministry of Commerce. Elected deputy from Aitolokarnania in 1974 and 1981. Secretary General of the Ministry of Coordination 1980-1981. Father of two sons.

/12. Bekiris, Vasilis/ (1936). Studied at the Pandeios Supreme School of Political Sciences and studied law at Salonica. Was director of the politburo of ERE head Pan. Kanellopoulos in 1965-1967. Deputy from Achaia since 1974. Father of four sons.

/13. Psarouda-Benaki, Anna (1934). Studied law at Athens and earned a doctorate at the University of Bonn. Temporary professor of penal law at the Athens University Law School. Deputy from Epikrateia in 1981. Married.

/14. Bletsas, Stelios/ (1937). Studied law at Salonica. ERE cadre. Deputy from Rodopi since 1974. Father of one son and one daughter.

- /15. Panagiotopoulos, Giorgos/ (1930). Studied law at Athens. Son of right-wing deputy from Kavala Nik. Panagiotopoulos. Elected deputy from Kavala since 1974. Deputy minister of commerce (1974-1977), minister of commerce (1977-1980), and minister of communications (1980-1981). Father of one son and one daughter.
- /16. Papadimitriou, Eleftherios/ (1948). Studied law and economics at ASOEE and the University of Athens. Earned a master's degree in economics from New York University. A leading cadre of ONNEED [Youth Organization of the ND]. Father of a son. Deputy from Arta.
- /17. Papaligouras, Anastasis (1948). Studied law at the University of Athens and took a master's from the University of Brounel [transliteration] in London. Son of former minister P. Papaligouras and son-in-law of former prime minister G. Rallis. Deputy from Korinthos since 1981.
- /18. Paulidis, Aristotelis/ (1943). Studied physicomathematics at the University of Athens and business administration at the Polytechnic in London. Deputy from the Dodekanisos since 1977. Divorced.
- /19. Prindzos, Konstandinos/ (1940). Studied medicine at Athens. Cadre of EREN. Deputy from Magnisia since 1977. Father of two daughters.
- /20. Souflias, Georgios/ (1941). Studied at the Polytechnic in Salonica. Deputy minister of the interior (1977-1980) and of coordination (1980-1981). Father of a daughter. Deputy from Larisa.
- /21. Tataridis, Stavros/ (1943). Studied economics and planning at the University of Massachusetts. Deputy from Evros since 1974. Deputy minister of agriculture (1977-1980) and commerce (1980-1981).
- /22. Tzannetakis, Tzannis/ (1927). Retired PN [navy] officer. Studied at the School for Apprentices (1945-1949), an electronics school in the United States (1959), and the War School (1967). Secretary general of EOT [Greek Tourist Organization] (1974-1977) and deputy from Athens First District since 1977. Candidate for mayor of Athens in 1981.

11587

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## WIDE-RANGING TALK BY ND'S MITSOTAKIS

Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 23 Feb 84 p 5

[Text] The nonexistence of Greek foreign policy or else its injuriousness--where it is pursued at all--was noted yesterday in a wide-ranging speech to the Association of Foreign Press Correspondents by the former minister of foreign affairs and parliamentary representative of the New Democracy Party, K. Mitsotakis.

Mitsotakis began his talk by saying that "for 27 months we have been witnessing a series of acts lacking coherence, lacking any internal connection, and without consistency, which are such that we cannot speak about an organized whole--that is, about a policy in the true sense of the term. As is known, zero multiplied by any number gives zero, and this is essentially the situation which we face today in the foreign sector.

"The other day, the otherwise very sympathetic Kharalambopoulos said to us in the Chamber of Deputies that since we ourselves have different perceptions--that is, blinkers--we do not want to understand the deeper meaning of the government's foreign policy. I want to assure him that he is wrong. We are trying, but we cannot manage to do this. Like PASOK, we ourselves want to, but we cannot!

"A foreign policy"--continued Mitsotakis--"without international support cannot work. The 'enfant terrible' of our foreign policy, K. Kapsis, said to us in the Chamber of Deputies that Greece--that is, the Greek people--has as its supporter...the Greek people. This saying is certainly perspicacious. Nobody disputes it, but unfortunately nobody agrees with this stand either. Neither neighboring Turkey, nor other countries with much greater power and influence than our own, such as the Soviet Union or the United States for example, which are struggling to acquire even greater influence--that is, to acquire even more international support. We ourselves, since we perceive that this is superfluous for us, are losing such supporters daily without replacing them with new ones."

And he added:

"To tell the truth, the PASOK government has not changed any of the basic choices made by the New Democracy. It has not changed the basic orientation of our foreign policy. It has remained in NATO and has not withdrawn

from the EEC. And very properly so. This is not the reason why we are in disagreement with it. Where we differ is in the fact that whereas it has carried on with our own choices and consequently one would expect that it would be cultivating our traditional friendships--it has done and is doing what it can to weaken them, to sow doubt among friends and enemies about our true intentions and to spread confusion, uncertainty, and anxiety among the Greek people themselves. But in this way it is leading the country into isolation and disrepute even within the framework of our alliances and the international organizations in which we are still a member."

#### The 6-month Postponement

Next he examined another...success of Papandreou's foreign policy:

"In 1983, without consulting anyone, we submit our well-known proposal for a 6-month delay in the stationing of the American Euromissiles, which is rejected within 24 hours by all the allies. This success encourages us to again submit it unofficially to the EEC council, which refuses to even discuss it. A triumph for the Greek chairmanship!

We go to Bucharest and sign with President Ceausescu the well-known appeal to the two superpowers for the freezing of nuclear weapons in Europe--that is, for the legitimation of the Soviet nuclear superiority. There is a new pulling of the ears of our council member in London. We convene a conference in Athens for the formation of a non-nuclear zone in the Balkans."

And after narrating the well-known events which end in last Sunday's trivial communique which lacks any substantive content, he stresses that "the Soviets have offered to guarantee a non-nuclear Balkans, without prejudice to them of course, because they will retain their missiles."

Are These Serious Affairs?

And Mitsotakis raises the question:

"Are these serious affairs? What are they aiming at, and what have they achieved? Have they improved our relations with our allies? No. We have offended the United States, Great Britain, France, and West Germany, which are the countries from which we expect some assistance on our great national problem. Have we by any chance gained the support of the Soviet Union on the Cyprus question? Once again no. The USSR was the last country to condemn the proclamation on the State of Denktas. Have we helped to reduce the tension in Europe? Certainly not. The Soviet Union continues to remain absent from both Geneva and Vienna, and our stand is not going to help in the resumption of these deliberations. In supporting the freeze on nuclear weapons, are we helping the cause of peace? Surely not, so long as we freeze the imbalance of forces which constitutes the greatest danger to peace. With the inter-Balkan conference, have we strengthened our international prestige? The answer is again no, because an unsuccessful conference does not strengthen but rather diminishes the prestige of those who took the initiative to hold it. Then what have we

achieved? Nothing. Nothing positive that is, because we have achieved much which is negative!

"Let me mention an example even in our stand toward the EEC: Prior to the elections we commenced with the slogans: "Out of the EEC" and "the EEC and NATO are the same syndicate," and subsequently went on to the referendum. Next to the renegotiations. Later to our special relationship, and we ended up with the famous memorandum which goes nowhere and which does not constitute anything new, since it is based almost completely on the 7th protocol of our accession agreement. All these things, of course, have not strengthened either our prestige or our credibility within the circles of the EEC."

#### The Cyprus Question

After pointing out various other blunders of PASOK's foreign policy, Mitsotakis continued by stressing the following concerning the Cyprus problem: "The intercommunal dialogue, it says, is not going to show results unless the Turkish occupation troops leave the island. That is, we are setting as a prerequisite--I stress the word--a condition which we know in advance will be rejected. But in this way we not only undermine the dialogue. We call into question also our own credibility. We want internationalization. But the Cyprus problem is already internationalized. Each year it is discussed in the General Assembly of the United Nations, which consists of more than 150 states. What do we want then? A more limited international body, and what would this be? Do we have in mind perhaps the Soviet proposal? But this was already rejected by Turkey a long time ago. And without the participation of Turkey, which occupies the northern portion of Cyprus, what can a general conference of limited composition do, even if it is convened with the blessings of the Soviet Union?

"The culmination of these approaches was the proclamation of the pseudo-state of Denktas."

He refers next to the quarrel between Papandreou and Kyprianou, including the famous statement "Greece cannot assume the responsibility for the developments in the Cyprus problem" and "let Kyprianou tell us at last what Cyprus wants, and I assure him I will do it!"

#### The Northern Epirotes

And he came to the issue of the strikers in northern Ipeiros.

"I must mention"--he said--the barbarous mistreatment, in violation of the Constitution and the laws, of the hunger strikers in northern Ipeiros outside the Albanian embassy, which was characterized very correctly by Averof as a disgrace to the government.

"Melina Merkouri travels unofficially to West Berlin in order to request, for "humanitarian reasons," the release of a Greek prisoner who is charged with an illegal act, and in West Berlin she causes additional displeasure

following the deplorable tale of the PASOK parliamentary delegation, which refused to visit the Berlin Wall. Hooded Turkish exiles who move about unchallenged in our country take part in marches and violently seize offices of a Turkish company. With governmental support and not merely toleration, marches are organized which head for the American embassy, with Margaret Papandreou as one of the participants. And we moved against the unfortunate hunger strikers of northern Ipeiros, who are struggling to free their families, in order to demonstrate that we respect the "international rules." We must normalize our relations with neighboring Albania. We are all in agreement on this.

"But an essential prerequisite for taking this step is the ensuring of fundamental human rights to the Greek minority in northern Ipeiros, and the freedom to communicate with them.

"Our country today"--adds Mitsotakis--"has no foreign policy. There are no guidelines, and frequently we put on an act for domestic party consumption. With the passing of time, this situation creates dangers. The Cyprus problem has entered a critical juncture. All of us are in agreement that time is working against us and that now a serious effort must be made toward a just and permanent solution within the framework of the decisions of the United Nations. The Cypriot side seems to be showing prudence and realism.

#### Greek-Turkish Relations

"And there is further the great issue of Greek-Turkish relations, which in any case influence developments in Cyprus. Now more than ever, a balance of forces in the Aegean must constitute a primary line of our foreign policy. But in parallel with this, a serious and sincere attempt must be undertaken toward dialogue and rapprochement. A chief line of our foreign policy must be Greek-Turkish friendship, so long as there is a response from the other side--something which we can, I believe, expect and hope for. Both from President Evren, who has shown that he has responsibility and reasonableness, and from the new president of the Turkish government, who undoubtedly is a realistic politician. In no case can Greek-Turkish relations be permitted to become a matter for domestic political exploitation. We must not forget the sensitivity of the other side. As in many other cases, the factor of trust is decisive with respect to Greek-Turkish relations: At the point reached by events, there are justifiable anxieties about the course of Greek-Turkish relations in the near future. The uncertainty which has existed for the last 2 years cannot continue any longer without danger."

#### Consensus Politics

Next he referred to the proposal by Boutos on pursuing a consensus policy, and he said:

"This is a major issue, and the pursuit of this objective, which is surely a proper one, is very difficult under the present circumstances. The sector in which perhaps this effort could be successful is the sector of

our foreign policy, because in this sector we do not have differences with PASOK, at least on the basic options. Provided that the government at last says straightforwardly and clearly what it believes. It should stop speaking in two different languages. One to the media and another language to the exterior. It should stop trying to deceive the people and above all it should stop being influenced in its foreign policy by domestic party considerations. Ever since the elections the New Democracy Party has dealt with foreign policy issues with a sense of responsibility. It laid aside and disregarded its narrow party interests in order to serve the more general national interests. It is not going to defect from this line now. But we consider it our duty at this time to point out to the government the dangers which are looming on the horizon and to ask it to abandon its dangerous acrobatics and to deal with our foreign issues with the seriousness and the responsibility which are necessitated by the circumstances."

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## ANALYSIS OF KKE POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS

Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 27 Feb 84 p 4

[Article by Giannis Loulis]

[Text] "For communists, in no case can any parliament be the arena for the fight to improve the standard of living of the workers....The only problem is how to use the bourgeois governmental institutions for their own destruction...."

Vl. Lenin

Recently the KKE has been systematically preparing the "ideological soil" for future cooperation with PASOK on a governmental level at last. As part of this we should include the attempt by the orthodox communists to advance moderate positions which can gradually make a KKE-PASOK "front" more and more "natural" and more broadly acceptable. With these facts in mind, one should not be surprised that (as we have noted in these columns) in Salonica Florakis passed himself off as an advocate and defender of... private enterprise. We should also treat within the same framework the sensational transformation of the KKE secretary general into an adherent of...multi-party democracy, via his interview with a pro-government afternoon newspaper.

Thus, in response to the relevant question Florakis emphatically stated, among other things: "The transition to socialism--regardless of what specific path is taken to realize it in this or that country--is democratic, since it will be based on the will of the majority of the people....All of the freedoms gained by the workers will be safeguarded and broadened, from the freedom of assembly to the freedom to choose one's own party....We are pursuing revolutionary change...by way of a peaceful path, by way of an open and free political confrontation....I repeat that in any case, the transition to socialism will come about by the will of the great majority of the Greek people....What specifically will take place, whether there will be one or many parties, will not depend solely on our own will....We aspire to take part in this transition and in building socialism with as broad a base as possible of leftist and progressive forces...."

Thus, Florakis is in favor of gaining power through elections! And in favor of safeguarding the right "to choose one's own party"-- that is, in

favor of the multi-party system! And we are told these things by the secretary general of a party: Which regards as its models those social orders of the Soviet type under "de facto totalitarianism"; which believes that these single-party and grim social orders constitute models of "democracy"; which applauds with steady and unflagging enthusiasm the brutal infringement of the most fundamental personal and civil rights in the concentration-camp societies of Marxism-Leninism. But after all these things is the leader of the KKE able to become an appraiser of democracy and the multi-party system? But of course he is....Given that his pseudo-progressive promoters naturally do not ask him these sorts of questions, and since in its attempt to "appease" the KKE, PASOK officially confers on the orthodox communists the title of "democratic party," why then should not Florakis go one better than all of us in "being democratic"? What does he have to lose?

However, it is not only its models that show us what the "democratism" of the KKE is. Nor its...sensitivity to the right of Soviet citizens to "choose their party," or of Polish workers to "expand the right of association." This democratism is illustrated to us by the official texts of the KKE themselves, which Florakis did not remember to mention, nor (of course) was he reminded of them in his interview....But what do these texts say?

For example, let us examine the previous positions of the KKE--especially of its 10th but also of its 9th congress--where its aspirations were presented much more crudely (although always somewhat disguisedly) than the way which Florakis presents them today. As the 10th Congress stressed, according to the KKE the transition to socialism will be realized in two stages: The first is called "the democracy of the people" and it will be "anti-imperialistic," "anti-monopolistic." The second is the "rule of socialist democracy"--that is, our familiar "dictatorship of the proletariat" (or in other words the social orders of existing socialism-totalitarianism). But what do these two stages "provide"?

1) According to the KKE, the "social order of the democracy of the people will be directed against international imperialism and the local oligarchy and against the spokesmen of their interests in all sectors of our country's life."

Thus it is obvious that the new social order, together with all its mechanisms, will oppose (at least) every non-leftist party. Because as is known, according to the KKE the New Democracy is considered to be "a representative of the interests of the Greek oligarchy, of the foreign and local monopolies," while the centrist configurations also have been denounced as "spokesmen of interests of some of the monopolies." Of course, it is not explained by the KKE precisely what the means are which this "democracy (??) of the people" will use against these party representatives of the "oligarchy," in all sectors of our life even! But here we do not need to resort to our imagination. After all we know what fate was in store for these parties in those social orders which the KKE has as its models. And how "democratic" the "democracy of the people" will be is evident also from the expectation (still according to the 10th

Congress of the KKE) that this social order will take care to "counteract every effort of the domestic oligarchy to reestablish its regime." In short, after the "democracy of the people" no longer is there any...turning back from the socialist one-way street.

2) Of course the first stage of the "democracy of the people" is the most "temperate." The second, the "dictatorship of the proletariat" (or "socialist democracy") is obviously a purer and more unvarnished form of communist social order. Of course, this social order has no relation to multiparty democracy as we experience it in the West, which the KKE denounces as a..."dictatorship of the bourgeoisie." And this is natural, since the KKE has another standard of "democratism" and considers as "democratic" the social orders of the Soviet totalitarian type. But what does the KKE foresee (in theory at least) for the "dictatorship of the proletariat"?

According to the 10th Congress: "The socialist democracy will ensure the free existence and activity of all parties within the framework of the socialist constitution, for the sake of the construction and development of socialism." In short, the socialist constitution of the KKE will permit the functioning only of those parties which are active on behalf of the "construction and development of socialism"--that is, only parties which believe in socialism. But in precisely "what" socialism? For example, will a certain PASOK, which views socialism differently from the KKE, be permitted to function? The 9th Congress of the KKE was very clear on this point (in contrast to the 10th). The scope of the...democratism of the KKE is crystal-clear: "The socialist democracy ensures the free existence of every party which voices the interests of workers...recognizes the leading role of the working class, and struggles for the building of socialism...." But of all the leftist parties, only the KKE recognizes the "leading role of the working class" in our country! In short, the KKE's "socialist democracy" (or "dictatorship of the proletariat"), while recognizing in theory the functioning of many parties, in essence sets such conditions that henceforth only one party can function: The KKE! Thus one will...choose his party, as Florakis said to us recently, provided that (and the KKE secretary general withheld these conditions from us) this party is socialist, expresses the concerns of the workers (in the judgment of the KKE, of course), and espouses the ideology of the...KKE! Other than this, we will have...a multiparty democracy....

#### Divisible Democracy

But if the official texts of the KKE are not enough to describe the "democracy" which it has in store for us, I warmly recommend that one read an amusingly "pluralistic" article by Gr. Farakos (a member of the KKE Politburo) in the KOMMOUNISTIKI EPITHEORISI [Communist Review] (November 1977) with the characteristic title: "Existing Socialism and Human Rights." In this article Farakos explains to us very clearly what kind of human rights can exist under the social order which the KKE aspires to.

Thus, for example, we learn that according to the KKE this...democracy: "Cannot be democracy equally for everybody."



That is, this democracy "is not indivisible...." The "democracy" of Florakis and Farakos, as they bluntly confess to us, "will forbid the activity of the few antisocialist elements which will try to engage in actions to impede the...development of socialism...." In short, every "antisocialist," everyone who fails to support the "development of socialism" is prohibited from acting! Moreover this is a natural ramification of the fact that the "democracy" of the KKE is not democracy equally for everybody: It is operative only for the adherents of socialism and especially of the KKE....Of course, what fate is in store for the "antisocialist elements" is evident also from the fact that these dissidents are treated by Farakos more or less like ...spies! Thus, in trying to explain why these "elements" exist in the "socialist societies," Farakos reminds us that: "They are encouraged by the existence of imperialism and imperialist propaganda, not to mention also the direct subversive work which is done by the espionage centers, which leads to the outright bribing of such elements...." Therefore, in the...multiparty social order of Florakis, if one happens to be an "antisocialist element" he runs the risk of being treated as an agent "of imperialism's espionage centers"!

After all these things, at the very least it is the height of absurdity for Florakis to talk to us about the...multiparty system and to go beyond this to...democratism. Of course, he will continue to do this, and in fact with increased brazenness, as long as our socialists (or those so-called socialists who in reality are his covert adherents) are quick to bestow on him democratic credentials. And the threat is clear (even if not especially comprehensible to that non-socialist camp which is not steeped in ideology): Namely, the danger that at some point the "democracies of the people," the "socialist democracies," the "dictatorships of the proletariat" will become more broadly accepted as the true democracies (regardless of whether they constitute a screen for the single-party system). And to the degree that this impression spreads, to that extent our democratic institutions which guarantee the multiparty system will be whittled away slowly but steadily. But democratic ideas are the foundations of these relations. For this reason, we should remind ourselves every day that (contrary to what the leaders of the KKE say) democracy is indivisible, is democracy for everyone...

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## TEXT OF BILL ON UNIFICATION OF SECURITY CORPS

Athens ETHNOS in Greek 26 Jan 84 pp 19-31

[Text] The unification of the security corps is finally becoming a reality!

The bill for the unification has already been prepared.

There were certain changes, made yesterday noon, that are probably the last ones prior to the bill's introduction for discussion and vote in the Chamber of Deputies.

The "Greek Police"--this is what it is going to be called--will shortly become a fact.

The following organizations will be abolished on the date that the law goes into effect:

- Gendarmerie
- Cities Police
- Fire Corps
- Rural Police Directorate
- National Security Service (YPEA)
- The Coordinating Staff of the Public Order Ministry
- Emergency Planning Policy (PSEA)

Four police divisions are created as follows:

- Order
- Security
- Civil Defense
- Administrative Support

The Order Division will have the mission of ensuring public law and order and the freedom of the citizens.

The Security Division will have the mission of crime prevention and control, the protection of the State and the democratic regime of the country.

The Civil Defense Division will have the mission of managing all emergency needs resulting from natural disasters, accidents or other catastrophes in time of peace or war. The present Fire Corps will operate under it.

The Administrative Support Division will include the directorates of personnel, planning, data processing, training, technical support and public relations.

The chiefs of the divisions will have the rank of Major General.

The Greek Police will have an organizational strength of 45,566 positions of police personnel for general services.

#### The Ranks

The ranks will be:

Lieutenant General--Chief  
Lieutenant General of Police  
Major General of Police  
Police Chief  
Deputy Police Chief  
Police Inspector  
Police Captain  
Police Lieutenant  
Police Master Sergeant  
Policeman

The budgeted positions are: Five lieutenant generals; 16 major generals; 87 police chiefs; 221 deputy police chiefs; 371 police inspectors; 595 police captains; 1,722 police lieutenants; 5,284 police master sergeants; 29,095 policemen and 8,170 municipal policemen (they are the rural police and master sergeants).

The maximum age limits allowed for Police and Civil Defense personnel of the Greek Police are:

Lieutenant General--Chief, age 62  
Lieutenant General of Police, age 61  
Major General of Police, age 60  
Police Chief, age 58  
Deputy Police Chief, age 57  
Police Inspector, age 56  
Remaining ranks, age 55

The bill provides for 10 years mandatory service for policemen and firefighters and 15 for lieutenants from the time they obtain their certificates.

#### Abolished

The ranks of brigadier general (and corresponding ranks for Cities Police and Fire Corps), of second lieutenant, warrant officer and sergeant.

Those in service, except for the brigadier generals, are automatically promoted to the next higher rank.

The rural guards and their master sergeants are transferred to the Municipal Police (a new institution).

## Seniority

The determination of seniority among officers of equal rank in the Gendarmerie and the Cities Police is based on the officer promoted to his present rank at least one calendar year earlier than the other.

In any event, the seniority determination is covered by Article 70 of the bill. In it, the corresponding mathematical formulas on the burning issue of seniority are analyzed.

The equally serious issue of the Police Insurance Funds is covered by Article 73 of the bill.

Article 34 covers the marriage of police personnel (men and women), while Article 24 covers promotions.

In the future, the Chief of the Greek Police will be selected from among the five lieutenant generals of the corps.

With regard to personnel matters in general, there is not a single provision to the detriment of the present situation. On the contrary, there is a series of other provisions that considerably improve both the working conditions, the development and the remuneration of personnel.

In order to apprise fully its readers on the most serious issue of the unification of the Security Corps, ETHNOS publishes the entire bill. Its text is as follows:

## Bill

### "Organization of the Ministry of Public Order"

#### Section 1

Mission--Structure--Organization--Ministry Personnel  
Mission--Constitution of the Ministry

#### Chapter I

#### Article 1

#### Mission of the Ministry

The Ministry of Public Order has, within the Constitution and the Laws, the mission of:

- a. Safeguarding and maintaining public order;
- b. Protecting public and state security
- c. Ensuring the civil defense of the country

## Article 2

### General Organizational Make-Up

1. The services of the Ministry of Public Order are divided into central and district. Central Services are the following:

- a. The Offices of the Minister and the Secretary General
- b. The Office of the Chief of the Greek Police
- c. The Division of Police for Law and Order
- d. The Division of Security Police
- e. The Division of Civil Defense
- f. The Division of Administrative Support

2. The following are also part of the Central Services:

- a. The Office of the Deputy Chairman of the Comptroller
- b. The Office of the Legal Counsel of the Administration
- c. The Disbursing Office
- d. The Statistical Service of the ESYE [National Statistical Service of Greece]

3. District Services are: The General Police Directorates of the Athens and Salonica Nomes, the Police Directorates of the Nomes and the dependent services. The task of these services is coordinated, controlled and supervised by district commanders whose headquarters and territorial jurisdiction are defined by order of the Minister of Public Order.

4. The Police and Civil Defense Services, as a whole, come under the title: "Greek Police." The Greek Police is a security corps according to the articles of the Constitution. Its local jurisdiction covers the entire nation except for the areas for which specific laws indicate that they belong to the territorial jurisdiction of the Port Corps.

## Article 3

### Division of Police for Law and Order

1. The Division of Police for Law and Order, as a more specific mission, ensures public law and order and the freedom of the citizens.

2. The Division of Police for Law and Order is composed of the following directorates:

- a. Directorate of General Policing
- b. Directorate of Traffic Control
- c. Directorate of Market Inspection

3. The Police's responsibility for law and order specifically includes:

- a. The protection of the individual rights of the citizens
- b. The maintenance of law and order in public areas, public meetings and gatherings

- c. The enforcement of laws concerning the mission of the Ministry of Public Order
  - d. The control of the operation of public gathering places and stores
  - e. The appearance at the deliberations of the Courts and the transfer of detainees
  - f. The enforcement of tourist laws
4. The responsibility for traffic control specifically includes:
- a. The control of pedestrian and vehicular traffic on the streets and other public areas
  - b. The enforcement of the Traffic Code and other related regulations
  - c. The conducting of the preliminary investigations of traffic accidents
5. The responsibility for Market Inspection specifically includes:
- a. The enforcement of market regulations
  - b. The control of the prices of the products and the quality of foodstuffs and prosecution for adulteration

#### Article 4

##### Division of Security Police

- 1. The Division of Security Police has the specific responsibility for crime prevention and control and the protection of the State and democratic regime of the country within the framework of constitutional order.
- 2. The Security Police Division is composed of the following directorates:
  - a. Directorate of Public Security
  - b. Directorate of State Security
  - c. Directorate of International Police Cooperation
  - d. Directorate of Crime Laboratories
- 3. Within the framework of the Directorate of State Security, there will operate, in accordance with the specific regulations concerning them, the following independent district services:
  - a. Service of the Security of the President of the Republic
  - b. Service of the Security of the Premier
  - c. Service of the Security of the Chamber of Deputies
- 4. The responsibility of the Public Security Police specifically includes:
  - a. The prevention and control of ordinary crime
  - b. The control and battle against the illegal traffic of narcotics
  - c. The battle against smuggling and illicit dealing in antiquities
  - d. The enforcement of laws on casinos, gambling and morals
  - e. The surveillance of those suspected of having committed ordinary crimes and the places they frequent
  - f. The search for wanted or missing persons and stolen goods
  - g. The battle against acts of violence and terrorism

- h. The use of scientific and technical methods for the solution of crimes
- i. The cooperation with international police organizations and the police forces of foreign countries

5. The responsibility of the State Security Police specifically includes:

- a. The protection of Greek and foreign officials who reside in the country
- b. The surveillance and control of the movement, residency and work of aliens in the country
- c. The protection of the State and the democratic institutions from any subversive action within the framework of the constitutional order.

## Article 5

### Division of Civil Defense

1. The Division of Civil Defense has as a specific responsibility the management of all emergency requirements, regardless of the kind and degree, arising from natural disasters, accidents or other catastrophes during times of peace or war.

2. The Division of Civil Defense is composed of the following directorates:

- a. Directorate of Fire Protection
- b. Directorate of Disaster Management
- c. Directorate of Civil Mobilization

3. The Fire Protection Directorate specifically includes:

- a. The publication of regulations and guidelines for all buildings, roofed or uncovered spaces and the cooperation with the responsible authorities for publishing similar regulations for rural areas, wooded areas and forests, whether they belong to the State or any private individuals or semi-government corporations.
- b. Informing and educating the public on matters of fire prevention
- c. The definition of specifications and the suitability of the means and materials for fire control
- d. The preparation and implementation of plans for the prevention and fighting of fires in cooperation with other authorities
- e. Fire-fighting and the saving of lives and property endangered by fire
- f. The conducting of preliminary investigations for the crime of arson
- g. The publication of fire-fighting regulations

4. The managing of disasters specifically involves:

- a. The publication, in cooperation with the agencies having joint jurisdiction, of safety regulations and guidelines in the event of disasters and catastrophes or other types of destruction of buildings, vehicles and means of communication belonging to the State or any private individuals or semi-government corporations
- b. The task of informing and educating the public in matters concerning disaster management
- c. The formulation and implementation of plans for the prevention and management of disasters



- d. The preservation of life and property endangered by disasters
- e. The publication of police regulations for protective measures after disasters

5. The Civil Mobilization specifically involves:

- a. The organization, in cooperation with Local Self-Government, of groups for self-protection in every municipality and township
- b. The training of self-protection groups in the handling of fires and other disasters
- c. The installation or maintenance of prompt alert systems (alarms) for the population in case of special needs
- d. The keeping of up-to-date lists of means and materials necessary for handling special needs and effecting requisitions, if the need arises
- e. The locating, or the task of constructing, appropriate shelters for the protection of the population in case of special needs in cooperation and under the responsibility of the Local Self-Government
- f. The formulation of evacuation plans of regions, transportation of people, services and property of vital importance
- g. The formulation and implementation of plans for civil mobilization in cooperation with the agencies having joint jurisdiction

Article 6

Division of Administrative Support

1. The Division of Administrative Support consists of the following directorates:

- a. Directorate of Personnel
- b. Directorate of Research
- c. Directorate of Data Processing
- d. Directorate of Training
- e. Directorate of Finances
- f. Directorate of Technical Support
- g. Directorate of Public Relations

2. The following Special Services of the Ministry of Public Order are under the jurisdiction of one of the above listed directorates, as set forth below:

- a. The Medical Services, under the Directorate of Personnel
- b. The Police Academy, the training schools of the Ministry of Public Order personnel and their branches as well as the museum, under the Directorate of Training
- c. The Comptroller of Expenditures and the Procurement Service, under the Directorate of Finances
- d. The Printing Plant and Vehicle Maintenance, under the Directorate of Technical Support
- e. The Music Department, under the Directorate of Public Relations

Article 7

The Organization of Police Directorates

1. Each Nome constitutes a Police Directorate that has as a more specific task to exercise, within its territorial jurisdiction, the entirety of police functions, that is to say, general policing, traffic control, market inspection, public security, State security and civil defense as defined in Articles 3, 4 and 5 of this Law. Specifically, in the Attiki and Salonica Nomes, General Police Directorates are constituted.

2. The Police Directorate consists of the Services of Public Order, Traffic, Market Inspection, Security and Civil Defense as well as of the public prosecutors and municipal police in accordance with the resolutions issued each time upon the decision of the Minister of Public Order.

With these resolutions it will be impossible to form more than one independent Police Service or Civil Defense Service. It is possible for the office of the regional commander to operate from the headquarters of a Police Directorate in accordance with what is provided in Article 2, paragraph 3, of this Law. This office is located in the same building as the Police Directorate, which provides secretarial services for it.

3. The General Police Directorates of Attiki and Salonica comprise the following services in accordance with what is provided more specifically by resolutions of the Minister of Public Order:

- a. Directorate of Public Order
- b. Directorate of Security Police
- c. Directorate of Traffic Control
- d. The necessary number of police precincts, Security precincts, traffic precincts, special task forces and Civil Defense Services
- e. Public prosecutors and municipal policemen

4. Under resolutions issued in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Article, it is possible to provide for the constitution and operation of volunteer groups for self-protection for Civil Defense work in municipalities and townships in cooperation with the Local Self-Government

5. By resolution of the Ministers of National Defense and Public Order, it is possible to make available Armed Forces personnel for manning certain positions of the Civil Defense Service.

#### Article 8

##### Constitution--Abolishment--Reorganization of Services

1. It is possible, by resolution of the Minister of Public Order, to reorganize the Central and District Services of the ministry. In the same manner, it is possible to create new Police services or Civil Defense or to abolish the existing ones.

2. In the event of the creation of a new service, the Police and Civil Defense personnel is increased gradually to a number equal to the organic force of the service being created.

3. Operational matters of the Central and District Services of the Ministry of Public Order, as well as the equivalence between them, are regulated by internal operational rules approved by a resolution of the Minister of Public Order.

4. Based on the organization of the Police Services and the Civil Defense Services, a district chart of their distribution is prepared, which is approved by a resolution of the Minister of Public Order that is not published in the government gazette.

## Article 9

### Character of the Service

1. The Police Services and the Civil Defense Services of the Ministry of Public Order that constitute the Greek Police are, because of the nature of their mission, organized according to a military hierarchy and equipped with weapons or other means necessary to carry out their mission, while their Police and Civil Defense personnel are governed by disciplinary rules similar to those governing the military. The personnel of the Ministry of Public Order are held in continuous readiness to combat crime and safeguard law and order in accordance with the dictates of the government lawfully elected by the people and to handle natural disasters, catastrophes, fires or other emergencies.

Or

1. The Divisions of the Greek Police are, because of their nature, armed and organized along military lines and equipped with weapons or the means necessary to combat crime and to discharge their remaining missions, and their Police and Civil Defense personnel have a military hierarchy and discipline. The personnel of the Ministry of Public Order are held in a state of continuous readiness to combat crime, to safeguard law and order in accordance with the dictates of the government lawfully elected by the people and to manage natural disasters, catastrophes or other emergencies.

2. The personnel of the Greek Police undergo special training in their own schools in the use of weapons, special equipment and machines and carry, in the discharge of their duties, up-to-date weapons and are considered to be held in readiness for duty in any eventuality.

3. Police personnel could be trained for special duties and jobs in the schools and training centers of the Armed Forces upon resolution of the Minister of Public Order.

4. In case of war, the Greek Police could be detailed to perform Military Police duties in accordance with the provisions of Article 12 of this Law.

## Article 10

### Nome Police Commission

1. A Nome Police Commission, composed of the prefect, as chairman, the president of the Nome Council and the police chief as members, operates in every Nome seat.

2. The Nome Police Commission has the following responsibilities:

- a. It decides all transfers of civilian personnel of the Ministry of Public Order, of Police personnel, of Civil Defense personnel up to the rank of master sergeant as well as for the Fire Corps and municipal police within the Nome limits.
- b. It decides on the extent and type of measures that must be taken in especially significant situations for the danger of the disturbance of public order, natural disasters, fires, catastrophes or other emergencies.
- c. It suggests to the Ministry of Public Order the implementation of measures for an improved organization and functioning of the Police Services and those of Civil Defense of the Nome.

#### Article 11

##### Public Prosecutors and Municipal Policemen

1. The Public Prosecutors are either Police personnel or civilian employees of the Ministry of Public Order from grades 8 to 2, who were transferred to it from positions of agronomists and commanders of the rural police in accordance with the provisions of Article 69, paragraph 1, subparagraph 7, of this Law, and who are serving at the headquarters of the Police Directorate or in other cities of the Nome and who perform the duties of general examining magistrates and public prosecutors for police courts.
3. The Municipal Police are police personnel of the Ministry of Public Order, are part of the force of the Nome Police Directorate and serve in municipalities and townships by resolution of the Minister of Public Order.
4. The municipal policemen have the following responsibilities within the limits of the municipalities or townships in which they serve:
  - a. They perform all the tasks of the Public Order police as described in Article 3 of this Law
  - b. They check and report all violations that occur in their jurisdiction and perform the duties of examining magistrate in accordance with the provisions of Article 66, paragraph 3, of this Law.
  - c. They supervise the self-protection groups of the municipal or township Civil Defense where they serve and whose work they direct in cases of emergencies in order to provide aid in accordance with the directives of the township council president or the mayor
  - d. They perform any other task assigned to them by resolution of the Minister of Public Order, which also provides for matters of their administrative dependence
5. By common resolution of the Ministers of Interior and Public Order, there can be assigned to the municipal police tasks for aiding the Local Self-Government or other public services.

#### Article 12

##### Military Police Units

1. During times of war, Military Police units may be formed from police personnel of the Greek Police by resolution of the Ministers of Public Order and National Defense. The resolution defines their composition and the military unit to which they are subordinate.

2. The duties of the Military Police units involve matters of security, law and order, and the conducting of preliminary investigations in accordance with what is more specifically defined in the preceding paragraph.

3. The officers of the Military Police units performing military police duties have the judicial powers provided, in this case, by the appropriate rules of the Military Penal Code.

#### Categories--Staff Positions of Personnel

#### Chapter II

#### Article 13

#### Personnel Categories

1. Personnel of the Ministry of Public Order are divided into the following categories:

- a. Police personnel
- b. Civil Defense personnel
- c. Civilian personnel

2. Police personnel are divided into General Services personnel and Special Services personnel, according to the category of the services into which they have been organizationally incorporated.

#### Article 14

1. The staff positions of the General Services personnel of the Greek Police are as follows:

Lieutenant Generals	5
Major Generals	16
Police Chiefs	87
Deputy Police Chiefs	221
Police Inspectors	371
Captains	595
Lieutenants	1,722
Master Sergeants	5,284
Policemen	29,095
Municipal Policemen	8,170

2. Temporarily, and for as long as the officers, who were promoted to their rank in accordance with the provisions of Legislative Decree 649/1970 and Article 69, paragraph 2, subparagraph b, of this Law, are serving with the Greek Police, the

following positions for officers of the General Services are created and will be added to the personnel positions of the corresponding ranks of the previous paragraph as soon as these officers retire:

Police Inspectors	2
Captains	92
Lieutenants	856

3. In accordance with the provisions of the resolution of the Minister of Public Order, 10 percent of the staff positions of Policemen and Master Sergeants, provided for by paragraph 1 of this Article, are reserved for women.

4. The staff positions of the police personnel of the Special Services of the Greek Police are as follows:

#### Medical Service

Brigadier Generals	1
Police Chiefs or Deputy Police Chiefs or Inspectors	33
Captains or Lieutenants	51
Physical Therapist Captains of Lieutenants	1

#### Veterinary Service

Police Chiefs	1
Deputy Police Chiefs or Police Inspectors	6
Captains or Lieutenants	24

#### Musicians

Deputy Police Chiefs or Police Inspectors	1
Captains	2
Lieutenants	7
Master Sergeants	43
Policemen	15

#### Chemists

Police Chiefs or Deputy Police Chiefs	1
Police Inspectors or Captains or Lieutenants	2

#### Chaplains

Deputy Police Chief or Police Inspector or Captain or Lieutenant	1
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5. The position of Brigadier General of Medical Services is temporary and will remain active so long as the officers who will be transferred to the Greek Police from the Medical Services of the Gendarmerie, the Cities Police and the Fire Corps are on active duty. Also temporary, and under the same provisions, are the positions of veterinarians, chemists and the musician Deputy Police Chiefs or Inspectors who remain on active duty. These positions will be abolished automatically when the reasons for their temporary existence have ceased.

6. The assignment of Police personnel of the General and Special Services and Civil Defense personnel to the local services is made by resolution of the Minister of Public Order.

Based on this assignment, the personnel roster of the Services is prepared and is not published in the government gazette.

7. The assignment of medical personnel to specialties is made by resolution of the Minister of Public Order.

#### Article 15

##### Staff Positions of the Civil Defense Personnel

1. The staff positions of the Civil Defense personnel are as follows:

Director General	1
Chiefs	3
Deputy Chiefs	12
Battalion Chiefs	58
Captains	77
Lieutenants	390
Master Sergeants	1,207
Firefighters	3,272

##### Pilot Engineers

Deputy Chiefs--Inspectors	4
Captains--Lieutenants	30
Firefighters--Master Sergeants	41

##### Pilot Captains

Deputy Chiefs--Inspectors	4
Captains--Lieutenants	20

##### Technicians

Deputy Chiefs--Inspectors	
Captains	3
Lieutenants	9

##### Drivers

Deputy Chiefs--Inspectors	3
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2. The positions of Technicians and Drivers are temporary and will be maintained until those who joined the Civil Defense from the Fire Corps retire. Also temporary is the position of Director General, which will automatically be abolished when those officers who joined the Civil Defense from the Fire Corps retire.

3. Temporarily and so long as the officers of Civil Defense who were promoted to their rank in accordance with the provisions of Legislative Decree 649/1970 and Article 69, paragraph 2, subparagraph b, of this Law, are in service with the Greek Police, the following positions of Civil Defense personnel are created and will be added to the personnel positions of the corresponding ranks of paragraph 1 of this Article:

Inspectors	1
Captains	2
Lieutenants	138

#### Article 16

#### Staff Positions of Civilian Employees

1. The staff strength of the civilian civil servants of the Ministry of Public Order, according to categories, is composed as follows:

##### a. Regular Civil Servants

Category AT1	
In grade	3-2
In grade	5-4
In grade	8-6

Category ME1	
In grade	5-4
In grade	10-6

Category ME3	
In grade	4-5
In grade	6-5

Category SE1	
In grade	6
In grade	12-7

Category AT3	
In grade	6-2
In grade	8-6

Category AR	
In grade	8-2

Category ME2	
In grade	9-4
In grade	10-6

Category ME4  
In grade

9-4

Category SE2  
In grade

10-9

- b. Employees under an indefinite duration contract 2
- c. Employees under a 2-year contract, renewable for equal or less time:

Polytechnic Engineers 2; Electronic Computer Analysts 2; automobile chauffeurs under an indefinite contract...

- d. Daily-wage employees under an indefinite duration contract 26
- e. Daily-wage skilled employees under an indefinite duration contract 300
- f. Hourly-wage employees. These are female janitorial service employees. Their positions are set at 1,041. These positions may be increased or decreased by resolution of the Ministers of Finance and Public Order. By the same resolution, the length of employment of the female janitorial service employees is also set. The janitorial services personnel are hired by decision of the head of the specific service, and, in case of problems or an absence of more than 5 days, replacements may be hired without prior notice. For the remaining matters, there apply the regulations governing the janitorial personnel of the other government agencies.
- g. Daily-wage skilled employees under an indefinite duration contract 7
- h. For the operational needs of the police schools and their branches, as well as for the operation of the Service clubs, there are hired, under definite or indefinite duration contracts, cooks and their assistants, mess attendants and barbers as well as the auxiliary personnel necessary for the operation of the kitchens and messes of the police schools and their branches or in the services where there are messes.
- i. Temporary employees are hired in accordance with what is provided by the Law on the Council of Ministers and the ministries.

2. The assignment of the employees covered by this Article to local categories of their branch, as well as their assignment to the Services and Service Units, is made by resolution of the Minister of Public Order, which is published in the government gazette.

3. When regular civil servants in the ME category obtain a degree from a university, they are transferred to a vacant position of an AT category employee, in accordance with the regulations on this subject for other civil servants.

4. In case of a vacancy occurring in a position in the ME category, a graduate of an institution of higher learning may be hired to fill this position.

5. With exception made for what is provided by Law 1320/1983, civilian employees of the Ministry of Public Order are hired only by selection in accordance with the provisions of the resolutions of the Ministers to the Premier and Public Order, which are published in the government gazette. The provisions of Article 1,

paragraph 3, of Law 1320/83, as amended by Article 2, paragraph 6 of Law 1400/83, are applicable in all other matters.

## Article 17

### Ranking Order of the Personnel

1. The ranking order among police personnel of the Greek Police, from higher to lower rank, is as follows: Lieutenant General of Police; Major General of Police; Police Chief; Deputy Police Chief; Police Inspector; Captain; Lieutenant; Master Sergeant; Policeman; Candidate Policeman; Municipal Policeman. One of the Lieutenant Generals is the Chief of the Greek Police.

2. The ranking order among Civil Defense personnel, from higher to lower, is as follows: Chief, Deputy Chief; Battalion Chief; Captain; Lieutenant; Master Sergeant; Firefighter; Candidate Firefighter.

3. With the exception made in the case of a different regulation on payrolls and pensions of the Law on Payrolls and Pensions, the corresponding salary equivalents of police personnel and Civil Defense personnel of the Greek Police to those of Army personnel are as follows:

### Greek Police

Lieutenant General Chief  
Lieutenant General of Police  
Major General  
Brigadier General (Medical Corps)  
Police Chief  
Deputy Police Chief  
Police Inspector  
Captain  
Lieutenant  
Master Sergeant  
Policeman

### Civil Defense

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Director General

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Chief  
Deputy Chief  
Battalion Chief  
Captain  
Lieutenant  
Master Sergeant  
Firefighter

## Army

Lieutenant General--Chief of GES [Army General Staff]

Lieutenant General

Major General

Brigadier General

Colonel

Lieutenant Colonel

Major

Captain

1st Lieutenant

Master Sergeant

Sergeant

## Article 18

### Personnel Age Limits

1. The maximum age limits for Police personnel and Civil Defense Personnel while on active duty are as follows:

Lieutenant General--Chief	62
Lieutenant General	61
Major General--Civil Defense	
Director General	60
Police Chief--Chief	58
Deputy Police Chief--Deputy Chief	57
Police Inspector--Battalion Chief	56
Captain - Captain and lower ranks down to policeman and firefighter and municipal policeman	55

2. For those in the Greek Police who are transferred from the Gendarmerie, the Cities Police and the Fire Corps, the age limit for the ranks of Captain on down are temporary and for as long as they are on active duty are as follows:

Captain	54
Lieutenant	53
Master Sergeant, Policeman, Firefighter	51
Municipal Policeman	65

3. The age limits for police personnel and personnel of the Civil Defense in the Special Services are increased by 2 years in each rank from that provided for by paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article. The age limit for the Brigadier General of the Medical Service is set at 61. The provisions of this paragraph cease to exist when those in the Greek Police, who transferred from the Gendarmerie, the Cities Police and the Fire Corps, have retired.

4. The age limits set in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 are in force for all Police personnel regardless of the more specialized service conditions in which they serve.

5. When, according to the provisions that govern Police personnel and that of Civil Defense, it is necessary to fix their age, or that of candidates for enlistment in the Greek Police, by fixing it on the basis of their birthdate, especially when it involves retirement from the service because of age limits, then the 31 December of the year of birth is taken as the birthdate.

## Section B [sic]

Sources--Promotions--Transfers--Discipline--Status--Command--Duties--Rights of Personnel

Sources of Personnel for the Greek Police

## Chapter I

### Article 19

Sources for the Lower-Ranking Personnel of the Greek Police

1. The policemen (men and women) of the General and Special Services are drawn from Greek citizens or Greek nationals from Northern Ipeiros, Cyprus and Turkey after prior training and graduation from the corresponding police school. One-half of the enlisted have not fulfilled their military obligation while the remaining 1/2 must have fulfilled their military obligation or been legally exempted. The enlistees (men and women) must be between the ages of 18 and 26. Those who have not fulfilled their military obligation must be graduates of a senior high school or graduates of a 6-year secondary education school or the equivalent of it. Those who have fulfilled their military obligation must at least be high school graduates or graduates of an equivalent recognized school. The selection process, the other qualifications of the candidates, the duration of their attendance at the police school and any other detail are governed by the statutes of operation of the police schools, which are approved by the PD [Premier's Decree] issued at the recommendation of the Minister of Public Order.

2. The successful graduates of the police school must complete a mandatory 2-year tour of duty in the active Services as candidate policemen. Upon the completion of 1 year following their graduation, they are evaluated by the council having jurisdiction, as to whether they are to continue their service as candidates for the second year, at the end of which they must undergo written examinations, mainly on general knowledge.

The granting of permanent status takes place after the evaluation of the service council having jurisdiction, which takes into consideration the recommendations of the supervisors and the results of the examinations. The courses, the manner for administering the examinations, the grading and the process for permanent status are regulated by resolution of the Minister of Public Order.

3. The Master Sergeants (men and women) of the General Services are promoted from the ranks of the General Services policemen, after their having taken examinations for promotion to fill existing vacancies on the staff. The other qualifications of the candidates and the process for administering the examinations are governed by the rules of operation of the police schools. The

policemen, who, on the date of publication of the examinations, have completed 3 years of service on permanent status, have the right to participate in the promotion examinations for Master Sergeant. The number of vacant positions for which the examinations is held is determined by a resolution of the Minister of Public Order in accordance with the provisions of Article 4 of this Law.

4. The policemen in the Band are drawn from private citizens who have fulfilled their military obligation or have been legally exempted and who have the necessary qualifications, as provided in the rules governing the Band, approved by resolution of the Minister of Public Order.

5. The Master Sergeants in the Band are promoted from the policemen in the Band after examinations for promotion. The qualifications of the candidates and the details for administering the examinations are governed by the rules of the Band.

6. The municipal policemen are drawn from among Greek citizens who have the necessary qualifications as defined by a resolution of the Minister of Public Order. In the filling of these positions, preference is given to those who are natives or reside permanently within the limits of the municipality or township where a position vacancy has been declared.

#### Article 20

##### Sources for Officers of the General Services

1. The Lieutenants of the General Services are commissioned from the following categories of candidates (men and women) after prior training and graduation from the corresponding police school to which they are admitted after examinations:

a. From Master Sergeants of General Services, up to age 35 at the time of the examinations, who have at least a high school diploma

b. From policemen, up to age 35 at the time of the examinations, who have a degree from an institution of higher learning as well as from citizens up to age 28 at the time of the examination, who possess a Law degree (Jurisprudence, Public Law and Political Science) or from the Pandeios Supreme School of Political Science or a degree in economics or social science or the equivalent from a foreign college or university.

2. The other qualifications of the candidates, the supporting documents they must submit, the selection process, the administration of the examinations and all other details are governed in accordance with the rules of operation of the police schools.

3. Temporarily, and so long as they are on active duty in the Greek Police, those who have been transferred to it from the Gendarmerie or the Cities Police and Lieutenants who were promoted to their rank in accordance with the provisions of Article 69, paragraph 2, subparagraph b of this Law, may take the examinations for the Officers' School with the same requirements for Master Sergeants.



## Article 21

### Sources of Officers of the Special Services

1. The lieutenants of the Medical Service are selected from among the graduates of the Corps Officers' Military School in accordance with the provisions of the resolution of the Ministers of National Defense and Public Order. In case of the impossibility of applying these provisions, they are drawn from among citizens and police personnel having the necessary qualifications as defined by resolution of the Minister of Public Order. The same resolution defines the selection process of the candidates as well as every other detail necessary for the application of this paragraph. The matter of the Chaplain Lieutenant is dealt with in the same manner.
2. The Lieutenants of the Band are promoted from the ranks of the Master Sergeants, after their having taken promotion examinations in accordance with the specific provisions of the rules governing the Band.
3. Those of the lower police ranks, who obtain a degree defined as necessary to qualify for the position of Lieutenant of the Special Services category of the Greek Police, are promoted to the rank of Lieutenant with PD issued upon the recommendation of the Minister of Public Order and are incorporated into the personnel of the specific category and, if there is no vacant position on the staff, they are kept on as surplus until they can occupy a staff position. The same rule applies to officers. However, the officers are placed on the seniority list at their present rank.

## Article 22

### Source of the Lower-Ranking Personnel of Civil Defense

1. Firefighters are drawn from among Greek citizens who have fulfilled their military obligation or from Greek nationals from Northern Ipeiros, Cyprus and Turkey up to age 26. The enlistees must possess at least a high school diploma or other recognized equivalent. The selection process, the other qualifications of the candidates, the duration of their attendance at the firefighters school and all other details are governed by the rules of operation of the police schools. Paragraph 2 of Article 19 of this Law applies equally to firefighters.
2. Firefighter Master Sergeants are promoted from the ranks of firefighters after having taken promotion examinations to fill vacancies. The provisions of paragraph 3 of Article 19 of this Law apply to other related matters.
3. Firefighter pilots--engineers are drawn from among Greek citizens who have the necessary qualifications as provided by the operation regulations of the police schools.
4. Firefighter Master Sergeants pilots--engineers are promoted from the ranks of firefighter pilots--engineers after having taken examinations for promotion in accordance with the specific provisions of the regulations for the operation of the police schools.

## Article 23

### Source of Officers for Civil Defense

1. The Lieutenants are promoted from the ranks of the Master Sergeants after prior graduation from the appropriate school to which they are admitted after examinations. Those in possession of at least a high school diploma or a degree from some other equivalent recognized school, and who are not over age 35 at the time of the examinations, have the right to take part in the examinations. The provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 20 of this Law also apply to the examination for Master Sergeants.
2. Temporarily, and for as long as they are on active duty in the Greek Police, those who are transferred to it from the Fire Corps are allowed to participate in the examination under provisions of the previous paragraph and Lieutenants, who were promoted to their rank in accordance with the provisions of Article 69, paragraph 2, subparagraph b, of this Law, are under the same rules provided for Master Sergeants.
3. The Lieutenant Pilot-Engineers are promoted from the ranks of the Master Sergeants Pilot-Engineers after taking promotion examinations. The qualifications of the candidates and the details of the administration of the examinations are defined by the regulations of the operation of police schools.
4. The Lieutenant Pilot-Captains are selected from among Greek citizens after examinations. The qualifications of the candidates and the details of the administration of the examinations are defined by the regulations of the operations of the police schools.

### Promotions--Transfers of Personnel of the Greek Police

## Chapter II

## Article 24

### Promotion of Officers

1. The Chief of the Greek Police is selected from among its Lieutenant Generals and Major Generals, regardless of their seniority in rank. When the position of the Chief becomes vacant, the Minister of Public Order sends to the KYSEA [Government Council for National Defense] a list of the Lieutenant Generals and Major Generals with their personal files. The KYSEA selects the Chief by free evaluation, without any obligation to make a comparison with those passed over, and prepares the relative report. Those senior are voluntarily retired. The minister can recommend to the KYSEA the retirement of a Chief at any time.
2. The Lieutenant Generals, regardless of their seniority in rank, are evaluated at regular evaluations by the Council, which is convened by resolution of the Minister of Public Order and is composed of the Chief of the Greek Police and two Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces, designated by the Minister of National Defense. During these evaluations, it is decided which Lieutenant Generals are

to be retained or to be retired. Those selected for retirement do not have the right to appeal for a reevaluation.

3. The Lieutenant Generals of the Greek Police are selected from its Major Generals regardless of their seniority in rank. Those passed over for promotion are retired as having successfully completed their careers and are promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General upon their retirement.

4. For the regular and extraordinary evaluations of the officers of the Greek Police, there are established by resolution of the Minister of Public Order, the following councils:

a. The Supreme Council: It is composed of the Chief as Chairman, with two Lieutenant Generals and two Major Generals as members. If there are no Lieutenant Generals of the Greek Police on the Council, there participate Lieutenant Generals of the Army, designated by the Minister of National Defense.

This Council evaluates, in the first instance, the Major Generals and, in the second instance, officers from the rank of Police Inspector--Battalion Chief, up to, and including, Police Chief--Chief. When the Major Generals are being evaluated, the Council meets without the participation of the Major Generals with a three-man membership. For the reevaluation of the Major Generals, who have been passed over for promotion, the Council of paragraph 2 of this Article is designated as the Supreme Council.

b. The Higher Council: It is composed of a Lieutenant General as Chairman and four Major Generals as members. This Council evaluates, in the first instance, regularly or extraordinarily, the officers from the rank of Police Inspector--Battalion Chief up to, and including, Police Chief--Chief and, in the second instance, the Captains--Lieutenants. It also prepares the lists of the officers evaluated or passed over at the regular evaluations.

c. Lower Council: It is composed of five Major Generals under the chairmanship of the most senior in rank. This Council evaluates, in the first instance, Captains and Lieutenants.

5. As regards other matters of evaluation, promotion and retirement of the officers of the Greek Police, the provisions of Law 671/77, as further amended, governing these matters for the Gendarmerie personnel of corresponding rank, apply with the following differences:

a. The Chief and the other Lieutenant Generals are not evaluated because they have completed 35 years of service.

b. As a result of the regular evaluations of the Major Generals, a percentage of them, equal to at least 1/3 of the staff positions, is mandatorily placed on voluntary retirement.

c. The Police Chiefs, when they leave the service for whatever reason, except in instances of conviction or dishonorable discharge after a conviction, are promoted for 1 month to the rank of Major General and are then voluntarily retired.

d. The Civil Defense officers who graduate from their specialized academy, after

this Law goes into effect will not be promoted beyond the rank of Captain, if they do not have a degree from an institution of higher learning. The Chiefs are promoted to the rank of Director General only when they leave the service for whatever reason, except in instances of conviction or dishonorable discharge as a result of a conviction, and are then retired voluntarily. This resolution applies until the officers, who joined the Greek Police from the Fire Corps, have retired.

e. The Civil Defense officers, who reach their rank after this Law goes into effect, will not advance beyond the rank of Captain.

f. The Medical Corps officers, the chemists and the veterinarians are promoted to the rank of Brigadier General for 1 month only, prior to their retirement from the service for whatever reason, except in instances of conviction or dishonorable discharge as a result of a conviction, and are then voluntarily retired. This resolution applies until those who joined the Greek Police from equivalent positions in the Gendarmerie, the Cities Police and the Fire Corps have retired.

g. Those who enter the service of the Greek Police as officers of the Medical Service after this Law goes into effect do not advance beyond the rank of Police Chief.

h. Regular and special efficiency reports are filed on Lieutenant Generals. The date of 20 March is established for the filing of efficiency reports on all officers.

i. The regular evaluations take place in May. The Minister of Public Order may, by resolution, postpone the beginning of the evaluations or extend it for 1 month.

6. Temporarily, and until those who have joined the Greek Police from the Gendarmerie, the Cities Police and the Fire Corps have retired, the provisions of ND [Legislative Decree] 649/1970, as amended by Law 1339/1983, remain in effect with the following differences:

a. The In-Service Training School for Warrant Officers will be renamed In-Service Training School of Lieutenants and the In-Service Training School for Fire Corps Warrant Officers, to In-Service Training School for Lieutenants.

b. In-service training will be received in these schools by the Lieutenants of the Police and Civil Defense, who will be commissioned to this rank in accordance with the provisions of Article 69, paragraph 2, subparagraph b of this Law, under the provisions and the process defined for the Warrant Officers of the Gendarmerie, Cities Police and Fire Corps, respectively.

7. For advancement in pay grade or other financial benefits to officers of the Greek Police, the rules that govern these subjects for the corresponding ranks of the Gendarmerie personnel, which are in effect at the time of their joining, apply. The advancements in pay grade of the officers are effected without evaluation as long as those being entitled to them are included in promotion or continuations lists or have been promoted within the same calendar year in which they complete the time for advancement in pay grade.

## Article 25

### Promotions of Lower-Ranking Personnel

1. Policemen and Firefighters who have completed 18 years of service since their enlistment, to which their previous service in the Gendarmerie, the Cities Police or the Fire Corps is added, are promoted, after evaluation, to the rank of Master Sergeant. Those promoted with this provision are not examining magistrate's employees, have a staff position of Policeman or Firefighter and discharge such duties and do not advance in rank unless they have successfully passed examinations for promotion or entrance examinations.

2. For advancement in pay grade and other financial benefits, the retirement and separation of Policemen, Firefighters and Master Sergeants, the provisions governing these matters for the corresponding ranks of the Gendarmerie personnel in effect at the time of their joining, apply with the following differences:

a. The Master Sergeants of Police and Civil Defense are advanced to the pay grade of Captain when they complete 26 years of actual service.

b. The Policemen and Firefighters are advanced to the pay grade of Lieutenant when they complete 26 years of actual service and to that of Captain when they complete 28 years of actual service. The advancement to the pay grade of Captain is granted to those leaving the service after completing 26 years of service for whatever reason, except as a result of conviction or dishonorable discharge after a conviction.

c. Wherever mention is made in Law 1135/1981 of advancement in pay grade to the ranks of Police Sergeant, Firefighter Sergeant and Warrant Officer, thereafter, for these advancements, the ranks of 1st Sergeant, Warrant Officer and 2nd Lieutenant of the Army are used as reference.

d. Wherever in Law 1135/1981 the advancement in pay grade of Master Sergeants is connected to the least time in rank for promotion, this time is set at 6 years.

3. The Municipal Policemen do not advance in rank beyond the rank with which they enlist or are inducted.

For their advancement in pay grade, the provision of the Law on Salaries apply.

## Article 26

### Transfers of Personnel

1. The assignments and transfers of the supervisors of the divisions as well as the assignments and transfers of the Major Generals, are effected by resolution of the Minister of Public Order.

2. The provisions of Law 671/1977 and Legislative Decree 974/1971, as further amended, regarding the Gendarmerie personnel on the subject of personnel transfers, are in effect for the transfers of the other personnel of the Police and Civil Defense of the Greek Police, with the following differences:

a. For the transfers within the Nome of Policemen, Firefighters, Master Sergeants and Municipal Policemen, the provisions of Article 10 of this Law apply.

b. The Service Council, which is convened by resolution of the Minister of Public Order, with the director of the appropriate division as chairman and



the director of personnel and a Major General as members, after a recommendation of the Nome Police Commission, acts upon the transfers of the Municipal Policemen outside the Nome. These transfers are effected either by mutual agreement or for disciplinary reasons.

c. The Service Council, which is convened by resolution of the Minister of Public Order, with the director of the appropriate division as chairman and the director of personnel and a Major General as members, acts upon the transfers outside the Nome of policemen, Master Sergeants of Police, firefighters and Master Firefighters.

d. The Service Council, which is convened by resolution of the Minister of Public Order, with the Chief of the Division as chairman and the directors of the divisions as members, acts upon the transfers of the officers within or outside the Nome.

e. The transfers of the officers are announced by order of the minister, while those of the other personnel are announced by order of the Chief.

## Article 27

### Detachment--Transfers of Personnel

1. The detachment of any officer, noncommissioned officer, policeman or firefighter of the Greek Police for duty outside of it, whenever it is provided for by existing regulations, is effected only by resolution of the Minister of Public Order, except in cases of detachments for which a specific regulation provides for action by other ministers.

2. The detachment of officers by order of the Chief and of the lower ranks by the Chief of Police of the Nome is permitted in the following cases:

- a. To replace an incapacitated officer or noncommissioned officer who is in command of an independent service
- b. To strengthen the service in order to meet seasonal needs
- c. For the formation of Military Police detachments
- d. To perform the works provided for in ND 1335/1973
- e. For the formation of special units to combat crime of a regional nature (Transient Detachment)
- f. For training purposes

3. The above detachments may last, in the cases of a, b, c and e, up to 3 months, while in the case of d, for as long as is provided for by ND 1335/1973, and in the case of f, for the duration of the training.

4. For the purpose of handling special, urgent and serious needs of law and order and security, permission is granted by order of the Chief of the Greek Police and the Nome Police Chief, to transfer temporarily police personnel outside the jurisdiction of the Service to which it is attached until the reasons which caused the transfer cease to exist.

5. Those serving in the Greek Police may be temporarily recalled to serve at the headquarters of the command of record whenever they are under investigation for serious criminal acts or for disciplinary violations.



## Discipline--Service Status of Personnel

### Chapter III

#### Article 28

#### Disciplinary Measures -- Service Status

1. The following disciplinary measures are meted out to police personnel, to Civil Defense personnel and municipal policemen and are entered on their personal records:

- a. Reprimand
- b. Censure
- c. Fine of up to one pay period of the person being disciplined
- d. Temporary suspension
- e. Separation
- f. Dishonorable discharge

2. The reprimand, censure and fine are minor disciplinary measures. The suspension, separation and dishonorable discharge are major disciplinary measures.

3. The violations that call for minor disciplinary measures, those having jurisdiction to impose these measures and the authority of each are defined by the Rules of Discipline of the Greek Police. These rules are approved by resolution of the premier, which is issued upon recommendation of the Ministry of Public Order. The monies from the fines are transferred to the Insurance Funds of the personnel of the Greek Police corresponding to the security corps to which the disciplined person belonged prior to his transfer.

4. In cases of violations calling for major disciplinary measures, there apply to the process of confirming and the hearing of the violations, appeals and the imposition of the punishment the provisions of ND 343/1969 and 935/1971, as further amended, which regard the equivalent personnel of the Gendarmerie at the time of their enlistment, with the following differences:

- a. In order to confirm the violations, an administrative hearing, under oath, can be ordered by the minister and the secretary general of the Ministry of Public Order, the Chief and the heads of the divisions of the Greek Police, the Police Chief of the Nome and the Police Chief, head of an independent service, for any of their subordinates.
- b. The investigative disciplinary councils of the 1st and 2nd degree are convened for 1 year and sit in Athens and Salonica. The councils are composed of officers by resolution of the minister, if the individual appearing before it is an officer, and by the Chief, for all others. If the individual appearing is an officer, the members of the council must hold a higher rank than he. If it involves the appearance of a Lieutenant General, the Council consists of three members and is composed, by resolution of the minister, of the Chief of the Greek Police and two Chiefs of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, designated by the Minister of National Defense. In such a case, no 2nd degree hearing is permitted.

5. The disciplinary violations that call for minor disciplinary measures are expunged 1 year after having been committed. Those that call for major disciplinary measures are expunged 5 years after having been committed, with the exception of those involving honor, which are never expunged.

6. For all other matters on the service records of police personnel and Civil Defense personnel, the provisions of ND 343/1969 and ND 935/1971, as further amended, remain in effect with the following differences:

a. The 1st Degree Council for granting permanent status to policemen and fire-fighters is composed, by decision of the Chief, of one Police Chief as chairman and two Deputy Police Chiefs as members. A 1st degree Council may also sit in Salonica.

b. The 2nd degree Council for granting permanent status to policemen and fire-fighters sits in Athens and is composed, by decision of the Chief, of three Major Generals, the most senior in rank, acting as chairman.

7. Those police and Civil Defense personnel temporarily released from custody or on bail may be placed on voluntary temporary suspension by decision of the minister, if officers, and of the Chief, for all others.

8. The police and Civil Defense personnel, regardless of rank, may be recalled, by decision of the Minister of Public Order, to active duty in time of peace, of general or partial mobilization or in the event of war in order to handle urgent needs of the service.

9. Those recalled to active duty, who had been promoted during their retirement to a higher rank, are recalled with this rank if, at the time of their recall to duty, a junior officer had been promoted. Otherwise, they are recalled with the rank they held while last on active duty.

10. The matters of transfer to the reserve rosters (books) and all other details regarding this Article are governed by resolution of the Minister of Public Order.

#### Command--Duties of Personnel

#### Chapter I

#### Article 29

#### Command

1. The Minister of Public Order, in accordance with the Law on the Council of Ministers and the ministries, is the commander-in-chief of the Services of the Greek Police and, therefore, directs, coordinates, oversees and controls their activities. The Chief commands the Greek Police and is directly involved.

2. The minister, by resolution, which is published in the government gazette, may transfer certain of his responsibilities to the secretary general, to the Chief and the directors of the divisions of the Greek Police or to the Nome

Police Chiefs. In the same manner, the responsibilities of the Chief may be transferred to the directors of the divisions or to the chiefs of their directorates or to the Nome Police Chiefs, as well as those of the chiefs of police directorates to the deputy chiefs or heads of the service units of the directorate.

3. Only the minister and the secretary general of the Ministry of Public Order as well as the ranking qualified officers and noncommissioned officers of the Greek Police have disciplinary jurisdiction over its personnel in accordance with the provisions of this Law and the Rules of Discipline of the Police Personnel of the Greek Police.

## Article 30

### Heads of Services

1. The Chief of the Greek Police is a Lieutenant General. The four heads of the four divisions, under which the Greek Police is organized according to Article 2 of this Law, are also Lieutenant Generals. The heads of the divisions hold the rank of Deputy Chief.

2. The regional chiefs are Major Generals of the Police. The rank of Major General is also held by:

- a. The adjutants of the heads of the Law and Order Division, the Security Police Division and the Support Division, who are, at the same time, chiefs of a directorate of their division
- b. The chiefs of the General Police Directorates of Athens and Salonica
- c. The chief of the Training Directorate of the Administrative Support Division
- d. The chief of Security of Attiki

3. The chiefs of the Police Directorates are Police Chiefs. The following commanders also hold the rank of Police Chiefs:

- a. Of the Police schools
- b. Of the Security Service of the president
- c. Of the Security Service of the premier
- d. Of the Security Service of the Chamber of Deputies

4. The Chiefs of the Police Subdirectorates and the branches of the Police schools are either Deputy Police Chiefs or Police Chiefs, depending on the importance of their office.

5. The Chiefs of the Police Precincts are either Deputy Police Chiefs or Inspectors, Captains, Lieutenants or Master Sergeants, depending on the importance of their jurisdiction.

## Article 31

### General Duties of the Commanders

1. The chiefs of services of the Greek Police are responsible for carrying out

the mission of the service they command. They have the obligation to organize, coordinate and control the operation of the service in order to ensure the best possible results.

2. The more specific duties and responsibilities of the commanders of independent services or service units of the Greek Police and their other personnel are governed by the rules of internal operation of its services, in accordance with the provisions of Article 8, paragraph 3, of this Law.

#### Article 32

##### Replacement of Commanders

1. The chief, head or supervisor of a service or service unit of the Greek Police is replaced, in the event of incapacitation or absence, by the deputy chief or the deputy director of it. If there is no deputy chief, then he is replaced by the highest ranking officer or the most senior officer or non-commissioned officer of the service. The Chief is replaced by the most senior head of division.

2. Whoever replaced the chief, head or supervisor of a service or service unit receives all the authority, duties and jurisdiction of the person whom he replaces.

#### Article 33

##### Special Obligations of the Personnel

1. Police personnel and personnel of the Civil Defense, when in uniform, always have the duty of being on the alert for matters connected with the mission of the service to which they belong, even when off-duty. The same attitude is to be kept in the event they are not in uniform, but only when it is within the territory of their service and there is no uniformed agent present.

2. Police and Civil Defense personnel have the obligation of being on duty in accordance with the provisions of the rules of the internal operations of the services of the Greek Police and are entitled to a 24-hour rest period per week during which they have worked for at least 5 days. Those who work more than 5 days during the week are entitled to compensation for the 6th working day, the amount of which is set by resolution of the Ministers of Finance and Public Order. Until this resolution has been made public, the amount of the compensation is set at 1,000 drachmas.

3. The type of uniforms of the police and Civil Defense and the Municipal Police personnel is defined by resolution of the Minister of Public Order; until the enlistees in the Greek Police are furnished new uniforms, they will wear the uniforms they wore prior to their transfer.

#### Article 34

##### Marriages of Personnel

1. Police and Civil Defense personnel are allowed to marry a Greek citizen, without permission from the service, 1 year after attaining permanent status, if enlisted prior to fulfilling their military obligation. Those who enlist after having fulfilled their military obligation may marry at any time. If there are special reasons, the Chief of the Greek Police may grant permission to marry prior to the completion of the required year on permanent status.
2. In order to marry a person of foreign citizenship, the prior approval of the Chief of the Greek Police is necessary and is granted after evaluating the special circumstances pertaining in each case.
3. Withholdings or contributions to insurance funds are not made for the recognition or registering of the marriage of the interested party.

#### Rights of the Personnel

#### Chapter V

#### Article 35

#### Remuneration of Personnel

1. The remuneration of the police, Civil Defense and municipal policemen personnel is defined by the Law on Payrolls.
2. The remuneration of police and Civil Defense personnel is subject to the following withholdings and deductions, in addition to those covered by other special provisions:
  - a. Due to unauthorized absence, full salary
  - b. Due to preventive incarceration, 50 percent of full salary. The withheld money is returned in case of acquittal or dismissal of charges or non-indictment.
  - c. Due to conviction, 50 percent of full salary for the duration of the sentence being served
  - d. Due to ordinary leave beyond that to which one is entitled, 50 percent of full salary
  - e. Due to a fine imposed for disciplinary violations
  - f. Due to disciplinary measures involving temporary suspension, 20 percent of full salary
  - g. Due to disciplinary measures involving suspension with dismissal, 25 percent of full salary
  - h. For the clubs of the Corps' personnel, in accordance with the provisions by resolution of the Minister of Public Order
  - i. Due to leave of absence, except for health reasons, 10 percent of full salary
3. The sums withheld for the above reasons are deposited in the insurance funds of the service where the individual, whose salary was withheld, is insured.
4. The remuneration of policemen candidates and firefighter candidates is not subject to any withholdings.

5. When this Law first becomes effective, the municipal policemen will continue to receive their remuneration as they did prior to their transfer and it will remain subject to the withholdings provided for by their own regulations.

#### Article 36

##### Travel Expenses

1. Police and Civil Defense personnel are entitled to travel expenses and related compensation in cases of transfer or temporary duty in accordance with the provisions of Law 617/1977.
2. The cadets (officers, policemen and firefighters), with regard to travel expenses and related compensation, are considered to hold the rank for which they are being trained.

#### Article 37

##### Material--Moral Rewards

1. A financial reward, the amount of which is determined by a resolution of the Minister of Public Order, may be granted to police personnel, to municipal policemen and to Civil Defense personnel in cases where they have gone above and beyond the call of duty that resulted in the solution of serious criminal acts or other illegal activities or the arrest or confirmation of the identity of those who perpetrated them.
2. Noncommissioned officers, policemen and firefighters who, after completing 12 years of service, leave the service without cause and are not entitled to a pension, may be granted compensation by the State equal to that received by retiring military personnel of equal rank. The last year is considered to have been completed if at least 6 months of it have been completed. Those denied the right to a pension, in accordance with the provisions of the Pension Code, are not entitled to this compensation.

The compensation provided for in this paragraph is paid to the family of the person entitled to it in the event of his death. The length of overall service is calculated in accordance with the provisions governing the matter of calculating the length of service for the purpose of promotion.

3. The moral rewards awarded to personnel of the Greek Police for action above and beyond the call of duty are defined and the details of their award are regulated by a PD issued at the proposal of the Minister of Public Order.

#### Article 38

##### Medical Care

1. The medical and dental care of the personnel of the Greek Police is administered by the physicians of the service in accordance with what is provided for more specifically under the regulations of the medical service, which is approved by resolution of the Minister of Public Order.



2. Where there are no medical or dental officers, the medical and dental care is administered by the medical officers of the Armed Forces and, where there are no such officers, by physicians of the civil service or private physicians under contract to the government.

3. The provisions governing the matter of hospitalization and outpatient care for civilian civil servants are applicable to Police and Civil Defense personnel on active duty or in retirement and to members of their families for hospitalization and outpatient medical care.

4. Police and Civil Defense personnel are treated, preferably, in military hospitals. The physical fitness examinations of these personnel are performed by medical commissions of the Army, unless medical commissions by medical officers of the Greek Police are available.

5. Police personnel and Civil Defense personnel, retired from the service because of tuberculosis, mental or psychiatric reasons and not entitled to a pension, are cared for for a 2-year period at a public hospital at government expense. If there are no available beds in hospitals, a care subsidy at government expense is granted for the same length of time, the amount of which is determined by resolution of the Ministers of Health and Welfare and Public Order.

6. The provisions governing the matters of personnel of the service from which they came apply for the hospital and outpatient care of municipal policemen.

#### Article 39

#### Funeral Expenses

1. Funeral expenses are granted, in accordance with the provisions covering this subject, for the military, for police and Civil Defense personnel on active duty or retired, as well as for the members of their families.

2. The provisions governing the matters of personnel of the service from which they came apply for the funeral expenses of municipal policemen.

#### Section III

#### Purpose of Training--Training--In-Service Training of Personnel

#### Chapter I

#### Purpose of Training

#### Article 40

#### Purpose of Training

1. The training, in-service training and instruction of Police and Civil Defense personnel take place at the Police Academy, its schools and branches.

2. The training, in-service training and instruction of Police personnel aims at:

- a. The conveying of knowledge considered necessary to the formation of a healthy, professional conscience in order that those trained may be able, after their graduation, to effectively discharge their duties.
- b. Strengthening the conviction that the mission of police and Civil Defense personnel in all ranks is the enforcement of laws and the safeguarding of the exercise by the citizens of their constitutionally secured rights and freedoms.

#### Article 41

##### Organization of the Police Academy

1. The Police Academy and its branches are organized into Schools and Sections of Schools in accordance with the provisions of the rules governing their operation. In this organization the following schools are mandatorily included:

- a. Policemen's School for the training, in-service training and instruction of the lower-ranking police personnel. The candidate firefighters and municipal policemen are trained in special sections of this school.
- b. The Officers' School of the Greek Police for the training, in-service training and instruction of officer candidates and officers. The Firefighter Lieutenant candidates are trained at a special section of this school.
- c. Higher cadres School of the Greek Police

2. The subject of the operation of Police Schools is governed by the rules of operation of the Police Academy and especially:

- a. The division of the schools into sections
- b. The qualifications and documentation of the candidates for the various schools and their sections, the announcement and date of the examinations, the manner of selecting the candidates and the process for administering the examinations.
- c. The curriculum of the trainees and in-service trainees, their evaluation during the courses, the length of the courses and the granting of degrees or other documents attesting to graduation
- d. The type of oath for the trainees
- e. The service status of the trainees or in-service trainees in the event of the interruption or shortening of their training or in-service training, as well as whether it is to be continued after the reasons that caused its interruption have been eliminated.

#### Article 42

##### Training Personnel

1. The training personnel of the Police Schools and their branches consist of professors, assistant professors, lecturers from institutions of higher learning, high school teachers or university graduates as well as personnel of the Greek Police Corps or of the Armed Forces. The university courses in the Officer Candidate School are taught by professors, assistant professors or lecturers from universities. The officer candidates may attend classes at local universities along with the regular students in accordance with the provisions by resolution of the Minister of Public Order.

2. The teaching personnel of the police schools and their branches receive compensation for every hour of teaching in accordance with the provisions by resolution of the Ministers of Finance and Public Order.

## Training--In-Service Training of Personnel

### Chapter II

#### Article 43

##### Number of Admissions

1. The number of candidates admitted each time for training at the corresponding school or its branch is determined by a decision of the Minister of Public Order, based on the existing vacancies in the corresponding ranks at the time of graduation. It is mandatory that the decision be publicized prior to the announcement of the examination or the enlistment.

No increase is allowed in the number of those admitted once the announcement has been made.

2. The number of women admitted as officer candidates may not exceed 10 percent of the total of those admitted. No fractions of numbers are considered in the determination of this number.

3. Those enlisting as candidate policemen, firefighters or municipal policemen take the oath immediately after their enlistment. The same oath is taken by the officer candidates of Police and Civil Defense when they complete their training and are notified of the results of their final examination.

#### Article 44

##### Candidates of Special Categories

1. Of the number of candidates admitted each time to the corresponding school or its branch, 20 percent is made up of the following categories, without taking into consideration the fractions of numbers based on their grades and without taking into consideration the order of entry of these categories in this paragraph:

- a. Those with large families and their children
- b. Children of disabled veterans and those killed in war-time
- c. Children of national resistance fighters, who are receiving a pension for their resistance actions
- d. Children or widows of policemen killed in the line of duty or as a result of such duty
- e. Greek nationals from Northern Ipeiros or Turkey and their children
- f. Children or brothers and sisters of disabled Greek Police personnel who were disabled or were victims in the line of duty in time of peace. Ranking in the same category are the retired members of the Gendarmerie, the Cities Police and the Fire Corps.

In the event the percentage set in the previous paragraph is not filled, the

remaining positions are filled by candidates in the category enjoying no benefits.

#### Article 45

##### Duration of Training

1. The duration of training for candidate policemen is set a one academic year, while that of candidate firefighters and municipal policemen is set at 5 months.
2. The duration of training for officer candidates is set at 3 years and is divided into three academic years, each of 10 months' duration. Especially in the case of candidates who possess a degree from an institution of higher learning, the duration of training is set at 13 months. By decision of the Minister of Public Order, the training period of university graduates may be shortened to 10 months.
3. The duration of training of officer candidates in Civil Defense is set at one academic year of 10 months' duration.
4. The duration of training for those admitted for training or instruction to other schools, or the branches of the police schools and their sections, is set by the rules of operation of the police schools.
5. Those attending police schools to attain the rank of Policeman, Firefighter, Police or Civil Defense Lieutenant are called Candidate Policemen, Candidate Firefighters, Candidate Lieutenants.
6. In the public interest, the training or in-service training at the police schools or their branches may be interrupted or shortened by decision of the Minister of Public Order.

#### Article 46

##### Mandatory Service

1. The graduates of police schools or sections of them must serve in the Greek Police for the following periods:
  - a. The policemen and firefighters, for 10 years from their enlistment, including the periods of training and probation
  - b. The Lieutenants of Police and Civil Defense, for 15 years from the time of graduation
  - c. Under the rules of operation of the police schools there may be set a period of mandatory service if it be judged necessary to serve the service needs and for those police personnel who:
    - a. Are retrained in the police schools and their branches
    - b. Are trained or retrained abroad or at home, but at non-police schools
    - c. Join the Greek Police Corps as officers of the Special Services
3. Personnel of the Greek Police are entitled to request leaving the service

prior to the end of their mandatory service, to which they agreed because of training or retraining, if their remaining in the service becomes especially burdensome for their careers in other professional areas or prevents the free development of their personalities, as long as they have completed two-thirds of their mandatory service. Whether these reasons exist or not is decided by the Council of the 1st Degree, which has jurisdiction to grant permanent status to policemen.

#### Article 47

##### Special Training

1. Police and Civil Defense personnel may be trained or retrained outside the police schools, either at home or abroad, at government expense or at their own. Those sent to be trained abroad at government expense receive the compensation set by the pertinent regulations for other civil servants.
2. The details for implementing this Article (qualifications of those involved, selection process, duration of training or retraining), are governed by the rules of operation of the police schools.
3. Police personnel may be issued a service permit as driver instructors for automobiles that is valid exclusively for the training of candidate drivers of service vehicles. These permits expire once the bearer has left the service for whatever reason. The details of implementing this paragraph (those authorized to issue the permit, process of issue) are governed by a resolution of the Minister of Public Order.

#### Article 48

##### Remuneration of Trainees

The candidate policemen, firefighters and municipal policemen receive, for the duration of their training, the remuneration set by the Law on Payrolls. The candidate Lieutenants, who have university degrees, receive, for the duration of their training, the remuneration of a Master Sergeant.

2. The trainees and in-service trainees in the police schools and their branches, with the exception of the candidates, are entitled to compensation for training, the amount of which is set by resolution of the Ministers of Finance and Public Order.

#### Section IV

Expenditures of the Ministry--Housing of the Services--Armament--Equipment of the Services

Expenditures of the Ministry--Housing of the Services

#### Chapter I

## Article 49

### Expenditures of the Ministry

1. The expenditures for the operation of the services of the Ministry of Public Order are drawn from public funds in accordance with what is provided for more specifically in Article 50 of this Law.
2. The financial operations of the ministry are performed by its own services, while the expenditures are made, controlled and justified in accordance with the provisions of public accounting.
3. The expenditures of the Ministry of Public Order and its services are controlled and cleared by the public accounting office which also:
  - a. Issues orders of payment for these expenditures
  - b. Monitors, from the accounting aspect, the assets of the ministry and its services in accordance with the provisions of the Finance and Accounting Service regulations of the ministry. This regulation is approved by PD, which is issued by proposal of the Minister of Public Order.

## Article 50

### Recording of Expenditures

1. The credits necessary to meet the needs of the operations of the services of the Ministry of Public Order are recorded each year in its budget. These credits involve making the following expenditures:
  - a. The procurement of armaments, transportation and communication equipment, machines, instruments, tools, spare parts, stores and materials or the repair, maintenance or lease of them or the procurement and the upkeep of police dogs
  - b. The maintenance and repair of government buildings housing the services of the ministry and the payment of rents for the buildings that do not belong to the government
  - c. The operation of the police schools and their branches for the training or in-service training or instruction of personnel of the Greek Police. Included in these expenditures are those for the procurement of visual education aids and texts or other teaching aids, the expenditures for the procurement of clothing, underwear and toilet articles for the candidate policemen, firefighters and municipal policemen, as well as the expenditures for the compensation of the trainees, the in-service trainees, the instructors and those who make up the examining commissions of written or oral tests or examinations
  - d. The training or instruction of police personnel at home or abroad, but outside the police schools and their branches. Included in these are the expenditures for training of the students of the Corps' Military School, who are destined for service with the Greek Police.
  - e. Personnel remuneration in general
  - f. Training trips abroad or duty abroad
  - g. Ceremonies, receptions, participation in expositions and conventions or other activities at home or abroad, establishing competition prizes or realizing other activities which involve public relations of the Ministry of Public Order and its services



- h. The procurement of paper for printing books or documents of any kind of regulations, codification of legislation, circular orders, log books and the ministry's magazine
- i. The operation of any kind of shop and the printing shop of the Greek Police
- j. The procurement of texts and books for the libraries of the ministry and its services
- k. The procurement of equipment, raingear, police batons and other materiel necessary to the police in carrying out their duties
- l. The procurement of cloth for uniforms, their manufacture and the procurement of the other items of clothing
- m. The procurement of civilian clothing as well as items and the means of protection and disguise for the Special Services personnel
- n. Heating and procurement of cleaning supplies and stationery. To meet these needs, it may be possible to provide a gross monthly subsidy from the credits entered for this purpose, which amount is set by resolution of the Minister of Public Order
- o. Loading, transporting and unloading of materiel
- p. Travel expenses and compensations connected with travel expenses
- q. Financial rewards for personnel for acts above and beyond the call of duty
- r. Rewards offered for the arrest or exposure or perpetrators of criminal acts
- s. Medical (hospital and outpatient) care of personnel
- t. Funeral expenses

2. By resolution of the Ministers of Finance and Public Order, there may be included in the budget of the Ministry of Public Order expenditures in excess of those listed in paragraph 1 of this Article, which are necessary for the operation of its services.

3. Credits are entered in the budget of Public Investments for the construction of buildings to house the services of the Ministry of Public Order.

## Article 51

### Housing of Services

- 1. The housing of the services of the Ministry of Public Order is effected in government buildings or in private buildings that are leased by the government in accordance with the provisions regarding this subject.
- 2. Those among the lower-ranking personnel who are single, and as long as there is sufficient and suitable space for this purpose, are mandatorily housed, rent-free, in buildings of the Greek Police services. Lodging of single officers, or married officers and those in lower ranks, may be permitted in the buildings of the services when there are special reasons which are evaluated and defined by the Chief of the local Police Directorate.

## Article 52

### Clubs--Canteens

- 1. Where the service needs demand it, clubs for the personnel of the Greek Police

may be established by decision of the Minister of Public Order, and may be housed in buildings leased by the government for this purpose or in buildings housing the services of the ministry.

The expenses for procuring the furnishings of the clubs are to be borne by the government.

2. The clubs used as mess halls and recreation centers for personnel are non-profit and their transactions are tax-exempt and duty-free.

3. Canteens for the sale of necessity items for personnel of the Greek Police may operate in the clubs.

4. Matters regarding the organization and operation of the clubs are governed by the resolution regarding their establishment.

#### Armament--Equipment of the Services

#### Chapter II

#### Article 53

##### Armament

1. The services of the Greek Police are equipped with the armament necessary to perform their mission.

From this armament, a revolver or pistol is issued to the officers and policemen, who must return it to their service when transferred or who may be absent for a considerable length of time, in accordance with the provisions as defined by a resolution of the Minister of Public Order.

2. When on duty, the police personnel of the Greek Police are required to carry the arms issued them by the service. When off-duty, they are entitled to carry or have in their possession a privately-owned pistol or revolver, or the one issued by the service, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article.

3. Municipal policemen may carry or have in their possession a revolver or pistol in accordance with the provisions in paragraph 1 of this Article.

#### Article 54

##### Equipment--Stores

1. The services of the Ministry of Public Order are equipped with the technical and other means that are indispensable for the performance of their duties, especially motor vehicles, armored vehicles, motorcycles, communications systems, helicopters, equipment to set up shops and printing shops, office equipment and typewriters. For the same purpose, the leasing of materiel and equipment, whose procurement is impossible or considered unprofitable, may also be permitted.

2. A list of armament equipment and materiel is prepared and approved by resolution of the Minister of Public Order and is not published in the government gazette.

3. The Greek Police may, by the expenditure of public funds, establish its own wire or wireless communications systems throughout the entire country after prior approval of the Ministry of Communications.

#### Article 55

##### Public Accountants

1. Those from the personnel of the ministry who perform the duties of auditors in making disbursements or expenditures or handling monies or other valuables or materiel become public accountants and are accountable in accordance with the provisions of the Law on Public Accounting, which govern public accountants.

2. Documentary stamps, monies for the mess, items and merchandise in the canteens and clubs are considered, in their administration, as belonging to the government; therefore, those who manage them are considered to be public accountants.

#### Section V

##### Law Enforcement

##### Exercise of Police Powers--Relations with the Authorities--Criminal-Procedural Regulations

##### Law Enforcement

##### Exercise of Police Powers

#### Chapter I

#### Article 56

##### Police Regulations

1. General law enforcement, whose more specific objectives are defined in Article 3 of this Law, is carried out by the Greek Police on the basis of laws and the directives of the Minister of Public Order.

2. Local law enforcement is exercised by the Police Directorates of the Nomes with the issuance and enforcement of police regulations and the granting of police permits based on the regulations in force.

3. Police regulations are issued by the Chiefs of the Police Directorates of the Nomes and are enforced in each entire jurisdiction or a specific section of it. Police regulations are approved by the prefect of the Nome headquarters of the officer who issues them and are published in the government gazette. In the

event of the dissent of the prefect, the police regulation is submitted to the Minister of Public Order, who makes the final decision.

4. Police regulations are issued for the enactment of special measures and only for the purpose of:

- a. Crime prevention
- b. The keeping of public peace
- c. The exercise of the occupation of guard or night watchman in such a manner as not to interfere with that of the professional policemen
- d. Taking appropriate measures for protection from disasters and natural catastrophes
- e. The protection of minors
- f. The regulation of matters of tourist interest
- g. The control of itinerant vendors in a manner so as not to affect the business of established merchants
- h. Taking fire protection measures for all types of businesses and public gathering places

#### Article 57

##### Police Permits

1. Police permits are issued only in cases provided for by ordinances in force. Police permits are issued by the Chiefs of Police Services, who are designated by the rules for their operation.
2. The validity of a police permit may depend upon the observation of certain rules and are issued after previous payment of the proper fees and are stamped in accordance with the provisions of the law.
3. In the issuing of permits by municipalities or townships for outdoor occupations in areas of public use, these permits are granted after a consenting opinion of the police authority that traffic will not be hampered. In case of dissent, the decision whether to grant the permit or not is made by the coordinating agency under Article 58 of this Law.
4. A police permit is needed to provide dependent services or as a night watchman to a private employer in accordance with the provisions in Article 56, paragraph 4, subparagraph g of this Law.
5. The police services issue permits for operation only to public centers of more than a 200-person capacity where health considerations are involved in the operation of shops and businesses. The other permits are issued by the mayors or township heads in accordance with the provisions of Compulsory Law 2520/1940 and health ordinances.

##### Relations of the Police with the Other Authorities

#### Chapter II

#### Article 58

## Relations with the Administrative Authorities

1. The relations of the authorities of the Greek Police with the prefects are governed by Article 3 of Law 1235/82 and the provisions of this Law.
2. The sub-prefects, mayors and township heads may cooperate and suggest the adoption of measures on matters of law and order, and more specifically that of order, directly with the supervisor of the local police of their jurisdiction; however, the responsibility for the decision rests with the head of the police.
3. A coordinating organ, composed of the prefect as chairman, the president of the Nome Council and the Chief of Police, is set up in each Nome for dealing with:
  - a. Any matter arising from fires, floods, earthquakes, natural disasters and, in general, Civil Defense problems on the Nome level
  - b. Policing problems arising from rallies of organizations, unions or other social, economic or political groups
  - c. Every matter of a more comprehensive nature regarding law and order in the Nome involves the Council at the proposal either of the prefect or the organizations or those described in paragraph 2 of this Article.
4. If deemed necessary, depending on the case, this coordinating organ, or the prefect, may call upon any head of local or Nome service, mayor or township head to participate or for information, as well as the district attorney of the Nome, if the case involves their territorial jurisdiction, to provide information, data or the submittal of proposals to cope with them.
5. No single individual may submit matters for solution to the coordinating organ except through the prefect, who will decide whether there is reason to refer it to the coordinating organ.

## Article 58

### Relations with the Judiciary Authorities

1. The relations of the officers and noncommissioned officers of the Greek Police as investigative magistrates and public prosecutors with the judiciary authorities are governed by the Regulations of the Courts and the Criminal Procedure Code.
2. The services of the Greek Police do not serve legal documents in civil cases. They serve only those legal documents regarding criminal cases whose serving is not possible by other means and only after this has been ascertained by the district attorney's office having jurisdiction.
3. The legal documents regarding criminal cases that involve personnel of the Greek Police are served by order of the Chief of the Police Directorate or the equivalent service on whose force the summoned person belongs.

## Article 60

### Relations with the Military Authorities

1. The Services of the Greek Police provide the Armed Forces with any information necessary for the security of the military installations while they cooperate with them on matters concerning national security. This information is either given to the Armed Forces or requested by them from the appropriate branch of the General Staff of the Ministry of Public Order.
2. The Armed Forces do not have jurisdiction or authority over the Services of the Greek Police and their personnel.
3. In the event of the application of the declaration of the state of siege, the relations of the Greek Police with the Armed Forces are governed by provisions of the Law "On Siege." In the event of war or general mobilization, the police personnel come under the jurisdiction of the Courts Martial.
4. The Services of the Greek Police are required to expedite the correspondence of the Services of the Armed Forces regarding the implementation of the mobilization plans.
5. The personnel of the Armed Forces offer to the agents of the Greek Police their assistance in case of attack or resistance while carrying out their duties.

#### Article 61

##### Relations with the Port Authorities

1. The relations of the Services of the Greek Police with the Services of the Port Corps are governed by ND 444/1970. Wherever reference is made in this Law to the Gendarmerie, the Cities Police or the Security Corps or their officers or their Services, it is understood to mean the corresponding Services of the Greek Police and its officers and noncommissioned officers.
2. In case of a jurisdictional dispute over matters or territory between the Services of the Greek Police and the Services of the Port Corps, the dispute is resolved by the coordinating organ under the provisions of Article 58, paragraph 3, of this Law, in which, in that case, the local head of the Port Service participates.

#### Article 62

##### Relations with Other Authorities

1. The Services of the Greek Police discharge only the duties related to their mission as defined in this Law and the Rules of Operation of its Services.
2. If a law, decree or resolution entrusts the Greek Police or its agents with tasks alien to its mission, these tasks are carried out only after prior approval by the Minister of Public Order.
3. The government agencies, the Public Service Organizations and Enterprises, the NPDD [Legal Entity of Public Law--Semi-government corporations] and the Local Self-Government Organizations provide the Services of the Greek Police



with any and all information on matters of public safety. In case of emergency, the services and organizations of this paragraph are required to provide the Police Authorities with the means at their disposal, which are judged suitable to handle the situation.

4. The tasks that the township head may assign to the municipal police are defined by resolution of the Ministers of Interior and Public Order.

#### Article 63

##### Guarding of Detainees

1. The exterior guarding of prisons and correctional institutions and the carrying out by the Greek Police of the tasks comprised in ND 1335/1973 is of a temporary nature and will continue until these tasks are taken over by the Ministry of Justice. The details of implementation of ND 1335/1973 with regard to the assumption by the Greek Police of the tasks performed by the Gendarmerie are governed by resolution of the Ministers of Justice and Public Order.

2. After the Ministry of Justice has taken over the tasks defined in ND 1335/1973, the interested Services of the Greek Police are terminated and their personnel is incorporated into the other police services.

3. In the case of the execution of a death sentence, the Greek Police is responsible only for maintaining order and the transportation of the detainees to the site of the execution. Under no circumstances are Police personnel permitted to be used as an instrument for executing a death sentence.

##### Criminal and Procedural Provisions

#### Chapter III

#### Article 64

##### Special Obligations and Prohibitions

1. Whoever is asked by a police agent to identify himself and refuses to do so or furnishes false information is punishable under Article 225, paragraph 2 of the PK (Penal Code).

2. The same penalty is imposed on whoever has knowledge of the identity of a third party and refuses to state it or furnishes false information, in the event he is asked by a police agent.

3. Whoever has been summoned by written notice by an interrogating magistrate of the Greek Police to appear at police offices for matters concerning the police [and refuses to do so] is punished by detention and a fine. The reason for which the citizen is called must be explicitly stated in the summons. In such a case, a bench warrant may be issued, signed by the head of the service to which the investigating magistrate who issued the summons belongs.

4. In cases where the police takes steps for maintaining order in open air or closed areas during meetings, gatherings, ceremonies or sports events, those present are obligated to conform to the order of the police agents detailed for maintaining order. Whoever does not conform is punished by detention and a fine and may be forcibly removed from that particular area.

5. In order for private citizens to use emblems and titles of the type used by the Greek Police, or similar to them, on any form of publication or poster, a permit from the Minister of Public Order is required. The violators will be punished with imprisonment of up to 3 months or with a fine, and the Court mandates the prohibition of the use of the emblem or title.

#### Article 65

##### Special Judicial Jurisdiction of Officers

1. The officers of the Greek Police, beginning with the rank of Police Inspector on up, have the special judicial jurisdiction provided for by Articles 111 and 112 of the KPD [Criminal Law Code].

2. The violations of police personnel are punished by disciplinary measures in accordance with the provisions of the Regulations of Discipline. However, the chief may decide to bind over the violator to the Court when he judges that the seriousness of the violation demands an investigation of the case by the Court.

#### Article 66

##### Exercise of Pre-Investigative Duties

1. The officers and noncommissioned officers of the Greek Police who operate as interrogating magistrates discharge their duties in accordance with the provisions of the KPD, while, for any eventual omissions, they are under the disciplinary control of their ranking supervisors, who are informed in writing by the district attorney having jurisdiction.

2. The officers and noncommissioned officers of the Greek Police who are not supervisors of services perform pre-investigative work on criminals, whether caught in the act or not, only after receiving orders from the supervisor of the service to which they belong.

3. The municipal policemen are investigative magistrates for matters which involve the drafting of reports, oral charges or reports of delivery of charges or drafting of reports of proof of crimes and misdemeanors whose perpetrators were caught in the act or, when a felony or serious misdemeanor whose perpetrator was caught in the act is involved, the taking of depositions of victims and witnesses until the arrival of an interrogating magistrate. They perform these investigative acts in cooperation with the town manager.

4. In the case where a felony or serious misdemeanor, whose perpetrator was caught in the act, was committed in the territory of a police station that is not headed by an officer, the pre-investigation process may be assigned to an officer by order of the chief of the service in whose jurisdiction the police station is located.

## Article 67

### Recommendations

1. In cases of violations which are verified by their subordinates, the Chiefs or heads of services or service units of the Greek Police may accept, after an interview with the offender, his objections, if they ascertain that during the verification there may have been an error on the part of the agent and file the case by action taken on the document with which the violation was verified.

## Section VI

### Final--Transitional--Repealed Provisions

#### Final Provisions

### Chapter I

## Article 68

### Abolishment of Corps and Services

1. On the date this Law becomes effective, the Gendarmerie, the Cities Police and the Fire Corps and their services are abolished throughout the country. Also abolished throughout the country are the Coordinating Staff of the Ministry of Public Order, the National Security Service (YPEA), the Criminal Services Directorate (DEY), the Emergency Planning Policy (PSEA) and the Rural Police Directorate and its services.

2. The responsibilities of PSEA are transferred to the Civil Defense Division of the Greek Police. The responsibilities of YPEA and DEY are transferred to the Security Division of the Greek Police. The responsibilities of the Agricultural Enforcement Rural Police are assumed by the Police Services, while those of the Master Sergeants of the Rural Police and the Rural Police are assumed by the municipal policemen in accordance with the provisions by resolution of the Minister of Public Order.

3. The buildings, equipment, armament and whatever materiel are in possession of the Services in paragraph 1 of this Article are transferred to the ownership of the Greek Police. The battle flag of the Gendarmerie will be used from now on as the flag of the Greek Police.

4. The portions of budgets of the abolished corps and services, which are being used, are consolidated into one budget which is handled as the budget of the Ministry of Public Order. The details of the implementation of this Article are governed by resolution of the Ministers of Finance and Public Order.

5. By resolution of the Minister of Public Order there may be formed, in its central and territorial services, councils or committees and their composition and responsibilities defined, if the provisions in force on the date this Law becomes effective provide for the functioning of the councils and committees with

the participation of the officers and noncommissioned officers of the Gendarmerie, the Cities Police, the Fire Corps or the Rural Police.

6. With PD's which are issued upon the proposal of the Minister of Public Order, the provisions of the Laws and PD's concerning the evaluations, promotions, transfers, travel expenses, disciplinary justice and other situations of the Security Corps personnel are codified into a unified text (ND 649/1970; ND 343/1969; ND 935/71; ND 974/1971; ND 671/1977; Law 617/1977; Law 1135/1981; Law 1234/1982; Law 1339/83, etc.) as further amended. At the time of the codification, it is permitted to change the order of the articles, the striking of the provisions that are not suitable to the situation being created with this Law and the adaptation of the names of the ranks and services in the context of this Law.

#### Article 69

##### Incorporation of Personnel

1. Personnel of the Corps abolished with this Law, Gendarmerie, Cities Police, Fire Corps and Rural Police (police, firefighting and civilian) are incorporated into the corresponding positions of the Greek Police unless within a revocable time limit of 20 days after this Law enters into effect, they declare, in writing, to the service to which they organizationally belong that they do not desire to be incorporated. Those who submit a statement that they do not desire to be incorporated will be considered as having submitted a request to resign, be separated or retired and leave the service in accordance with the provisions governing these personnel at the time of the submission of the request, according to the category to which they belong. Especially, as regards officers with the rank of Colonel, Police Chief 1st Class and Chief of Firefighters, the statement must be submitted within a revocable time limit of 7 days from the date this Law goes into effect.

2. The incorporation of the personnel of the Gendarmerie, the Cities Police and the Fire Corps into the personnel of the Greek Police will take place by resolution of the Minister of Public Order which governs every detail related to the subject. Upon the incorporation of the personnel, the provisions of the next Article are observed with the following differences:

a. The 2nd Lieutenants, Police Lieutenants 2nd Class and Firefighter 2nd Lieutenants are promoted, prior to their incorporation and without evaluation, to the next rank and incorporated as Lieutenants of Police and Civil Defense, respectively.

b. The rank of 1st Lieutenant, Police Lieutenant 1st Class and Firefighter 1st Lieutenant is given to the Warrant Officers of the Gendarmerie, Cities Police and Fire Corps and are incorporated into the corresponding positions of Article 14, paragraphs 2 and 15 of this Law. For their rank advancement, the provisions of Article 24, paragraph 6 of this Law apply.

c. The Sergeants of the Gendarmerie, Cities Police and Fire Corps are promoted, prior to their incorporation and without evaluation, to the next rank and are incorporated as Master Sergeants of Police and Civil Defense, respectively.

d. The Master Sergeants of the Rural Police are incorporated as Municipal Policemen.

- e. The medical officers of the Gendarmerie, Cities Police and Fire Corps are incorporated as medical officers of the Greek Police.
  - f. The Special Services personnel of the specialties and ranks being abolished by this Law are incorporated into positions of corresponding rank in the General Services personnel.
  - g. The permanent civil servants of the Security Corps and the Rural Police are incorporated as permanent civil servants of the Ministry of Public Order, and the secretaries of the Rural Police specifically are incorporated as civilian personnel of the police station.
3. If, at the time of the incorporation of the personnel of the Gendarmerie, Cities Police, Fire Corps and Rural Police as personnel of the Greek Police, there are surplus personnel in some rank, these personnel will be kept in service until vacancies occur.
  4. The personnel that are incorporated into the Greek Police continue to be governed by the retirement laws which were in force at the time of their incorporation into the Greek Police.
  5. During the initial stages of this Law, the rural policemen who serve in municipalities and townships that have police services will be placed in temporarily created positions of municipal police. These positions are abolished when those who hold them retire from the service. Also during the initial stages of this Law, the Master Sergeants of Rural Police are incorporated into temporary positions of the MEI branch in grade 10 to 9 that are created at the police stations and will be abolished when those incorporated retire from the service. Those who are incorporated will continue to receive the salary they received prior to their incorporation. Their duties and the details of the implementation of this paragraph are governed by resolution of the Minister of Public Order.
  6. The positions of Municipal Policeman covered in Article 14, paragraph 1, are progressively cut according to the number of positions being abolished in accordance with the provisions of the previous paragraph.
  7. Until the incorporation of personnel has been completed and the leadership of the Greek Police selected, the ranks of Brigadier General and General Police Chief are temporarily maintained.

#### Article 70

##### Determination of Seniority

1. Among officers of the same rank of the Gendarmerie and the general services of the Cities Police, the officer who was promoted to the present rank at least one calendar year prior to the other is considered the senior officer. If the dates of promotion are less than 1 year apart, the officer who graduated from the Officers' School of his Corps at least one calendar year earlier than the other is considered the senior officer.
2. In case none of the conditions in the previous paragraph exists and the two

officers graduated from their respective officers' schools the same academic year, seniority is determined on the basis of the following mathematical ratio:

- a.  $M = N (\lambda + 1)$ , which is applied to the Gendarmerie officers
- b.  $M^o = N^o (\lambda + 1) - 1$ , which is applied to the Cities Police officers

In these ratios, the  $N$  and  $N^o$  is the class rank of the officers from the respective officers' schools,  $M$  and  $M^o$  is the probable class rank of the two officers were they to graduate at the same time from the same school,  $\lambda$  is the ratio of the total of staff positions of the officers of all ranks of the Gendarmerie on the date of incorporation to the total of staff positions of the officers of all ranks of the Cities Police on the same date.

3. After calculating  $M$  and  $M^o$ , a comparison is made and then:

- a. If  $M^o$  is greater than or equal to  $M$ , then the officer of the Gendarmerie is declared the senior officer
- b. If  $M^o$  is smaller than  $M$ , then the officer of the Cities Police is declared the senior officer.

4. In the case of officers who were promoted in accordance with the provisions of ND 649/1970 as amended by Law 1339/83, the seniority list is determined in accordance with the provisions in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, with the following differences:

- a. The performance rank in the corresponding school of in-service training (Warrant Officers) is considered to be equivalent to the graduation class rank at the corresponding officers' school.
- b. The value of  $\lambda$  is taken to be equal to the ratio of the staff positions of the officers of this category of both Corps on the date this Law goes into effect.

5. The seniority list of the Master Sergeants of the Gendarmerie and Cities Police of General Services, who have graduated from their own advancement training school, and the officers who were promoted to their rank in accordance with the provisions of Article 69, paragraph 2, subparagraph b of this Law, is determined according to the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, with the following differences:

- a. The list of performance at the Corps' own advancement school for noncommissioned officers is considered to be the graduation class rank at the school and, in the case of those who were promoted by competitive examinations, the performance rank in the examinations.
- b. The value of  $\lambda$  is considered to be equal to the ratio of the staff positions of the total of Master Sergeants and Warrant Officers of the Gendarmerie of the General Services to the corresponding positions of the same rank of the General Services of the Cities Police.

6. The seniority list of the noncommissioned officers who are not graduates of the advancement schools of both the Gendarmerie and the Cities Police is determined as follows:



a. Whoever was promoted to the rank prior to the other is considered the senior, while in the case of the same promotion date, the one with the higher scholastic standing is considered the senior.

b. In the case of the same promotion date and equal scholastic standing, the Gendarmerie noncommissioned officer is considered to be the senior.

7. The seniority of the Special Services personnel, regardless of rank, is determined on the basis of the date of promotion to the present rank. In the event of the same promotion date, the determination is made on the basis of the date of appointment or enlistment or graduation from the Corps' own school. If it is not possible to determine seniority by the above data, then it is determined by whoever has the higher scholastic standing or the higher certificate of studies. If the scholastic standing and certificates of studies are equal, then the Gendarme has the seniority.

8. The seniority list of civilian employees of the same grade is determined on the basis of the date of promotion to that grade and in the case of simultaneous promotion, the seniority is determined by the Corps of origin.

9. The firefighting personnel of the Fire Corps is incorporated into the Civil Defense personnel based on the rank and seniority they now have. The Chief of the Corps is retired voluntarily because of the abolishment of his position.

10. After establishing the seniority of personnel, the lists of their various categories and ranks are compiled in accordance with the governing provisions on the subject.

#### Article 71

#### Equivalency of Incorporation

1. For the incorporation of the Gendarmerie and the Cities Police personnel into the police personnel of the Greek Police in accordance with the previous Article, the following rank equivalency is to serve as a guide:

Gendarmerie	Cities Police	Greek Police
Major General	Deputy Chief	Major General of Police
Brigadier General	General Police Chief	Brigadier of Police
Colonel	Police Chief 1st Class	Police Chief
Lieutenant Colonel	Police Chief 2nd Class	Deputy Police Chief
Major	Inspector	Inspector of Police
Captain	Captain	Captain
1st Lieutenant	Lieutenant	Lieutenant
Master Sergeant	Master Sergeant	Master Sergeant
Gendarme	Policeman	Policeman

2. If, in applying the provisions of the legislation in effect, there arises the need for determining the equivalency between rank-holding personnel or services of the corps being abolished (Gendarmerie, Cities Police, Fire Corps and Rural Police) and rank-holding personnel or services of the Greek Police, this equivalency is determined in each case by resolution of the Minister of Public Order.

3. Where in the current Law mention is made of ranks, rank-holding personnel, supervisors of services or services of the Gendarmerie, the Cities Police, the Fire Corps or of the Rural Police, this mention is, in the future, intended to mean the rank-holding personnel, heads of services or services of the Greek Police based on the equivalency defined in this Article.

#### Transitional Provisions

#### Chapter II

#### Article 72

#### Selection of the Chief--Filling of High Command Positions

1. Immediately after this Law goes into effect, the Chief of the Greek Police will be selected by the following procedure:

a. The Minister of Public Order sends to KYSEA [Government Council for National Defense] a list of the Chiefs of the Gendarmerie and the Cities Police Corps as well as of the Major Generals of the Gendarmerie and the Deputy Chiefs of the Cities Police, regardless of their seniority in rank, along with their personal files.

b. The KYSEA selects the Chief of the Greek Police by free evaluation, without having to compare him to those who may be passed over, and prepares the relative report. If one of the Chiefs of the Corps is selected as Chief, the other is placed on voluntary retirement and is considered as having successfully terminated his career.

If the Chief selected is a Major General of the Gendarmerie or a Deputy Chief of the Cities Police, the Chiefs and those senior to the one selected are voluntarily retired and are considered as having successfully terminated their careers.

2. Immediately after the selection of the Chief, the positions of Lieutenant Generals and Major Generals are filled by the following process:

a. The Minister of Public Order, by his resolution, forms a three-member Service Council with the Chief of the Greek Police as president and two Lieutenant Generals of the Army, who are designated by the Ministry of National Defense, as members.

A higher-ranking officer is designated to be secretary.

b. The Council evaluates on a special basis all the Major Generals of the Gendarmerie and the Deputy Chiefs of the Cities Police, the Brigadier Generals of the Gendarmerie and the General Police Chiefs, regardless of their seniority in rank, and selects those who are judged qualified to fill the positions of Lieutenant Generals and Major Generals.

c. The Major Generals of the Gendarmerie and the Deputy Chiefs of the Cities Police, who are not selected for the rank of Lieutenant General, are placed on voluntary retirement and are considered as having successfully terminated their careers.

d. The Brigadier Generals and General Police Chiefs, if they are selected for the rank of Major General, are promoted immediately; if they are not selected for the rank of Lieutenant General, they are immediately promoted to the rank of Major General and become senior to the other Major Generals and after 1 month are promoted, without further evaluation, to the rank of Lieutenant General.

3. If, during the evaluations of the previous paragraph, all the positions of the Major Generals are not filled, there may be an evaluation of the Colonels and Police Chiefs 1st Class during which all those who have completed at least 1 (one) year in the rank are evaluated by the Council of Article 24, paragraph 4, subparagraph a of this Law.

4. The more senior of the Brigadier Generals, of the General Police Chiefs, of the Colonels and Police Chiefs 1st Class, who are not selected for promotion, are promoted to non-staff positions with the rank of Major General and after 1 month are placed on voluntary retirement and are considered as having successfully terminated their careers.

#### Article 73

##### Personnel Insurance

1. Personnel which will be incorporated into the Greek Police (Police, Civil Defense, municipal policemen, civilian employees) continue to be governed by the law which was in force at the time of their incorporation as regards their insurance with the insurance agencies of the personnel of the Corps and Services that are being abolished by this Law.

2. It is possible for the Insurance Funds of the Gendarmerie, Cities Police and Fire Corps personnel to be consolidated into a single agency and the details involving the insuring of the Police and Civil Defense personnel, who were incorporated into the Greek Police by a PD issued upon the proposal of the Ministers of Social Insurance and Public Order. After this Law, the adaptation of the terminology that is used in the laws of the Funds is made in order to correspond to the situation resulting from the founding of the Greek Police.

3. The matters of insuring those who join the Greek Police upon the implementation of this Law, and thereafter, are governed by resolution of the Ministers of Insurance and Public Order.

4. Special decrees which provide for funds for the Insurance Funds of the Gendarmerie, Cities Police, Fire Corps and Rural Police personnel continue to be in force and the corresponding sums are paid to the insurance agencies which will be constituted in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Article. Until then, these funds are to be paid to the Insurance Funds of the personnel of the Corps and Services being abolished.

#### Article 74

##### Handling of Pending Matters

1. Matters of the active service personnel of the Gendarmerie, Cities Police,

Fire Corps and Rural Police, which were pending at the time this Law goes into effect, will continue to be governed, until their finalization, by the law which was in force at the time this Law goes into effect, if the interested party is not incorporated into the Greek Police.

2. Matters of the Gendarmerie, Cities Police, Fire Corps and Rural Police personnel: personnel which leave the service and are still pending at the time this Law goes into effect, or emerge after this date, continue to be governed by the law which governed the Corps and Services being abolished.

3. When, in the cases of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, it is necessary to refer the matter to the Service Council of the 1st or 2nd degree, the composition of the Council is defined by resolution of the Minister of Public Order.

4. Cases against Gendarmerie personnel pending before Military Courts, as well as those for which a preliminary inquiry is in progress at the time this Law goes into effect, are transferred to Civil Courts if the person involved is incorporated into the Greek Police. The details of implementing the provisions of this paragraph are governed by resolution of the Minister of Public Order.

Preliminary inquiries in progress against these personnel, in accordance with the articles of the Military Penal Code, that are pending at the time this Law goes into effect are continued until their completion and their referral to the Military Court.

Abolished Decrees

### Chapter III

#### Article 75

1. From the time this Law goes into effect, the following decrees are abolished:

- a. Articles 11 and 18, paragraph 4 of Law 671/1977
- b. Article 14, paragraphs 13 and 14 of Law 1145/1981

2. Also abolished is every general or specific decree which is contradictory to the provisions of this Law.

#### Article 76

##### Beginning of the Law's Effect

This Law goes into effect after \_\_\_\_\_ months have elapsed since its publication in the government gazette.

9731

CSO: 3521/178

## DISSIDENT COMMUNISTS ORGANIZE SEPARATE GROUP

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 27 Feb 84 p 2

[Article by Hubert Smeets: "Home for Orthodox Members of CPN [Communist Party of the Netherlands]. Party Board Considers Role of League Communists"]

[TEExt] In order to still supply a political home to disappointed orthodox communists, who have cancelled their memberships of the CPN, a League of Communists in the Netherlands has been established. The party chairperson speaks of an intervention group by which non-members attempt to gain influence on the policies of the CPN. During the last day of the party convention, there was a passionate call to action, but the party leadership for now has its work cut out with the young league, and with the after-effects of the new platform.

The party board of the CPN on Wednesday night will address the question of whether measures should be taken against the League of Communists in the Netherlands, which was established on Saturday. According to chairperson Elli Izeboud, it is "inconceivable" that the separate organizational form, which the league has chosen, could be further expanded without repercussions.

"This is not a question anymore whether one will allow factions within one's party, this is an intervention group by which non-members attempt to gain influence on the policies of the CPN", Izeboud said about the league. The league has been established expressly in order to still supply a political home to disappointed orthodox communists who have cancelled their memberships of the CPN, and to link them to the opposition within the party, which wants to take no notice of the results of the platform convention.

But the party board did not want to use the opportunity, offered by the fourth day of the convention about the new platform, to isolate the originators of the league in front of the whole party. According to Elli Izeboud, the executive board, which already on Saturday night immediately

and fiercely criticized the establishment of the league, without, however, attaching any consequences to this, does not want to put the existence of the new organization to discussion, because this development was not slated for the convention.

### Opinions Diverging

Within the party board, the opinions diverge about the actions which should be taken against the league. Elli Izeboud hopes that the appeal of the executive board will produce so much effect that the league will not be fated to a long life. She shrinks from "disciplinary measures", such as expulsion, but does not tend to just tolerate the league, either.

With this position, Izeboud stands in between those party board members who think that the "horizontal" (pro-Moscow group) with their league are a "quasi party", and so have crossed the boundary of what is admissible, and, on the other side, those board members, among whom party delegation chairperson Ina Brouwer, who first quietly want to wait and see how the organization crystallizes.

Last night, after the conclusion of the convention, Elli Izeboud did emphasize that the league can not be bracketed with another separate group which operates within the outside of the party, the so-called Left Breakthrough, which aims at closer collaboration, and possibly a merger, of CPN, PSP [Pacifist Socialist Party], and PPR [Political Party of Radicals]. Izeboud thus afterwards distanced herself from the orthodox districts of Groningen and North Holland--North, which, true enough, had openly turned away from the politically congenial league, but who had dismissed the party members of the Left Breakthrough, as well.

The party board, however, during the convention wrapped itself in silence about the earlier issued declaration. The interpretation, which declared opponents of the board, from North Holland--North and Groningen, gave to the reaction of the party board, was also not refuted by the board.

The originators of the league showed themselves to be disappointed about the slight support from like-minded members of the CPN from the North of the country. Rene Dammen from Amsterdam, one of them, reproached those party members with "cowardice, because they let themselves be intimidated by the executive board."

But the originators nevertheless announced that they will continue on the now chosen road.

### Rebellion

"This is pure rebellion", admitted Laurens Meertens from Amsterdam, one of the founders of the league, which was established Saturday. "But this party board will accept anything, anyway", he already predicted on Saturday. "It is irresponsible to direct oneself to that party any



longer. We have to just break through the china cabinet, that is the only way to achieve that something will happen, after all", said Meertens Saturday, on the even of the fourth and final day of the special convention. To this, he added that the "political-ideological rift" within the CPN is a fact, but that the organizational rupture has not yet taken place.

The founding meeting of the League of Communists in the Netherlands on Saturday was graced by the presence of, among others, a representative of the Spanish Communist Labor Party (PCOE), an off shoot, which is supported by Moscow, of the Euro-communist PCE (Spanish Communist Party).

At the convention, René Dammen underlined--somewhat more cautiously--that the new league is intended for those party members who are fed up with the internal platform discussion, and who just want to "have their turn" in the actions against the possible stationing of cruise missiles, and against the reduction of the social security benefits per 1 July, because the party board is not capable to lead those, anyway.

The convention yesterday proceeded reasonably successfully. An ample majority of the party followed the party board. That way, all the amendments from the horizontals and other like-minded opponents, in order not to link socialism, as pursued by the CPN, unbreakably to parliamentary democracy and individual liberties, were defeated. The radical innovators also came away empty-handed with their proposals to record in the platform that the CPN aims at a "re-alignment" of the left, and does not exclude a merger with the PSP and the PPR in that respect.

The new platform, which replaces the old one dating from the 1940's, was ultimately approved by a large majority of 70 percent of the delegates. For the crucial issues in the platform, however, the majorities during the preceding three days of the convention were no larger than around 55 percent.

The decision of the CPN caused dissent, most of all, to act in favor of a 35-hour working week, and of decreasing the number of working hours while retaining the same wage level. Neither the feminists, nor the members of the CPN who want to let the wage-struggle prevail above all else, can identify with this. The interpretation therefore still differs on the question whether this wording, which actually was intended as a compromise, contains one and the same demand.

The resolution of the convention, made during the first weekend, three weeks ago, to the effect that from then on, both marxism and feminism would be built on, had already earlier exposed the unbridgeable conflicts within the CPN in a fundamental sense.

The party leadership, which during the past months has lobbied indefatigably to try and reconcile the extremes with one another, but which yesterday was faced with the reproach by Groningen District Secretary Geert Lameris that it does not "act in a unifying way", yesterday could in the end rejoice in a reasonable support for the innovation of the CPN, such as it has in view.

#### Conflict about interpretation

General Secretary John Geelen said in his final address to the convention that he is "proud" of the party, the "democratic content" of which has, according to him, now been "irrefutably determined". "Communists are not performing animals, but self-confident people, who make mistakes, as well", he said.

However, John Geelen immediately warned for a conflict about the interpretation of the adopted resolutions. He made an appeal to the party, in response to the League of Communists in the Netherlands, to "uncompromisingly launch a struggle" against the stationing of the cruise missiles and the benefits decrease per 1 July. In this way, Geelen waited hand and foot on the convention, which shortly before had hailed the new platform by chanting the slogan, which can be explained in various ways, of "Action, action, action".

But at the very first party board meeting after the convention, that action, which so many communists are craving for, is not to be the first point of business. The party leadership for now has its work cut out with the young League of Communists in the Netherlands, and with the other after-effects of the new platform, which the CPN now has.

12568

OSO: 3614/49

## GRASS ROOTS UNREST FROM COALITION PARTNERS OVER WILDCOSE POLICIES

## Statoll Concerns Center Congresses

Oslo Aftenbladet in Norwegian 28 Feb 84 p 6

[Article by Gunnar L. Johansen: "Grass Roots Rebellion in Center Party Also"]

[Text] Like the Conservative Party the Center Party has also had its grass roots rebellion. At the party's annual county congresses this weekend in Rogaland and Troms, respectively, strong criticism was directed in part against the role the Center Party is playing in the three-party government.

The annual congress of Rogaland's Center Party ended in a letter to the Government in which one warns against Statoil's being deprived of essential tasks which the company has had up until now. "Statoil ought to play approximately the same role as before," it says in the letter from the CP [Center Party] annual congress in our number-one oil country.

The annual congress feels that Statoil must continue to play a central role in the development and the administration of the petroleum resources. The Center Party in Rogaland advocates that Statoil play the same role which the company has played up until now. The annual congress also warns the Government against advancing proposals for changes for which there is no majority in the Parliament or in the Norwegian people.

It is clear that some of the Center Party's politicians most influential in oil policy matters oppose essential parts of the Melloye committee's recommendations, which the Conservative Party has backed. This committee proposes, among other things, that the company be relieved of so-called administrative tasks by transferring them from the company to municipal tasks.

In the annual congress of the Grand Center Party this weekend it was the Government's energy policy and the party's attitude to the possibility of the North Sea oil discovery which was the focus of attention. As a temporary expedient measure the Center Party's role in the three-party government was also discussed. It was agreed that collaboration with the two other coalition partners should be based on the party's program and responsibility in policy.

The county party voted for a Directive to the Center Party's parliament representatives to support continued planning of the North-Norway railroad.

### Economic Policy Questioned

Oslo Aftenposten/III in Norwegian 2 Mar 54 p. 1

[Article by Steinar Tveit "Increasing Displeasure with Government"]

[Text] The county parties in the Center Party and the Christian Democratic Party continue to lose patience with the government's economic policy. The annual county congress after the other raises strong criticism of the government's effort against unemployment and its initiative on behalf of counties and municipalities. Transportation policy, education policy, housing policy and oil policy are also the object of local dissatisfaction in the government parties.

In the SF [Center Party] it was Nordland which first came out with strong criticism. It concerned deficient state subsidies for regular traffic, it concerned the agricultural policy, and it concerned the poor economy of the counties and municipalities. The same weekend the Akershus SF voted at its annual congress, during which major emphasis was placed on joblessness. The debate was relatively unimpassioned, but the annual congress was unable to agree on a statement about interest reduction. Instead the matter was transmitted to the leadership.

### Interest Reduction

However, the Hedmark SF adopted a statement on interest reduction and a very strong statement that the county economy must be improved. At the annual congress Chairman Johan J. Jakobsen warned against too strong formulations on the interest question.

The leader in the SF's county board group, Ole E. Stordalen, felt that strong wording about the county economy was absolutely necessary in order for the government to understand the seriousness of the situation. During the congress debate in Hedmark County a few days later he said that the economy of the counties is catastrophically bad and that it is necessary to gather the government's county politicians in a common front in order to call attention to the dereliction. He wanted to take the initiative on a nationwide gathering of the three parties' foremost politicians on the county level. SF Chairman Johan J. Jakobsen later reflected that this must be understood as a clear lack of confidence in the government.

### Endorsement

Last weekend, however, the Svalbard SF gave its endorsement of the statement from Hedmark about the poor county economy, but with an addition: the counties also secure the municipalities. At the same time there was strong criticism of the government's policy since the SF's annual county congresses in Troms and Finnmark. In Troms the displeasure concerned first and foremost the housing and education policy. In Finnmark they warned against weakening the oil.

The telemark SP adopted a statement which gives honor to the SP cabinet ministers, but just the same the debate revealed impatience where unemployment and the economy in counties and municipalities are concerned.

#### KRF Dissatisfaction

The annual county congresses in the Christian Democratic Party have in many ways drowned in the media picture, but there, too, dissatisfaction with the government's policy has been clearly expressed. In Vestfold and Akershus there was, among other things, strong criticism of the housing policy and the effort against unemployment, and a demand was raised for interest reduction. Last weekend at the annual congress of the KRF [Christian Democratic Party] a demand to the parliamentary group was adopted to support a resolution of principle on extension of the North Railroad. Parliamentary Representative Odd With also then indicated at the congress that he will vote for such a resolution of principle.

#### Joint-Party Program Appeal Attacked

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 6 Mar 84 p 2

[Editorial: "A Manifesto of Cooperation"]

[Text] Not unexpectedly, the Center Party newspaper OSTLENDINGEN, the so-called bastion of Hedmark guerillas in Elverum, has made it sound like something "suspiciously overzealous," when then Christian Democratic Party's Kare Kristiansen again makes a plea for nonsocialist cooperation. What OSTLENDINGEN has latched onto in particular is a statement by cabinet minister Kristiansen that he for his part would find it natural if the nonsocialist parties called for an election on the issue of a joint long-range program with a view to continuing the government cooperation after 1985 as well. This, of course, was interpreted as if "Kare Kristiansen's zeal for cooperation is boiling over." It would have been unlike the newspaper to express itself otherwise.

For anyone who is more or less familiar with political and parliamentary practice there is nothing in the mentioned assertion by Kristiansen which gives ground for suspicion about anything whatsoever. On the assumption that the current government will remain in office until the spring of 1985, and all the signs indicate that it will, it is up to the Government to work out a long-range program for the coming election period. Here it is a question of an unalterable practice, in the same way as the presentation of the state of the nation and the national budget is each autumn. There is nothing suspicious in that either, even though these documents can also serve as a manifestation of nonsocialist cooperation as long as we have a coalition government.

We have reason to believe that the Willoch government considers the work with the long-range program not just as an inspiring challenge but as a welcome opportunity to stake out the correct course for work which will build up society. And obviously there is intrinsic political value in the fact that three different parties can work together to formulate a comprehensive joint government program. That is again an acknowledgment that the way to influence for these parties is through open trustful cooperation.

In the coming election campaign the Government's long-range program will be the most tangible expression of a real nonsocialist alternative with appeal to broad voter groups. Against this background we can well understand the woeful complaints from Elverum, from a newspaper which in our more recent political history has opposed every constructive drive in the direction of a credible alternative to socialism.

We share Kristiansen's interpretation of the significance of the long-range program as a common denominator for nonsocialist policy. OSTLENDINGEN is thus on the right track when in this connection the newspaper writes about a new manifesto of cooperation. That is exactly what it is, something we for our part will greet with pleasure. In addition there are the individual party programs which stress the parties' distinctive qualities, their political identity. That, too, is necessary in order to create maximum support for the nonsocialist government alternative.

#### Concern Over New Conservatives' Chairman

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 25 Feb 84 p 3

[Text] The top leaders of the middle-of-the-road parties have expressed alarm over the prospect of a stronger Conservative emphasis through the possible election of Erling Norvik as chairman of the Conservative Party. Some people also find recent statements of Norvik to be a rapprochement with the Progress Party. "The Conservative Party cannot be disestablished," denies incumbent Conservative Party chairman Jo Benkow and stresses the party's responsibility as a government partner.

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## SIPRI PEACE RESEARCHER AGRELL: SUBS PART OF USSR POWER DISPLAY

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 13 Mar 84 p 3

[Commentary by Per Knudsen: "Peace Researcher Regarding Submarines: A Soviet Power Display"]

[Text] Sweden has for decades heavily underestimated Soviet distrust of the country's neutrality, Peace Researcher Wilhelm Agrell believes, who sees the submarine offenses as deliberate Soviet revenge after the humiliation in the wake of the U-137 which ran aground.

The hunt for presumed frogmen and foreign submarine activity in the skerries opposite Karlskrona on the Swedish southeast coast went into its 31st day on Monday.

On Sunday evening the Swedish armed forces exploded a mine in Bollösund [Bollö Sound] between Aspö [Asp Island] and Hasslö. At the same time three so-called shock charges were detonated near Kungsholmsfort between Aspö and Tjurkö.

The explosion of the mine was provoked by new "indications," the armed forces staff reported, which is convinced that there is still at least one foreign submarine inside the mined-off area.

Around the time of the explosion a minesweeper searched the ocean floor near Bollösund, while a helicopter by means of searchlights reconnoitered the beaches within the barricades near Hasslö Bridge.

Last week the Swedish armed forces staff presented a so-called "technical proof" that foreign submarines had invaded Swedish territorial waters, but during the weekend Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme stated that he still found it too early to draw any conclusion regarding the submarine hunt of the last few weeks.

#### Speculations

There is much to indicate that the Swedish navy will this time also not be in a position to present /visible/ [in italics] proof of submarine invasions, but

however this has not prevented others from presenting /their/ [in italics] solution to the mystery in the Swedish skerries.

The Workers' Communist Party can, for instance, report from its annual meeting in Malmö that it is /not/ [in italics] a question of "Soviet submarines, minisubmarines or frogmen." It is really only Sweden's own military and the country's right wing that these days is "waging a private war against the Swedish people." By reporting on the submarine hunt Swedish journalists have "prostituted themselves in a dirty game," which according to the Workers' Communist Party has only the objective of "torpedoing Swedish neutrality" and "undermining relations between Sweden and the Soviet Union."

At the other end of the political spectrum, in the conservative party, the Moderates, and in the non-socialist Swedish press, strong emphasis is being placed on some statements made by Russian former UN Vice-General-Secretary Arkadiy N. Shevchenko who defected to the West in 1978. He reported that the Soviet Union is working on plans for hiding Soviet nuclear submarines in Swedish and Norwegian fjords in case of an international crisis. According to Shevchenko, the Soviet Politburo at the beginning of the 70's reluctantly gave the armed forces permission to undertake the necessary charting of Swedish and Norwegian coasts.

According to Major Robert Elliot of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, the Swedish skerries are an excellent training ground for the Russians, and he does not find it strange that the Soviet military leadership wants to procure the most knowledge possible regarding the naval station at Karlskrona, which lies opposite some of the Warsaw Pact's most important bases on the Baltic Coast.

### Espionage Theory

Swedish Peace Researcher Wilhelm Agrell, who works at the Institute for Peace and Conflict Research at Lund University, is, however, very skeptical about these unequivocal explanations which point out espionage and war preparation operations as the most important reasons for the activities of submarines in the Swedish skerries.

"I think that some form of military common sense must be attributed to the other side," Wilhelm Agrell says in a conversation with INFORMATION.

"Espionage operations have the objective of charting certain conditions, i.e., ocean floor conditions, armed forces installations and the like. And here normally one is not interested in having the operation discovered. On the contrary. Espionage operations must be carried out in secret so that the party spied on does not know that espionage operations have taken place and in any case not /where/ [in italics] they have taken place and to what extent."

In Agrell's opinion there has not been a question of such espionage operations. "On the contrary," he says, "we can assert that because of the nature of the submarine invasions over the last two and a half years the Swedish armed forces became informed of the presence of minisubmarines; knowledge has been gained

of a coherent system regarding submarine warfare; it is known that these vessels can move far into Swedish territory and that they are doing so; knowledge has been gained of foreign divers who are attempting to explore certain military installations; it has been learned that these vessels are heavily armored and they can withstand a quite strong weapon attack."

"It can thus be said that via these operations a capability has been disclosed which the Swedish armed forces up to now were not aware that the Soviet Union had."

"Added to this is the fact that the invading vessels did not immediately leave Swedish territory when these operations had been discovered. On the contrary, an attempt was made to remain within the territory as long as possible instead of evading the hunting forces. This is a pattern which appeared already in 1982 when the first regular submarine hunts were established."

#### Soviet Revenge

Wilhelm Agrell's conclusion is therefore that it is first and foremost a question of a Soviet power display which must be seen not least in connection with the running aground of the Russian U-137 submarine in October 1981.

"I do not think," Agrell says, "that it was really understood in Swedish quarters /how/ [in italics] hurt and humiliated the Soviet Union felt on this occasion. My interpretation is that in Soviet quarters the Swedish action was perceived as a provocation, which can sound absurd since Sweden certainly according to common international law was the injured party. But nevertheless the Swedish reaction and protest was seen as a provocation against the leading naval power in the Baltic, or the /world's/ [in italics] leading naval power. This is how the Soviet Union certainly perceives itself. The Russians are, not least for historical reasons, fantastically sensitive about this type of humiliation and for this reason I believe that everything which has happened since 1982 has been a way of retaliating."

"They go quite deliberately into Swedish waters and behave in a manner so that they are more or less sure to be discovered. There have been examples of the snorkel's being raised in the middle of the skerries, and you do not do this if you do not want to be seen. The result is that the Swedish military is being ridiculed, or is ridiculing itself."

"In this way this conflict has gained a life entirely of its own. A power struggle has been begun regarding access to Swedish waters and neither of the parties seems now to be able to step down their activities without losing face."

#### Soviet Distrust

But what would the underlying political objective of such a power display be? Here Wilhelm Agrell believes that there is a long line of explanations which bear on one another:

"It is certainly obvious that there must be some good underlying reasons for the fact that the U-137 could become the spark which caused this conflict to flare up. Here I think that in Swedish quarters we have been more or less blind to the fact that the Soviet Union in the entire postwar period has had a very skeptical attitude toward the Swedish armed forces and above all toward our neutrality."

"Here it is a question first and foremost of Sweden's relations with the Western World and credibility in the fact that Sweden in a conflict situation can or will remain completely free and independent of the Western powers. Right since the Second World War the Soviet Union has directed harsh criticism against Sweden as far as these questions are concerned, but in some way or another, especially in the 60's and 70's, this problem area has been completely disregarded. There has been no debate at all regarding relations between Sweden and the Soviet Union and about the Russians' view of Swedish neutrality in this period's defense and security policy debate. It is as though no thought at all has been given to this dimension."

An example of this is, according to Agrell's opinion, Sweden's behavior in connection with the "weapons deal of the century" in 1974-1975, when Saab with the government's active assistance attempted to sell Viggen fighter planes to NATO countries in competition with F-16's.

"The government went so far as to guarantee that we even in a war situation would continue deliveries of spare parts. This kind of promise was given apparently without thinking of how it would be interpreted in Moscow and what consequences it would have for the Soviet Union's view of Sweden's neutrality."

"I accordingly believe that in Soviet quarters there has been far greater distrust than we in Swedish quarters have been conscious of. There are also clear signs that this distrust increased at the end of the 70's."

"This is associated partly with the fact that we have had several changes of government in Sweden. Continuity in Swedish foreign policy has been put in doubt. It was not farther back than in Erlander's time when the same people sat in power for decades."

"At the same time noticeable worsening occurred in relations between the super-powers, which is also an important precondition for activation of the latent distrust. In addition, there is the increased interest in the Scandinavia area both on the part of the East and West."

Wilhelm Agrell is thinking here of the military buildup on the part of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. On NATO's part it is a question of expanded exercises and support stations in North Norway and the whole question of the cruise missiles, which could fly over Scandinavia. At the same time a change has taken place in the Soviet Union's view of the Baltic. Since the middle of the 50's the main emphasis has been placed on the Kola Peninsula, which is now the world's largest naval base and the stronghold for two thirds of the Soviet Union's nuclear-armed strategic submarines. But since the middle of the 70's

the Baltic has gained greater importance still again, which according to Agrell is associated with the Soviet Union's gradual changeover to a global naval strategy.

Against this background it has been asserted that Scandinavia is about to assume the role of a possible European front in a clash between the superpowers. However, Wilhelm Agrell is very skeptical about this interpretation.

"The tension has indeed increased along the entire 'confrontation front' between the East and West. We can see it in the Far East (the South Korean passenger plane), in Central Asia (Afghanistan), in the Middle East, in Central Europe (the cruise missiles and Pershing II's) and, of course, in Northern Europe (Poland, the Baltic and North Norway). But it can be said that increased tension has perhaps a more dramatic effect in areas which formerly were considered areas of relaxation of tensions. In Central Europe, which has always been a high-tension area, the increased tension is for this reason not felt so markedly as in Scandinavia."

#### Scandinavian Countries in Same Boat

Seen in this connection, the submarine invasions in Agrell's opinion are very important and they raise the whole question of the Soviet Union's view of small countries and the neutrality of small countries:

"There is no doubt that the situation of the Scandinavian countries is worsening these years. The entire Finnish debate, for instance, reflects quite obvious fear for Finland's delicate position and how it can be affected by the current conflict. In the Norwegian and Danish security policy debates, too, there are indications that there is beginning to be consciousness of what dangers the conflict entails."

"What this can lead to in the longer term I dare not predict, but it can well be that gradually new interest will arise in the Scandinavian countries in discussing security policy questions on a mutual basis. With this I am not saying that a Scandinavian defense alliance should be considered, or anything in this direction; I think this is very far from the situation we find ourselves in at the moment, but in any case I think that there gradually will come an understanding of the fact that to a great extent we are in the same boat and that what happens in one country will also have a decisive influence on what happens in the other Scandinavian countries."

#### Peace Movement

What consequences such a new consciousness will have for the peace movement Wilhelm Agrell dares not predict: "But in the short term it can indeed be said that the submarine episodes, for example, touch on some approaches to problems which the peace movement either has not wanted to or not been able to take up. There has been a tendency toward not wanting to become involved in immediate security policy problems. This is true especially in Sweden, where the submarine episodes to a great extent have been regarded as an upsetting phenomenon. To a great extent the focus has been on the problems of nuclear

weapons and the nuclear threat and, thereby, primarily on problems on the international level."

"But when immediate security problems bubble up in this manner in some way one's picture of the world must be made to fit harsh realities, and this has perhaps not really been done."

"This is certainly due to the fact that the immediate security problems are sort of being regarded as the opposite side's 'side of the road.'"

"There exists a reluctance to enter into these questions at all. Anything else possible in relations between the East and West would rather be discussed."

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## FABIUS ON EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION, RESEARCH

Paris L'UNITE in French 9 Mar 84 pp 17-19

[Interview with Laurent Fabius, minister of industry and research, published in L'UNITE, a weekly Socialist Party paper: "Laurent Fabius: 'A French Silicon Valley? It's Already There!'" ; date and place not specified]

[Text] Three nice scientific and technological achievements --the Airbus 320, the Esprit program and Ariane--have proved, within one week, that when Europe is united it can pull itself up to the rank of a world leader. This is something Laurent Fabius, minister of industry and research, firmly believes.

[Question] Recently, the general manager of CGE [General Electricity Company], Mr Pebereau, was saying that his company was a small/medium size enterprise compared with IBM or ATT. Now, we know that in high technology sectors, such as electronics, Europe can survive only through industrial cooperation, something which has not yet really started. Would you say that research on a European scale would be a prerequisite?

[Answer] I believe so. As far as industry is concerned, European cooperation is necessary, but few agreements have been signed until now. The latest one is very positive; it is the agreement between Bull and Philips for the joint creation of the "memory card" which will give this French and European product a leading position in the world. But if we draw a balance of European industrial achievements over 15 or 20 years, except for Airbus and Ariane, the results are unfortunately not very good. Scientifically, I believe we are beginning to see some action. Large European-scale projects have been completed: the ECNR [European Council for Nuclear Research] for nuclear physics, the Jet program for fusion, and we have now just approved a program which is halfway between research and industry (this is what we call "precompetitive research") dealing with all data-processing technologies: it is the Esprit program, undeniably the most ambitious decision made by Europe in many years, as far as new technologies are concerned.

[Question] What is it all about?

[Answer] Esprit is a program that will cost close to 10 billion francs over a 5-year period; its goal is to encourage research in software technologies, advanced microelectronics, robotics and factory automation. In other words, all technologies of the future that have to do with information. It is financed half by enterprises and half by the European Community. Those who qualify to get financing are of course universities, laboratories, European enterprises, whether large, medium-sized or small, and the projects financed must belong to the sectors I have just mentioned. This is the first time that we truly make a material effort to catch up with Japan and the United States.

[Question] Speaking of catching up, some say we are 15 years behind the United States?

[Answer] That depends on the sectors. Take computer software for instance; we are one of the three leading countries in the world. As far as professional electronics or aeronautics are concerned, we are in a very good position. For components, on the other hand, France had fallen considerably behind; we are trying to catch up. It is true that, during the past 10-15 years, the necessary efforts were not made with respect to education, research, investments. And France is not always big enough. Let us take an example to show what is at stake: the total sales of our largest computer company, Bull, which are now improving markedly, amount to only half the research expenditures of IBM. This shows you what is at stake! It means that we cannot often go it alone and that Europe must attempt to form collaboration agreements. This is the meaning of the European dimension of science and industry which we have in mind.

[Question] How does the Esprit program envision industrialization subsequent to research?

[Answer] Let us take an example: you could have a French group, a German group and an English university cooperating on a research program. Once results have been achieved, all partners may decide to industrialize and market them together. When you pool research efforts, you also encourage people to pool their industrial efforts.

[Question] Esprit is for electronics. Are there other European research projects under way? I am thinking of the biotechnologies.

[Answer] There are, but first let us take a look back. Last week has been one of the most positive weeks that Europe has known for years, scientifically speaking, since that single week saw the adoption of the Esprit program, which is chaired by the French and had been under consideration for two years; the firm decision to build the Airbus 320--which means that by 1990 Boeing will not be alone in the world, but there will also be a first-rate European program for civilian aeronautics. And the night of Sunday to Monday saw the success of Ariane, which is its passport to great commercial prospects.

Therefore, a single week saw three nice European technological and scientific achievements; this shows that, when European countries join forces, they can be among the world leaders. As far as research is concerned, I have three goals for the six months of the French chairmanship. First, approval of Esprit, and that is done. Second, approval of a biotechnology program. Biotechnologies will be just as important during the 1990's as electronics were during the 1970's. That sector will radically change industry and agriculture. Think that these technologies can both provide a solution to our agricultural deficit, for instance by helping us produce proteins which, until now, we cannot do in France, and resorb our dairy surpluses by using them to make industrial raw materials. These technologies will also play an important part in the chemical industries, the sanitation sector, etc.

France is in a rather good position because it has several dynamic enterprises; I am thinking in particular of SANOFI [Aquitaine Financial Omnium for Hygiene and Health], Rhone-Poulenc, Roussel-Uclaf, Lafarge and a whole series of small and medium-size enterprises which are in a very good position. We have first-rate labs, for instance the Pasteur Institute, Merieux, etc. In that case too, however, French entities are not always of an adequate size. This is why we are considering pooling our European research in a biotechnology program. We have obtained that, at the next European Research Council meeting, late in May, the European Communities will be in a position to approve a program of action.

[Question] What will this biotechnology program involve?

[Answer] Not all conditions are known yet. A lot will depend on decisions made in a few days at the Brussels summit, depending on whether or not financial means will be available. What has been practically agreed on already is that there will be at least an inventory of all that is being done in Europe, which is often not known; then, a parallelism of research efforts to avoid costly duplications.

The third goal, which should be reached too, is to adopt a program to stimulate exchanges among European researchers. Nowadays, our researchers like to get additional training in the United States and in Japan. That is all very well! But why should they not also move around in Europe? This is why France has taken two initiatives. To encourage researchers' mobility within the Community through very concrete measures: for instance, years spent abroad are taken into account in researchers' careers; equivalent diplomas are recognized; laboratories are twinned; and additional housing and transportation costs are reimbursed throughout Europe. In that case too, we should be in a position to make decisions in May 1984. Simultaneously, we have also obtained that the first meeting of the 21 research ministers of European Council countries, which will consider the same question: encouraging researchers' mobility, be held in Paris, in September. Considering that there are more researchers in Europe than in Japan, and nearly as many as in the United States, we must improve the overall coordination of our efforts. All this should now begin to materialize.

[Question] In France, now. How can we bring industry and research closer to each other?

[Answer] Our objective under the research orientation and programming law is both quantitative and qualitative. Quantitatively, research expenditures should reach 2.5 percent of the gross domestic product. Qualitatively, certain barriers should disappear and the scientific community and its work should go first. Quantitatively, in 1984 we should reach 2.2 percent of the gross domestic product; that would be the largest effort ever made by the country. The previous figure was 2.16 percent in 1967. After that, there was a decline. Although much still remains to be done, we have reversed the trend since 1981, and that means a lot.

The removal of barriers: until now, the industry and the research worlds have been wary of each other. We are making an effort to overcome this barrier. At a recent cabinet meeting, a series of measures were adopted to encourage industrial research; allow me to mention a few: in 1984, 50 percent of the Research and Technology Fund will be devoted to industrial research. Industrial training agreements using CIFRE [expansion unknown] research grants--to enable researchers to write their theses in the context of companies, which often hire them afterwards--will double already in 1984.

As far as small and medium-size enterprises are concerned, we are developing a system of "technological consultations" with experts, 70 percent of which will be financed by public funds. A total of 10 measures have been taken to overcome barriers, and the results can already be seen. More generally, we are trying to strengthen the ties between public research and industrial research by developing the implementation potential of the former and enabling the latter to rely on the expertise of our large laboratories and universities.

[Question] What could we do to help young engineers create enterprises? Is it not a complex problem?

[Answer] First, it is a question of state of mind. An increasing number of enterprises are being created in France. Fortunately, a lot more are created than fold, but this is rarely said. Creating enterprises is one of the best ways to fight unemployment. Therefore, we should do all we can to encourage the young to do just that. Engineering schools are making a contribution by making sure that, during their school years, students get to learn how enterprises are created. I would like this type of venture to become more common; it should not be the privilege of engineers alone, but should become more widespread.

[Question] National enterprises are recovering; how much research do they do?

[Answer] The operating contracts they signed with the State always include provisions for research. Since 1981, we have witnessed an appreciable increase in their research effort. It has been uneven, depending on the companies. Bull or Thomson, which operate in high-technology sectors, are obviously spending proportionately more on research than some other sectors.

Yet, in all cases, efforts are required. We have reached figures of 5-10 percent and over. The future trend in industrial production will be for products to incorporate an ever greater amount of grey matter, i.e. of research. I also intend to take advantage of the forthcoming renewal of the boards of public enterprises to increase the number of researchers on these boards.

[Question] Would you say that researchers, like sales people, were usually left out when industrial decisions were made?

[Answer] Often, yes. There was a tendency to see scientists as professors living in the clouds. But the development of enterprises, their ability to create jobs require huge research efforts.

[Question] Not all research is industrial. What about research in other sectors?

[Answer] There, too, things are beginning to move, unevenly, but significantly. Initiatives are being taken in the human sciences: for instance, the creation of the International College of Philosophy which allows for a lot of freedom in philosophical research, without requiring any diplomas, in the context of the Montagne-Sainte-Genievieve. In economics, we have launched a new research program and gathered existing teams in an applied research center, the CERNEA [expansion unknown]. The CNRS [National Center for Scientific Research] is starting a large interdisciplinary program on "Work, Employment and Lifestyle," which brings together many university teams.

One of our objectives is to give scientists a better knowledge of our own society and the problems of our time. I would add that, despite the present crisis, the government is not neglecting higher research, especially philosophical research. Another initiative: I have just given the go-ahead to a team headed by Dominique Lecourt who is planning a large encyclopedia, like Diderot's, summing up all "live" scientific and technical issues.

Another example is the Museum of La Villette; it will provide for a wide dissemination of scientific and technical knowledge among the public. We are now witnessing a highly positive welter of ideas and achievements. We shall encourage them. In particular, 1983 was a very good year for French science: it was very well represented at the CERN in the discovery of new elementary particles; it enabled Rhone-Poulenc to industrialize a new synthesis of vitamin A; it took an active part in the fruitful scientific experiments that were used in the Spacelab of the U.S. shuttle. We could give many more examples to illustrate the international quality of our research. In spite of problems and limitations, all this was made possible only because the State kept giving-priority to providing human and financial means for research.

[Question] Let us come back to industrial research. In the conversion poles, results are awaited impatiently. Do you believe that the effects of these measures will soon become evident?



[Answer] Unfortunately, all this requires time. In the conversion poles, we would like to see the creation of new jobs and the development of training take place simultaneously with the elimination of certain jobs. Specific measures are being taken for that. For instance, an additional one billion francs was made available to national enterprises to implement industrial projects, and an additional two billion francs in CODEVI [Industrial Development Accounts] were also made available. But these amounts are not much compared with what it will take. Personally, I believe that it is just as important to create an environment favorable to job creation--development of training, research, engineering schools--than to create jobs directly, although we must obviously create directly as many jobs as possible. All this will require time and, to quote the president of the Republic, our task is to reduce to a minimum the gap between what we have now, a position resulting from inadequate industrial modernization during the past 15 years, and the changes that have become necessary. The government is working to reduce that gap as much as possible, especially through a massive training effort. Which is why time off can now be obtained for conversion, for periods of up to two years.

[Question] Do you think that we have the potential for a development like that of Silicon Valley?

[Answer] Yes, with a French approach. We already have a number of realizations like that: in the Grenoble area, in the Toulouse area, at Sophia Antipolis (near Nice), or again in the Essonne department. There, we have what is at the basis of Silicon Valley, i.e. a close link between research, the universities, and the creation of enterprises. We must encourage this type of linkage, in particular in the conversion poles. To this, I would add a financial aspect. We must encourage the financing of these activities by venture capital. I do hope that banks will soon have dynamic correspondents working in the conversion poles to help new projects take off, as far as industrial risks are concerned.

[Question] What about specific research financing for enterprises?

[Answer] We have decided to abolish complex subsidies and replace them with a research tax credit. This will allow enterprises to deduct every year from their taxes 25 percent of their additional research expenditures. What we are trying to do, whenever possible, is to change subsidies into tax reductions. As far as research is concerned, this will amount to about 750 million francs per year in tax reductions for enterprises. Also, do not forget that the Industrial Modernization Fund can finance research expenditures associated to an enterprise modernization program. This is something new and positive.

[Question] The other day, speaking about industry, the minister of finance was saying that 30 percent of the reorganization objective had been achieved. As minister of industry, what is your opinion?



[Answer] We are now facing an industrial mutation of the first magnitude. Certain nations in Europe and the Pacific area began to undergo such a mutation in the 1970's. As for us, we did not do enough then. For instance, from 1973 to 1981, investments declined nearly constantly and, in addition, our training effort was inadequate. Consider that, in France, only 25 percent in any age group have completed high school, compared with 95 percent in Japan. Our efforts to prepare for the future were not intensive enough, at the very time when growth was adequate to support them. Therefore, we must now complete them, in a time of crisis, which makes it twice as difficult. This accounts to a large extent for our present difficulties. We have started to tackle this huge task, always keeping human considerations uppermost in our minds. Yes, we are beginning to catch up, to prepare ourselves to meet future obligations, but I am not a demagogue: we are not at the end of the road, and we shall have to continue our efforts to recover, and do so justly.

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## BACKGROUNDS OF ECONOMIC CHAMBER TECHNOCRATS

Athens TO VIMA TIS KYRIAKIS in Greek 15 Jan 84 p 16

[Article by Nikos Roussis; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] The newly established Economic Chamber of Greece [OEE] acquires its first governing body on 16 January. Its 11-member administrative council, chosen in the November 1983 elections, is formed into a "body." Greece's "economic population" is finally acquiring official expression and representation.

There is party polyphony in its composition. /Giorgos Stathis/, 37 from Athens, graduate of AVSP [Piraeus Supreme Industrial School] and the School of Economics and Political Science of Salonica University, was president of the confederation which created the Economic Chamber and president of the OOE Temporary Administrative Committee until the eve of the elections on 27 November 1983. In 1978 he was secretary general and member of the DS [Administrative Council] of the League of Economists and Political Scientists from Greek and Foreign Universities. Today he is general director at the "Sismanogleio" Hospital. He was elected on the PASKO [expansion unknown] slate (which is on friendly terms with PASOK) and received 55 votes.

/Dimitris Kotsopoulos/, 50, from Messinia, is a high official in the Ministry of Justice. He studied political science at the Panteios Supreme School of Political Sciences and law at Salonica University. As president of the Graduates of the Panteios Supreme School of Political Sciences, he was among the main organizers of the First Economics Congress which took place in Athens in 1966. He too was elected on the PASKO slate and received 36 votes.

/Giannis Koutsoukos/, 30, graduate of ASOEE [Supreme School of Economic and Commercial Sciences], serves in the central service of the Ministry of Finance and is working to prepare the implementation of the FPA [Value Added Tax] in Greece. He was elected president of the Panhellenic Accountants Federation. He was elected on the PASKO slate and received 33 votes.

/Nikos Tzinieris/, 39, AVSP graduate, is an independent professional and is employed as an economics consultant to businesses. As a representative of OEE he is participating in the Central Advisory Committee of Development Law 1262/82. He was also elected on the PASKO slate with 33 votes.

/Thanasis Argyris/, 43, is an assistant professor of political economics at the School of Law and Political Science of Salonica University. Since 1982 he has been a professor at Greece's School for Regional Economic Development and Finance, chairman of its Economics Department, and chairman of the DS in the Salonica Harbor Organization. He finished the School of Economics at the Free University of Berlin and earned a doctorate with honors. He was also elected on the PASKO slate with 33 votes.

/Evangelos Kavvadias/ is a graduate of ASOEE and has done post graduate studies in marketing. He is an ATE [Agricultural Bank of Greece] employee, a member of the DS of the bank's Association of Professional Personnel, DS member of the League of Economic and Commercial Sciences Graduates, general counsellor of OTOE [Federation of Greek Bank Employee Organizations], and vice president of the League of Greek Economists. He was elected on the DIKIO [expansion unknown] slate (which is on friendly terms with ND) and received 55 votes.

/Angelos Moskhonas/, 41, a graduate of AVSP, of the Center for Organization and Administration, and has taken ELKEPA [Greek Productivity Center] seminars on organizational subjects. Today he is working as an economics consultant to businesses. He was a member of the OEE Temporary Administrative Committee and was elected on the DIKIO slate, receiving 33 votes.

/Spyros Kanellopoulos/, 48, graduated from the commercial department of ASOEE and has been president and secretary general in various societies and associations. He has served as a fiscal officer in the Air Force. He was elected on the DIKIO slate with 31 votes.

/Kostas Lykourgiaris/, 37, is a graduate of AVSP, IEDE [expansion unknown], and ASOEE, and today is financial director of a private business. He was a member of the president's bench of the administration of the confederation which created the OEE, a member of the Nomarch Council of Attiki, and a member of the temporary administration of the OEE. He was elected on the DPK [expansion unknown] slate (which is on friendly terms with KKE), and received 30 votes.

/Apostolos Takos/, 30, graduated from the Economics Department of the Athens University School of Law, and has a master's degree from Leeds University in England. He works in the Directorate for Economic Studies in the Commercial Bank. He was also elected on the DPK slate, and received 18 votes.

/Themos Kalliakidis/, is a graduate of ASOEE and the Administrative Institute of the University at Dofin [transliteration]. He was a member of the DS of the League of ASOEE Graduates and vice president of the DS of the confederation which created the OEE. He is employed as a financial director in the stereo equipment company ADAMCO, AE [Inc.]. He was elected on the Renewal Party slate (which is on friendly terms with KKE-Int.), and received 14 votes.

11587

CSO: 3521/171

## AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY STRIKE THREATENS PRODUCTION SHUTDOWN

Athens I VRADYNI in Greek 18 Feb 84 pp 1,13

[Text] While the government repeats at every opportunity that its first priority is the defensive rearmament of the nation, the National Defense Deputy-Minister in charge, Mr. P. Zakolikos, made a shattering disclosure yesterday: the Greek aircraft industry (EAB) finds itself in an impasse and is in danger of shutting down. This terrible revelation came to complete the chaotic picture which prevails in public enterprises, a few hours after the dramatic confession in Parliament of the Minister of Labor, Mr. Yannopoulos, regarding the government's total failure in the nationalizations and in labor policy.

Mr. Zakolikos made the disclosure yesterday, at a meeting he had with planners of the Ministry of National Defense concerning the strike of EAB technical personnel, which has been going on for 15 working days, with a daily cost of 20 million drachmas. The minister admitted the legitimacy of the strikers' demands and he said that he would make efforts to satisfy them, provided the government's revenue policy is not overthrown.

Simultaneously, technicians, members of the D.S. [Administrative Council] of the Aircraft Technicians' Association, made shocking revelations at a press conference, regarding anomalies and inadmissible waste in the management of the EAB material; meanwhile the company's deficit (as the chairman of the Administrative Council, Mr. Fotilas, disclosed a few days ago) has reached 38 billion drachmas.

What Mr. Zakolikos did not say is that the technician's strike is due to his and his fellow ministers in charge intransigence. The collective labor agreement they were asking for in 1983 has not been signed yet! In fact the Aircraft Technicians' Association, in a gesture of good will, restricted their profession's demands to salary claims for 1983. Today the EAB technical workers' minimum salaries vary between 16,000 and 20,000 drachmas, at a time when the pro-government GSEE [Greek General Confederation of Labor] signed a National General Collective Agreement, setting the minimum daily wage of an unskilled worker at 1,202 drachmas, that is a minimum salary of about 27,000 drachmas.

Mr. Zakolikos said that, in order to meet the strikers' demands, the amount of 960 million drachmas would be needed for 1984; but already, because of the intransigence of government officials, 300 million drachmas have been lost, since the strike costs 100 million drachmas every 5 days, not to mention the loss of

prestige and credibility of the EAB in the international market.

The striking technicians demand a fixed pay scale, which will preclude "parachutists" from the company and will ensure its productive and profitable functioning. It is revealing that the ratio between administrators and technical workers is 5 to 3 (2,500 administrators against 1,500 technical workers) whereas in the corresponding manufactures abroad the ratio is 1 to 6.

A further proof of the EAB's wretched state, denounced by one of its former vice-presidents, is the frequency of elections in its administration. Within 3 years it has changed 3 administrations and according to information a fourth "change" is impending.

#### Terrible Improprieties

The EAB technicians denounced yesterday a series of improprieties, like machines that are not used, machine tools that have been discarded because no one knows how they work, unsuitable materiel (which is outdated), the consequences of all of which cost the economy million of dollars.

.They presented written proof of machines which remain unused or are hardly ever used and which cost \$400,000.

.Also of equipment in the copying and printing department (for micro-films, brochures etc.) of a total value of 5,748,805 drachmas which has been discarded.

.Of control apparatus of aircraft systems, which is not used either because it is outmoded or was meant to service a type of aircraft whose maintenance is not done by the EAB.

. Of materiel that has lost its technical specifications and a great deal of which is already outdated when it arrives. The value of each box weighing 1 kilo is \$24. Many tons of such materiel are wasted.

.Of spare parts that are "lost" because they come with the wrong set of instructions. It might well be the case there is a "stock" of spare parts and no one knows where they are kept.

All of which cause production delays and a waste of public funds.

Subsequently, the EAB technicians suggested taking an inventory of the equipment and its proper uses; checking unsuitable materiel and taking the necessary steps to return it; repairs and maintenance of the machinery and putting it to proper use; auctioning it off and selling it to bidders; remaining faithful to the company's quality standards and setting up a committee which will be responsible for an in depth investigation to uncover every aspect of materiel supply and how to turn this into account in order to protect the EAB from a "hemorrhage" of foreign currency.

As they told the VRADYNI, they had notified both the company administrators and the Ministry of National Defense 2 years ago about all of this but they never got any reply.

10 months of Government promises which never materialized to the technicians of the EAB are the cause of the 16 day strike of 1,500 members of that profession.

Once again, they stressed their main claim which is also the fundamental reason for their striking activities, in relation to their minimum salary which is much lower than the minimum wage of an unskilled worker.

The technicians' administrative council believes that the reason for the delay in signing the special collective labor agreement is that the factory workers' union, the PEEAB, which defers to the governmental PASKE [Panhellenic Militant Workers Trade Union Movement] which at the beginning held the majority in the association, was shunned by the technicians themselves because it never solved any of their problems.

"We will fight to reform our company for our own sakes and that of our country." It should be noted that work stoppage takes place between 9 to 11 a.m. and 1 to 3 p.m. daily, while there is a 24-hour work stoppage every Wednesday.

12278

CSO: 3521/206



## COMMENTARY ATTACKS STAGNANT ECONOMIC POLICY

Madrid ABC in Spanish 7 Mar 84 p 15

[Article: "Breakdown in Socialist Party"]

[Text] The list of questions asked of the prime minister on economic policy, recently raised at the meeting held with the Socialist Parliamentary Group, is the beginning of a crisis, both official and unofficial, for the present government. This statement by Prime Minister Gonzalez, together with the long meeting with trade union members affiliated with the UGT [General Union of Workers] which preceded it, is the prologue to a broad assembly of socialists scheduled for the middle of March at Moncloa Palace.

In his analysis of the tense political situation Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez, with good reason, placed special emphasis on the responsibility of the Workers' Commissions, which are carrying out a strategy leading to a call for general strike throughout Spain. However, he stopped short of completing this denunciation by not saying that the socialist trade union itself has signed, jointly with the communist trade union, the majority of the calls for strikes. He did not point out, moreover, that it is from a certain office in Moncloa Palace that someone is encouraging this social tension, in the hope of definitively disposing of the present minister of economy and finance. At the same time he did not make the slightest reference to the internal split within the government party at present, as reflected in the dismissals in various ministries (economy and interior) or in the Administration of Autonomous Communities (Andalucia and Murcia). He also made no reference to the repeated threats to resign made by two important economic ministers.

There lies the great error in the projected broad-based meeting of socialist ministers, members of Parliament, and trade union leaders with Prime Minister Gonzalez in March. Instead of bringing the whole government together in support of the minister of economy, the government party and trade unions are inciting each other to ask themselves questions on the economic policy followed for the past year and a half. The simple fact of holding this debate at Moncloa Palace already amounts to a victory for this common front of the Workers' Commissions, the UGT, and a sector of the Socialist Party represented in the cabinet which is opposed to Miguel Boyer [minister of economy and finance] and Carlos Solchaga [minister of industry and energy]. Thus, after 18 months in government, the Socialist Party is considering whether to replace the present economic policy with an expanded and

uncorrected version of the agreements reached at the Moncloa Palace. These agreements contributed so much to the serious deterioration of the Spanish economy.

We are not unquestioning defenders of the economic policy of Minister of Economy Boyer. Our views are known. However, we are convinced that his replacement, which would involve the preparation of another set of guidelines, would necessarily sharpen the economic crisis and lead to instability in economic policy. If there is room in the Socialist Party for a minimally realistic program, this is represented by the man who is now almost totally surrounded by some of his own comrades in the party and the government. If things have not yet totally stagnated, this is only due to the lack of decision shown by the prime minister himself.

5170

CSO: 3548/208

## REGIONAL OVERVIEW OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC CRISIS

Madrid DIARIO 16 in Spanish 9 Mar 84 p 13

[Text] Madrid--The trend toward narrowing the gap between rich and poor provinces has been interrupted in recent years, according to the national income report published by the Bank of Bilbao study service. Moreover, between 1979 and 1981 the differences between people living in rich regions and those in poor regions grew larger.

The growth of this disparity is due in large measure to the fact that the Spanish population has continued to abandon the interior in recent years to go live in coastal regions. Madrid continues to be an exception, because although it is in the interior its population has continued to grow since the crisis began in 1973. The primary concentration, however, is seen in Balears and the Canary Islands, and in the Mediterranean provinces. On the contrary, the regions that lost the most residents and were thus hamstrung in their ability to deal with the crisis, were Extremadura, Castilla-La Mancha and Castilla-Leon.

In addition to the loss of population in the poorest regions, the rate of activity has also fallen in these areas. For example, Andalusia, Extremadura and Castilla-La Mancha have an activity rate below 30 percent.


This decline in the activity rate, however, usually conceals a growth in the underground economy. In these very regions can be found the greatest discrepancy between the number of jobs and the number of employed people. These areas, on the other hand, have a lot of part-time employment in sectors such as agriculture and construction.

The data compiled by the Bank of Bilbao study service reveal that, contrary to what was assumed at first, the economic crisis has not hit the industrialized zones the hardest; the regions most dependent on the agriculture and services sectors have also been hurt. In this regard, one of the facts reported in the Bank of Bilbao study is important: "The greatest relative loss of jobs in industry was seen in Extremadura, the Canary Islands, Balears and Andalusia, which are not very industrialized." The economic crisis has drowned the few industries that did exist in the least developed areas, which do not receive official aid under the reconversion plans. Such plans cover the most industrialized zones almost exclusively.

Given the industrial crisis and the drought that has plagued the agriculture sector, the services sector has had the best response in recent years. In addition, as has happened in most developed countries, the services sector is gaining ground on agriculture and industry in Spain.

All these circumstances mean that the regional ranking by per capita income has undergone major changes. Madrid holds first place, followed by Baleares and Catalonia, which have pushed the Basque Countries back to fourth place.

Growth of Regional Income (1973 to 1981)



Key:

1. More than 2%
2. From 1 to 2%
3. Less than 1%
4. Decline
5. Annual Percentage of Change (in constant pesetas)
6. Average Spanish growth, 2.03

8926

CSO: 3548/213

## REVIEW OF DIRE SITUATION IN CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY

Madrid YA in Spanish 10 Mar 84 p 20

[Text] Production in the construction sector will fall by about 4 percent as a result of the 17.4 percent decline in public bidding over the past year, the evaporation of public investment, the delays in the housing plan, and the restrictive monetary policy being pursued by the government, with the resultant higher cost of money, according to statements made yesterday by officials of the National Construction Confederation (CNC).

The situation in the sector was termed disturbing, the primary cause lying in the decline in public and private investment, according to the CNC. Thus, in 1983, investment as a percentage of the Gross Domestic Product fell to 18.6 percent (it was 24.7 percent in 1974), meaning a loss of 1.3 trillion pesetas in value. In other words, in the last year 780 billion pesetas less was produced than in 1974. That amount would have created some 300,000 direct jobs and the jobless rate would have been 6 to 7 percent.

#### Administration Debt

In the view of the CNC, in addition to the severe contraction of investment, the sector has other problems stemming from the administration's debt to contractors, which totals 120 billion pesetas. This involves an additional financial burden of 25 billion pesetas a year for these firms.

The Ministry of Public Works, according to the CNC, has outstanding debts equal to the average of the administration's debts. The General Office of Highways is 2.7 months behind, while Hydraulic Works is 4.1 months behind. All together, the Ministry of Public Works owes 65 billion pesetas, involving a financial cost to businesses of over 13 billion pesetas.

Competition is becoming alarmingly fierce. There was an average decline of 23.1 percent in bids in the past year, the second-largest decline in 10 years. The average number of bidders per project has reached a record high of 8.3.

To solve this serious problem, the CNC proposes a more suitable classification of contractors and of the standards for admitting bidders to competitive bidding, thus eliminating participation by contractors without bona fide credentials. In this regard, the CNC regards as unacceptable the proposal by

the INEM [expansion] for the use of funds earmarked for community employment. Another serious problem facing the sector is the confusion generated by the transfers to autonomous communities. Because of this, the issuance of certifications and documents by the Institute for the Public Promotion of Housing (IPPV) has completely ground to a halt.

#### 4-Year Housing Plan

The housing plan was met with great satisfaction, states the CNC, because it represents progress over the last plan in terms of financing provisions as well as the processing of credit and assistance. Nonetheless, there has been an incomprehensible delay in publishing the plan, which has prevented the beginning of work on 33,000 government-regulated housing units throughout the country since January. This has meant the loss of 12,888 jobs in this sector in January alone.

The specific problems plaguing small and medium businesses in the sector stem from the lack of effective measures. Other matters of concern involve the need for a new, strict regulation of autonomous businessmen, and excessive competition by public enterprises and the bureaucratization of the administration.

The underground economy is of enormous concern, since it may account for as much as 20 percent of activity in the sector.

8926

CS0: 3548/213



## STRIKES, UNEMPLOYMENT CRIPPLE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY

Madrid EL ALCAZAR in Spanish 7 Mar 84 p 11

[Text] Labor conflicts are growing, day by day. Strikes and work stoppages are expanding to all sectors of the economy, threatening a labor stoppage which would involve the paralysis of the whole country. At present a Spanish region free of labor conflicts is hard to find. Specifically in Madrid yesterday [6 March] the construction and lumber industries were on strike. In the construction industry the characteristic note, just as on previous days, has been the war of numbers between management and the trade union organizations which called the strike. While the strike in the construction industry has not involved more than 1 percent of the workers in this sector, the Workers' Commissions and the UGT [General Union of Workers] state that 90 percent of the construction workers are out on strike. It is stated that 100 percent of the workers are out on strike in the areas most affected: Coslada, Getafe, Fuenlabrada, Leganes, Pozuelo Estacion, Villaverde, Moratalaz, Vallecas, Tres Cantos, Orcasitas, Parla, and Pinto. Meanwhile, in Carabanchel, the central zone, and Humanes the strike has affected 60 percent of the workers.

The companies most affected were Vallehermoso, Peninsular de Asfaltos, Fersa, Ferroviaria, Cubiertas MZV, Flosa, Jose, and Cotos.

A spokesman for the Workers' Commissions informed EL ALCAZAR that it was not true that pickets were forcing workers to go on strike. Rather, "their mission was to inform the workers that the strike was not political in character." At the same time the communist headquarters accused some companies of forcing their workers to come to work under threat of a lockout by management if the workers went on strike.

The spokesman of the Workers' Commissions stated: "We have held 11 meetings to consider a collective bargaining agreement, and even so there has been no agreement reached." He said that if the negotiation continued along the same track, there would be a general strike throughout Spain, since management has proved that it is opposed not only to accepting the salary increase requested by the two large trade union organizations, the Workers' Commissions

and the UGT, and which range between 8 and 10 percent, depending on the category involved, but also declines to apply the 40 hour week. Management is offering a 5 percent increase. It is expected that the strike will continue today and tomorrow.

On the other hand the lumber and cork industry of Madrid Province is on strike for the second, consecutive day of the 10-day strike resulting from stalled negotiations for an agreement, which have already gone on for 2 months. According to information available to the Workers' Commissions yesterday 7 March, the strike was total in Mostoles and the eastern area of Madrid. In Fuenlabrada 95 percent of the workers went on strike. In Arganda, 60 percent went on strike. In the central zone of Madrid 20 percent were on strike. In Torrejon 10 percent of the workers were on strike. Here there is only one company still operating, as the other companies have disappeared over the past few years.

The positions of both sides to the conflict may be summarized in the request for a 10 percent increase by the Workers' Commissions and the UGT, as against the 6 percent increase offered by management. The trade unions want 1,816 hours of annual work, compared to 1,927 hours in the government decree. They want an agreement valid for 1 year, subject to semiannual review, with the inclusion of Article 24 of the present agreement which provides a bonus of 25 percent above the eventual salary agreed upon for the workers.

For their part the independent woodworkers, principally engaged in installing parquet floors, have also begun a strike paralleling that of the salaried workers. They are asking for an increase of 15 percent in the charge for their services and for the postponement of the IGTE (General Tax on Business Activity).

#### Valencia

Yesterday 7 March work stoppages, strikes, and labor conflicts were the outstanding feature in Valencia and the surrounding province, according to Justo de Avila, our correspondent. At the RENFE Spanish National Railroads there was a 2 hour strike from 8 to 10 am, which affected long-distance trains. This repeated the stoppage from 9 to 11 pm which halted suburban trains.

Regarding the furniture sector, which includes two companies and 2,000 workers, strikes occurred and a demonstration took place before Generalidad Palace, at the end of which a letter was delivered to Prime Minister Juan Lerma.

At the same time many workers from the metals industry, which includes 30 small companies, went on a 24-hour strike.

The hotel workers have announced that, following a meeting of their directorate, no solution has been found for their dispute, and a strike has been called for 14 March, in the middle of the St Joseph holidays. Negotiations on a collective bargaining agreement covering the hotel sector were broken off on 1 March. While management offered a salary increase of 6 percent for this year, the Workers' Commissions are asking for 10 percent, and the UGT is asking for 8 percent.

The strike, which might begin before the time scheduled, will affect the whole province of Valencia and some 30,000 workers.

Yesterday morning construction industry management was presented by the workers with a notice of a strike scheduled for 12, 13, and 22 March.

Ford of Spain workers rejected the offers made by management in the new collective bargaining agreement, as a result of which negotiations were broken off by management, leading to the assumption that, beginning now, preparations for a strike will be made.

Yesterday there was also a strike by shipboard personnel of the Compania Transmediterranea, which forced the company to suspend its transportation services between the Balearic Islands and Valencia.

Elsewhere, in Castellon and in the lumber sector all companies were on strike, as were companies in Villarreal and Vall de Uxo. Clean-up crews at colle in Valencia are also on strike, due to the money owed them by the city administration.

Finally, there was a demonstration yesterday afternoon against the economic policy of the government, which moved through the center of the city.

#### Andalucia

A general strike called by the Workers' Commissions in Seville yesterday was followed by most of the workers in the industrial and service sectors and in the countryside, according to sources in the trade unions which called the strike.

In the construction industry, still according to the communist trade union, there were stoppages in Seville supported by 85 percent of the workers; in Cordoba, supported by 100 percent of the workers; and in Malaga, with 100 percent support by the workers.

The Workers' Commissions also announced that day laborers in 28 villages in Seville Province supported the strike call, later going on strike and holding meetings "with particularly high attendance in the villages of Fuentes, Ecija, and Puebla de Cazalla."

Strikes and workers' meetings also took place at 22 factories in Seville, with 90 percent worker participation at the Industrias Subsidiarias de Aviacion (ISA) [Aviation Support Industries], 97 percent worker participation for 2 hours at the Astilleros de Sevilla [Seville Shipyard], and 100 percent worker participation at RENFE [Spanish National Railroads], where there was a strike from 8 am to 10 am.

#### Santander

The majority of the 1,520 workers at the SNIACE plant in Torrelavega continued yesterday. It was their 14th day on strike, in the absence of an agreement in the negotiations for a new collective bargaining accord. After a meeting

of the workers it was decided to continue the strike indefinitely. The increase which management is offering is 6.5 percent, while the workers are demanding an increase of 12 percent.

Only 28 employees reported for work for each of the three shifts for essential maintenance services, while 23 workers not on strike reported for work during their normal shifts.

#### Asturias

Management at HUNOSA [National Northern Coal Enterprise] yesterday made an offer to trade union representatives for a collective bargaining agreement covering the coal mining sector, which has about 22,000 workers. The agreement would cover 3 years.

This plan, according to management leaders, "will not resolve the enormous difficulties the company is going through and will not exempt it from the great sacrifices which overcoming the present problems will require."

In this offer, which the trade unions will study and then return for negotiations next Thursday, management will require retirement at age 64, as a result of which during the 3 years of the agreement there will be 2,492 retirements. Combined with the rest of the vacancies anticipated, there will be 2,650 positions left vacant. In the management offer a broad-based process of mechanization and modernization is provided, which will be applied in segments of 27, 28, and 30 percent in each of the 3 years of the agreement, in addition to plans for the mechanization of internal and external services of the company.

Management also proposed a salary freeze for 1984, with the increase in wages for 1985 limited to the IPC minus three points. The increase in 1986 would be the same as for 1985.

5170

CSO: 3548/208

## INI PRESIDENT ON INTEGRATED ROLE OF PUBLIC SECTOR

Madrid ABC in Spanish 5 Mar 84 p 33

[Article by Enrique Moya, president of the National Institute of Industry (INI)]

[Text] The president of the National Institute of Industry analyzes in this article the role of INI enterprises in strategic sectors as support for the goals of the government's industrial policy. Enrique Moya proposes two responses to the question of which sectors are strategic and which ones the public sector can and should promote. The important thing, he concludes, is to point out that the action of the public sector will be one of cooperation with the national and foreign private sector and that its real role is to promote and not take the place of, to negotiate rather than exclude.

One of the prime objectives of INI enterprises is their presence in those industrial sectors considered to be strategic and which in certain cases are the so-called future or third generation sectors. To the extent that a government wants to promote development, it must make two major decisions: to determine which strategic sector is most effective for its purposes and choose the instruments it will use to support that sector.

Forms of government intervention can be summed up in three major categories: purchases by the government and support for research, incentives or regulation of the market and direct action in the business sphere of the public sector.

Government purchases as a driving force for technological development is, in my opinion, the most effective mechanism for making the most of strategic sectors. The United States is the country that has done this the most. I believe that in Spain, this tool can be (and is beginning to gain force as) a very useful type of industrial policy for the immediate future.

Intervention in the market, whether protecting or channeling private enterprise, has been done profusely through the tariff policy, price policies, official credit, tax exemptions, and so on. The result has been a distorted structure of costs and prices with respect to the international market. The angle pursued was to take advantage of the national market. Strategic



sectors chosen with this view of the domestic market are not so certain to generate the right technology making it possible to spread the knowhow to other areas.

The third form of government intervention, direct involvement in a business activity, has been done through public enterprises.

This public business activity can be pursued in a nationalized sector, which has generally been the case with public services, or in a competitive market on which public enterprise does not take the place of, but rather, coexists with private enterprise.

In contrast with what has happened in European countries, the government in Spain has made intense use of instruments based on the second kind of intervention -- that is, by giving incentives to and protecting private enterprise on a market, in which intervention has therefore occurred. And yet, public enterprise in Spain has been used in a very specific way and in limited volume compared with other European countries.

I believe that if we had laid the foundations for the development of enterprises in a free market situation, they would now have been capable of making the changes required of them without the major difficulties that the world crisis has imposed and that, at the same time, public enterprise would be bigger and more efficient. The current situation of the Spanish economy is not unrelated to this disproportion between the two types of state intervention.

Protectionism could only result in the lack of international competitiveness of our products. It has prevented the technological development that occurs when there is competition. Our public and private enterprises have not been thinking about productivity. Our products have not been adapted to international prices.

With respect to direct government intervention in strategic industrial sectors, the INI has played a relevant role in the different phases of the Spanish economy.

At the present time and looking to the future, strategic sectors such as electronics, data processing, food, defense, capital goods, and so on, are those which hold the Institute's attention with respect to the future.

The promotional role of public enterprise in sectors that have made up the Spanish industrial fabric, such as automation, has been important, especially around the mid 1960's.

In the past two decades, however, and especially during the crisis, the role of the public sector has been opposite that of the promoter. Its role has been to keep basic sectors in crisis, such as steel and shipbuilding, on their feet!

In the case of the public sector as promoter, the trend has been one of penetration when the sector was almost nonexistent, resulting in competition in the area of an infrastructure now established.



However, the public sector has at the same time suffered from the same problem as that affecting private enterprise relating to competitiveness. State intervention in the market has also affected it. The public sector has also had a protected market. When the private sector has not been capable of solving problems, its activity has fallen into the orbit of public enterprise. The fact is that given the existence of protectionism and public enterprise, the defense is to pass the crisis on to the public sector. This is what has happened in sectors in crisis. In sum, it can be said that:

The question is now: Which are the sectors of the future in which public enterprise can play a role and what will be the form of that role?

First of all, if the public sector is to play that driving role that I previously outlined, it can no longer be for the domestic market as it was in the early decades of the INI. The challenge is on the international market. The strategic sectors will be those with an international market. If there is something that stands out, this is what now defines a sector as strategic.

In this situation of the 1980's, the different instruments of intervention that must be brought together are, in my opinion, three in number: government purchases, funds for research and long-term, high-risk investments.

It is not a matter of protecting industry and obtaining licenses for technology from other countries. Government purchases must be used as a lever to finance technological development or its assimilation through compensation. Know-how must be incorporated into Spanish enterprises.

There are two answers to the question of which are the strategic sectors and which ones the public sector can and must promote:

The sectors must not be different from those which the countries into which we want to be integrated are developing: electronics, data processing, biotechnology, and so on. The question has more to do with specialization by product, by component or parts, meaning that even though "we import electronics," we also export equivalents.

Those which the public sector can and must promote are those with the longest period of maturation or financing requirements of 1 + D, those requiring greater bargaining power vis-a-vis foreign partners or competitors and similar reasons we have given. The important thing is to point out that action in this direction on the part of the public sector will be in cooperation with the national and foreign private sector and that its role is one of promoting, not replacing, negotiations, not excluding.

11,464  
CSO: 3548/203

## SAGUNTO CLOSURE ENVISAGED OVER LABOR UNREST

Madrid ABC in Spanish 5 Mar 84 p 41

[Article by C. de M.]

[Text] The National Institute of Industry (INI) has hinted at the possibility of a closure if workers at the Mediterranean Blast Furnaces (AHM) continue their disobedience of recent weeks. As announced yesterday, the INI does not recognize the validity of contracts promised as a result of the kidnapping of AHM head of personnel Ignacio Beristain.

In a bulletin published yesterday, the INI, as sole shareholder of the AHM, clarified its stand on events occurring over the weekend and stated:

- 1) its condemnation for illegal action carried out, culminating in the kidnapping of the AHM chief of personnel, issuing serious insults and threats against his physical integrity in an attempt to ensure that measures ordered by the enterprise and authorized by the Central Government Administration would not be applied;
- 2) its failure to recognize the validity of manifestations obtained as a result of the foregoing threats; and
- 3) its firm support for the decisions of AHM management concerning the application of the resolutions of the Labor Regulation and the stoppage of blast furnace 2, in addition to its determination to back the decisions of the AHM management in application of legal standards, including the closure by management as provided by the decree-law of 4 March 1977, and the instigation of disciplinary action in the case of the authors of these events.

In the meantime, AHM workers at Sagunto are continuing their disobedience with the shutdown of blast furnace 2, which occurred on the afternoon of 20 February, and they have announced a major demonstration in Valencia for tomorrow, coinciding with a general factory strike. In addition, the AHM enterprise committee has sent invitations to trade union confederations asking that the strike be observed in all sectors now involved in the conversion.

If the National Institute of Industry should order the shutdown of the iron and steel industry in Sagunto, the consequences could be much more serious

than the loss of jobs as a result of the cessation of activity of the overall headquarters that has now been proposed. Some 2,000 full-time and another 700 part-time workers would be out of jobs.

The shutdown of an iron and steel plant would have to be organized with the assistance of certain minimum services so that a number of facilities would continue in operation, those which for technical reasons cannot be stopped and restarted. In addition, in the case of Sagunto, the operation would not be profitable. If minimum services were not provided, the shutdown by management would be technically impossible or the consequences of such a shutdown could immediately multiply the number of jobs lost at Mediterranean Blast Furnaces.

11,464

CSO: 3548/203

## REDUCING STATE DEBT WOULD REQUIRE BASIC ECONOMIC REFORMS

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 1 Mar 84 p 2

[Editorial by Nils-Eric Sandberg: "Who Can Pay 500 Billion?"]

[Text] The Swedish national debt now totals about 500 billion [kronor]. This is money the governments have borrowed in order to avoid having to make the unpleasant decisions they are elected to make. The taxpayers are responsible for paying.

The first reflection one makes is "I can't afford it."

How are we going to be able to pay for this, considering the fact that the national debt grows at the rate of 80-90 billion a year?

First, a distinction must be made between loans in Sweden and loans abroad. The net national debt to foreign countries--more than 100 billion, if we include the foreign exchange reserve--must be repaid with export revenue, which requires the use of resources. Interest payments and amortizations of domestic national debt means "only" a redistribution of money within the country--that is to say no net burden on the economy.

The fact that the state is borrowing within the country has long been regarded by the economists as a fictitious problem; the national debt is mostly a question of bookkeeping. That is correct--in theory. But permanent budget deficits of about 10-14 percent of the GNP mean that the interest on the national debt grows with a snowball effect. Financing these deficits forces up the interest rates, or the total amount of money (and thus inflation); it is also likely that it displaces investments.

These are not fictitious problems. But a large national debt is not a new phenomenon. During the wartime years the state borrowed tremendous amounts, and at the end of the war in 1945 the national debt was over 50 percent of the GNP. Today it is about 70 percent of the GNP.

A comparison provides some perspective for today's problems.

After the end of the war the national debt shrank rapidly, in particular as a fraction of the GNP. Repayment occurred relatively painlessly (from the government's point of view).

If it worked out then, it could work out now--if conditions are the same. But they are not.

The national debt of the wartime years was a result of the wartime efforts. And they were temporary. From the end of the 1940's the economy was on a peace footing and restrictions were abolished.

The budget deficits now reflect a fundamental lack of balance in the economy: Public spending is growing more rapidly than the GNP, and partly as a result of this consumption is growing, relatively, at the expense of investments. This disturbance of the balance does not appear to be temporary, because the budget deficits are financed in a manner which reduces investments and therefore aggravates the imbalance.

Also, after the war the real interest rate was very regulated and very low. In the 1950's it was usually negative. This meant that inflation cancelled out a large portion of the national debt, that is to say the state repaid only a small fraction, at a fixed monetary value. The inflation functioned as a special tax for those who had been loyal enough to save with government bonds.

Now the real interest rate is high. Partly this is internationally determined, partly it follows the inflation rate. If the government allows the rate of inflation to rise in order to decrease the real value of the national debt, the interest rates will soon follow suit. And the national debt grows with the interest burden.

That path is thus blocked. The only alternative seems to be tight regulation of the entire credit market, combined with forced savings.

Third, production and productivity grew rapidly during the fifties and sixties. Partly this was due to increasing international demand for Swedish exports and the fact that it was a seller's market (for Sweden). And partly an enormous labor force switched from less productive agriculture to industry. Now, there is no equivalent productivity reserve--except in the service sector. And that is difficult to utilize, with the obstacles to mobility inherent in the wage and tax regulations.

After the war the national debt dropped as a proportion of the GNP, since the GNP grew rapidly. An increase at the same rate is not likely now and furthermore will not have the same effect on tax revenue, because now the public sector represents almost twice as large a proportion of the GNP.

Eliminating the budget deficit and slimming the national debt by means of greater exports are only theoretical possibilities. It requires an extreme increase in investment and production, which presumes large profits and low wage increases--over several years.

What is serious is not the debt as such, but the fact that financing it cuts back on the savings of households and companies and directs the funds to the budget, where they are used for current consumption. We are thereby

curtailing investments and shrinking the basis for the economic growth which could lead the country out of the crisis and out of the deficits.

Perhaps there will be a new "national defense tax" for the interest the state pays on the debt. But unfortunately it cannot be paid for the interest on the foreign debt.

11949

CSO: 3650/142



## 'HIDDEN UNEMPLOYMENT' BECOMING SERIOUS PROBLEM FOR PALME

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 9 Mar 84 p 8

[Article by Lilian Ohrstrom: "Record-High Hidden Unemployment"]

[Text] The AMS [Labor Market Board] and SCB [Central Statistical Bureau] will today issue statistics showing that open unemployment in Sweden has declined. But at the same time we have never before had as many engaged in activities controlled by measures of labor market policy as now.

The February unemployment figures were actually to have been released on Thursday. However, SCB's computers broke down and the figures were not presented until Friday. But although open unemployment has dropped drastically, hidden unemployment has never been higher.

The available jobs are increasing. The number of openly unemployed is dropping. There is a boom under way. But there is a great deal of criticism by the labor union movement against the government's employment policy.

## LO Criticism

"It is quite obvious that the tightly restrained policy conducted by the government does not create the demand needed in order for employment to be able to increase. More purchasing power is needed in the Swedish economy," it says in the editorial of the most recent issue of LO's [Federation of Labor Unions] periodical.


Each percent drop in real wages adds 20,000 persons to unemployment, the LO economists have figured out. It is permanent jobs and not temporary measures that the LO people are now calling for.

In one year the government has managed to keep employment constant only thanks to labor market measures. As many as 50,000 more people are holding public works jobs, undergoing labor market training etc. than a year ago.


## Many in Youth Teams

It is primarily the youth jobs which have contributed to this. The number of unemployed youths aged 18-19 was only 5,300 in February. This must be compared to 17,000 a year ago. In February 26,600 18-19-year-olds were instead working on youth teams.

## Unemployed including AMS measures



## Openly Unemployed



Each month the proportion of labor market measures grows which keeps more people in jobs. In one year the labor market measures have increased by more than 50,000.

Today there are more people without work, or who cannot work as much as they want to, than in September 1982.

Key: 1) Unemployed, incl. AMS measures  
2) Thousands  
3) Change of government

Instead of passively having their papers stamped and cashing unemployment benefits, they perform work which would otherwise not get done.

### Replace Permanent Jobs

"But if in one day the youth teams and the municipal public works jobs were to be eliminated, many activities in the municipalities would function very badly," says Lars Åke Almquist at the Municipal Workers' Union's section for labor market issues.

Through public works jobs and youth jobs work is being done which would otherwise be performed by permanent personnel.

business and industry. In January the so-called new hiring subsidy was introduced, which means that for 6 months an employer will receive a 50-percent wage subsidy from the government if he employs someone for a trial period or as a temporary employee.

But so far the hiring subsidy has not delivered what it promised. In February only 6,000 had been employed with the hiring support. It is a long way to the 40,000 which the AMS anticipated for the spring.

The Municipal Worker's Union views this with concern. While concentrating on industry the AMS has cut back on subsidies for public works jobs for the municipalities.

#### Time-Bomb

Today 45,000 are employed in public works jobs for the municipalities. In the fall there will be subsidies for only 25,000 jobs. What happens if industry fails to absorb those who have not gotten jobs with the municipalities?

"Here lies a time-bomb, which in one swoop could increase unemployment dramatically," Lars Ake Almquist says.

For the municipalities do not dare use their billion-kronor surpluses in order to expand services and provide more people with care and others with work.

"Municipalities and provincial councils are afraid of the government's jerky planning. They want reserves in case a subsidy suddenly disappears," Lars-Ake Almquist says.

A recent study made by the Municipal Workers' Union shows that the care of children and the elderly is not even being expanded at the modest rate previously planned.

#### Overtime Steals Jobs

The Swedish people works just as much overtime as all openly unemployed would need in order to have full-time jobs.

In 1982 the overtime was equivalent to 140,000 full-time employees. Since then overtime work has continued to increase.

This is shown in a study made by Marianne Axling at the AMS for the Delegation for Working Time Questions (DELFA). Half a million employees worked more than 40 hours per week.

The total overtime work was 215 million hours, and that is the amount of work normally done by 140,000 employees.

However, this many new jobs would not result if overtime work were limited, in the opinion of Berit Rolle, chairman of DELFA. Some of the overtime amount would be compensated for by increased productivity.

## REDUCTION IN NUMBER SEEKING JOBS AIDS UNEMPLOYMENT RATE

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 10 Mar 84 p 8

[Article by Lilian Ohrstrom: "Fewer People Work"]

[Text] There is now less unemployment, as DAGENS NYHETER reported on Friday. In February 139,000 persons were openly unemployed in Sweden, a decrease by 16,000 in comparison with the same time last year. The drop is due to the record number of measures in the area of labor market policy.

The computers of the Central Statistical Office [SCM] which were down the other day were capable on Friday of disgorging the new unemployment figures for February. These show a drop in open unemployment. They also show a smaller supply of labor, that is to say the number of persons who want to work and who have work is now smaller. This is because the number of retired people has increased.


With the help of the SCB and AMS [Labor Market Board] data, DAGENS NYHETER has constructed a diagram in which unemployment and the efforts made to reduce open unemployment can be seen.

Despite a tremendous effort in the form of labor market measures--as many as 222,700 persons are engaged in AMS training, public works jobs, youth teams, state-owned companies etc.--no more people are working now than a year ago.

In Sweden 4.19 million people hold some form of gainful employment. But this year 40,000 more are engaged in measures of labor market policy; 993,000 work in industry, and that is the same number as a year ago.

Although industrial jobs are increasing at the rate of 10,000 a year, this is not sufficient to absorb even those who are just entering the labor market, that is to say about 30,000 this year.

Even today nearly 570,000 cannot get jobs in the open market, or do not get as much work as they would like. At the end of the month of February there were about 42,000 jobs available.



According to information by the AMS and SCB for February, there are 570,000 persons who cannot get jobs in the open market, or who cannot work as much as they want to. At the same time there were 42,000 jobs available at the end of the month.

- Key:
- 1) Number in thousands
  - 2) Participating in labor market measures (public works jobs, labor market training, wage-subsidized employment etc.)
  - 3) Part-time unemployed (working part-time but want full-time)
  - 4) Hidden unemployed (would seek work if it were available)
  - 5) Jobs available at the end of the month
  - 6) Openly unemployed

11949

CSO: 3650/142

## GAINS FROM DEVALUATION CONTINUING TO IMPROVE EXPORT FIGURES

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 10 Mar 84 p 10

[Article by Bjorn Anders Olson: "Continued Increase for Swedish Export"]

[Text] The Swedish export success is continuing. Since the devaluation in October 1982, Sweden has increased its market shares abroad by 9.5 percent.

This was shown by a report compiled by the Board of Commerce.

According to the figures--which apply to processed goods except for ships--the Swedish export continued to grow faster than world trade as a whole even during the fourth quarter last year.

Increasingly more economists are otherwise insisting that the advantages of the devaluation have now been used up, which is why the first quarter this year could become something of a test for the devaluation and the capability of industry for utilizing it.

Between the third and fourth quarter of last year the Swedish export grew 4.0 percent in volume, seasonally adjusted. At the same time world trade increased 2.1 percent. This shows that, according to the Board of Commerce, Sweden increased its market shares abroad by 1.8 percent.

The Swedish export success depends largely on the fact that prices for Swedish goods have been lower, compared to the prices of the principal competing nations. Which, after all, was precisely the objective of the devaluation.

Since the devaluation, the Swedish relative prices--that is to say prices compared to those of the competitors--have dropped 10.5 percent.

Between the third and fourth quarter last year the Swedish export prices rose 0.9 percent, at the same time as the competitors' prices rose 1.4 percent. (Some of that difference is explained by the constantly rising dollar exchange rate at that time.)

Last year Sweden exported for about 211 billion kronor. The Swedish export volume grew 8 percent between 1982 and 1983. Simultaneously, world trade stood almost still; the volume increased by scarcely one percent. This means in turn that last year Sweden managed to grab an increasing market share of 7 percent during the course of 1983.



Footnote: World trade, in the manner used here by the Board of Commerce, means the total exports of the United States, Japan, Canada, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, the FRG, Italy, Holland, Switzerland, Great Britain and Sweden, that is to say the "Group of Ten," plus Switzerland.

11949

CSO: 3650/142

## REVIEW OF RECENT ECONOMIC LEGISLATION

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 18 Mar 84 p 15

[Text] Ankara--Four major new laws were published in the Official Gazette yesterday: the "sales law"--as it is known by its short name--the Public Housing Law, the law amending the Government Contracts Law and the law rescinding the Foreign Travel Expenditures Tax.

Thus the government has written off 18 billion Turkish liras in revenues expected from the Foreign Travel Expenditures Tax in 1984.

The law on "encouraging savings and boosting public investments"--known in short as the "sales law"--envisioned the issuing of revenue partnership bonds for some public service corporations and shares for others in order to encourage investments and the construction of public housing. The said fund is to be administered by a council to be headed by the Prime Minister or a minister to be designated by the Prime Minister.

The institutions for which revenue sharing will be introduced or whose management will be turned over to the private sector are defined in the law as follows:

"The Public Housing and Public Partnership Council may issue revenue sharing bonds for these installations on condition that property rights on their infrastructure are reserved by the appropriate public companies and corporations. The revenue sharing bonds will be issued in 'to the bearer' form. Management rights will be given for a maximum term of 15 years. This term is renewable."

The Public Housing and Public Partnership Council which will implement this law will issue a set of guidelines for this purpose. The council will then issue revenue sharing bonds and stock within the framework of these guidelines. Income derived from partnership in bridges and other similar installations will be exempt from taxes for 5 years.

Spending areas for the fund to be formed by the revenue to be earned are as follows:

"--Ten percent of the fund will be used in all types of investments in which public corporations will have a share of at least 10 percent and which will boost employment in areas with high development priorities.

"--Payments to holders of revenue sharing bonds.

"--The financing of infrastructure and other installations that may be included within the scope of legislation on revenue sharing bonds, stock and management rights."

The public partnership fund will be supervised by the Higher Supervisory Council of the Prime Minister's Office.

#### Public Housing

The Public Housing Law which envisions the creation of new financing resources to meet the housing demand went into effect after it was approved by President Kenan Evren. The revenues to be procured by the said law will be used to establish a Public Housing Fund under the jurisdiction of the Central Bank. According to the law, \$100 will be collected for each trip abroad.

The authority to designate areas for public housing construction has been given to the governors. The law envisions the nationalization of such lots, if necessary, by the Directorate General of the Cadaster Office. It is also stipulated that the subsidized projects be subject to the provisions of legislation on incentives.

Since the primary source of revenue envisioned by the law will be tax levied on the refinery selling price of domestic and imported fuel products--15 percent on gasoline and 7 percent on other products--the prices of petroleum products should be expected to rise in the coming days.

According to the law amending the Government Contracts Law--enacted in order to remedy some of the problems encountered in the building of certain special investment projects--the procurement of lots and the completion of property transfer and nationalization procedures will no longer be required before bids are opened on large projects such as dams and seaports. The criteria to be sought in the acceptability of bids and the maximum discount rates to be accepted will be determined by appropriate ministers every year.

According to another provision of the law, paymasters and all officials involved in the preparation, processing, selection and supervision of contract bidding procedures as well as their blood and in-law relatives up to the second degree will not be able to bid on government contracts. However, partners in joint stock companies are exempted from this provision on condition that they sit on the investment boards of the companies. The law also states that the contracts commission will not be held responsible if the contract is opened to bidding with missing documents.

Also published in the Official Gazette was the law rescinding the Foreign Travel Expenditures Tax which was introduced in 1964 but which has become unenforcable for a long time.

## BUSINESSMAN CAKIR ON INDUSTRY AS ECONOMIC PREREQUISITE

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 18 Mar 84 p 9

[Interview with businessman Yilmaz Cakir by CUMHURİYET correspondent Osman Ulagay]

[Text] Who is Yilmaz Cakir?

Yilmaz Cakir was born in 1943. He completed high school in Eskisehir and later graduated from the Eskisehir Academy of Economic and Commercial Sciences. After serving as an executive in several industrial corporations, Cakir served as the Secretary General of the Eskisehir Chamber of Industry for 9 years. He later served as Deputy President of the chamber for 6 years. Currently, Cakir is a member of the governing board of a holding corporation headquartered in Istanbul.

[Question]: What, in your opinion, is and should be the fundamental function of chambers of industry in a country like Turkey which is working very hard to industrialize?

Cakir: Industry chambers must first of all have an "industrialization philosophy or viewpoint" in connection with Turkey. The most fundamental and important mission of industry chambers, among their many other functions, is to formulate through research, debates and contacts an industrialization philosophy which will take into account the developments that will come in time, to imprint this philosophy in the minds of the new generation, the implementers, the press and the public in general and to defend that philosophy without compromise until our country is industrialized. A chamber of industry that does not have an industrialization philosophy will frequently encounter contradictions in the views it promotes and the initiatives it undertakes and will be discredited before the public. The press will flash headlines such "Industrialists Cannot Agree Among Themselves." Until now chambers of industry have been presented to the public as "organizations which promote and defend the interests of the private industrial sector", or, in other words, "organizations which serve the function of officially representing the private industrial sector."

[Question]: When we say "industrialization philosophy", what must be done to formulate a basic outlook for such a philosophy?

Cakir: In order to formulate an industrialization philosophy, chambers of industry must first assess their views regarding such issues as development

plans and strategies, balance of payments, taxation policies, investments, basic education and universities, foreign capital, banking, advancement and transfer of technology, public service corporations, industrial free zones, relations between Turkey and the EEC, land reform, overseas contracting services, relations between Turkey and Middle Eastern countries, the collective bargaining system, the expansion of East-West trade within the context of world trade, relations with the Eastern Bloc, the utilization of natural resources and the establishment of a capital market. Once basic views are determined on these major issues, it becomes easier to take stances in response to economic decisions taken and implemented at home and overseas and to prevent contradictory viewpoints.

[Question]: Do you think that industry chambers in Turkey do not have basic views on the issues you mentioned? In other words, do they not have a definite philosophy regarding the industrialization of Turkey?

Cakir: It is hard to say that they do. If they had one, the Turkish industry would be in a much better state today. Definitive stances could have been taken against incorrect economic decisions taken at various times and consistent counterproposals could have been developed. Industry chambers could have a stronger influence on governments and could command more public respect. In many Western countries, a statement by the head of an industry chamber can be the leading news item, but we are still far behind that stage. Let me give you a concrete example on the issue of relations with the government. In the last three or four years, prime ministers have had not more than two meetings with the heads and representatives of industry chambers. Promises have been made to the effect that frequent meetings will be held, but they have not been held. At least two or three such meetings must be held every year. In industrialized countries this has become a routine matter. It is known in advance when and where the meetings will be held and they are held regularly. Naturally, industry chambers in those countries do not go to such meetings with empty hands; they take to the meetings very serious reports and well-thought viewpoints. The public perception that industry chamber leaderships in Turkey have been very close to governments at certain times has also hurt the respectability of the chambers.

[Question]: You have cited examples from the West. Could you elaborate a little more on that issue? How do industry chambers operate in industrialized countries? What are their functions?

Cakir: Industry chambers in industrialized countries operate exactly like "service corporations." They provide a very high-quality and timely package of services--including physical services--to their industrialist members very efficiently and at a minimal cost. At the assembly meetings of these chambers world markets are discussed at the country and subject level, and depending on their importance the political, economic and social aspects of the subjects are examined in detail to formulate competitive strategies for each country's market.

Delegations are formed from among the members of the general assembly to visit country groups. For example, delegations are formed for North Africa, the Near East, the Far East, South America, North America, Australia and so on. Each

delegation organizes at least two business trips to the countries in its region. The program of such business trips is prepared with the help and cooperation of appropriate ministries and the embassies and trade attaches in the countries to be toured. Issues are debated and discussed in all their aspects with businessmen and representatives from the industry chambers, the related ministries, the political parties, the press and the international organizations of the countries visited. Delegation members also hold talks at the company and subject levels in connection with their private businesses. After the trip is completed, an extensive report covering the economic, political and social conditions of the countries visited is prepared and the report is presented to a special session of the chamber's assembly. Thus, members of the chamber's assembly are adequately informed about all the world's markets and are able to take more consistent decisions regarding their own firms. Furthermore, there are direct telex and telephone lines between the industry chambers and the trade missions in countries with which there is a large volume of trade. Trade missions compile all the useful information in the countries they are in and dispatch it to the industry chambers on the telex or the telephone. Industry chambers pass on this information to their members within at most 24 hours. The flow of information is thus maintained in an efficient and punctual manner.

[Question]: What is done at home?

Cakir: Information related to industrial production, employment, turnover, profits, stocks, capacity utilization and investments are compiled at short intervals to be evaluated at a data processing center and conclusions reached on the basis of results are reported to the public and official authorities. When necessary, statistical data on industrial organizations in a certain region or the entire country is gathered and compiled accurately every week and used in economic forecasts. When the statistics are accurate, forecasts also turn out to be generally accurate.

One of the primary functions of industry chambers in Turkey is to pioneer the gathering of error-free statistical data and to provide services in this area. One sector that is most adversely affected by incorrect economic decisions stemming from inaccurate statistical data is the industrial sector.

[Question]: How can industry chambers approach the solution of this problem?

Cakir: Every industry chamber must form a data processing center. As far as I know, no industry chamber in Turkey has a data processing center in this sense. Not much need to be spent for such a center. With a mini-computer center that can be set up for 1.5 to 2 million Turkish liras, industry chambers can at first store information they already have. By training and helping their members they can then start gathering accurate information. When industry chambers begin gathering accurate information through their members, they will see that they will also be able to influence the government in compiling accurate statistics.

[Question]: What other functions can industry chambers have?

Cakir: Another important function that the industry chambers can perform is the establishment of organized industrial zones, which constitute one of the essential elements of industrialization. An organized industrial zone is an



area where all types of infrastructure amenities--such as roads, electricity, sewage and drainage lines, industrial water and steam and communication lines--are already provided. These zones are sold at cost to firms and corporations on a long-term basis. Only organized industrial corporations can build plants in these zones. In industrialized countries, for the past 100 years organized industrial zones have been built by industry chambers with the assistance of the government. In fact, this arrangement has advanced so much in industrialized countries that some private companies build organized industrial zones and rent them to prospective industrial corporations for terms of 15 to 20 years.

[Question]: Is there an industry chamber in Turkey that builds organized industrial zones?

Cakir: The industry chambers of Eskisehir, Konya and Bursa did that and were very successful. Some industry chambers, namely those of Adana, Ankara, Izmir, Denizli and Kayseri, are working on setting up organized industrial zones, but clearly they are too far behind.

[Question]: Can industry chambers perform functions in connection with other investments in their regions?

Cakir: Industry chambers must know which industrial sectors must be supported in their respective regions. Each chamber of industry can establish through research the areas of investments that are suitable for the conditions of its own region. Some of these areas may be eliminated on the basis of certain criteria. The chamber can then have feasibility reports prepared for the areas of investments selected taking the capital potential of the region into consideration and can obtain an incentive document. The chamber can also lead the way in the establishment of the companies that will realize investments with higher priority. When the investment process gets under way, the role of the industry chamber ends.

[Question]: How should Turkish industry chambers look to the future in your personal view?

Cakir: Turkey's transformation into an industrial society is a prerequisite for the solution of all of its current and future problems. This transformation can only be achieved by changing our current industrial structure. To that end, it is necessary to change consumption trends, to develop resources and to realize investments and other economic enterprises in an "applied" planning discipline. Industry chambers must endorse as their policy and must promote the idea that the structure of the Turkish industry can be changed into better conformity with the realities of the industrial community without the need for undemocratic coercions and problems by employing a more persistent and disciplined approach than the ones used so far. Industry chambers must effectively explain to the society that for countries with the size of Turkey industrialization is a universal concept, that industry has certain objective indicators and standards and that industrialists, who constitute a well-educated and experienced segment of the society, must not be onlookers to the country's problems, that their participation in the solution of those problems must not be resented and that, on the contrary, such participation is their duty.

## ASSESSMENT OF PROSPECTS FOR 1984 EXPORTS

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 17 Mar 84 p 1

[Editorial: "Export Incentives"]

[Text] Treasury and Foreign Trade Undersecretary Pakdemirli's visits to the Soviet Union, Libya, Iraq and Romania have ended with encouraging news. The undersecretary is expected to undertake similar initiatives in the coming days in new and important markets for Turkey such as Iran.

It is pleasing to see the government and the private sector collaborating in establishing direct contact with the leaders of appropriate countries in order to spur our exports, which did not grow and even declined slightly [in 1983] over their 1982 level. In view of the emphasis the Ozal government places on exports and the fact that exports will remain as the savior of the economy in the near future, such contacts should continue in a manner that will yield even more dramatic results.

However, foreign tours and bilateral contacts are not sufficient to enable our exports to regain the ground they lost in 1983 and to contribute to the development of the country. Such initiatives need to be complemented by incentives as well as new legislative arrangements.

Heading the list of needed legislative changes is the issue of export credits which have clearly become inadequate. The bottleneck in export credits and the shortage caused by tight money policies are causing substantial declines in domestic financing and industrial capacity utilization. And it is Turkey which has to pay for the cost of this decline by exporting less.

Meanwhile, the issue of which companies are small and which ones are big has not yet been clarified. The time has come to state clearly who will be considered a small firm and on what basis and how and under what circumstances it will be eligible for incentives.

Another bottleneck is observed in the timidity shown by companies which enter into contracts. Manufacturing and exporting firms which can invest and enter into contracts in areas requiring specialization complain about penalty sanctions and charge that it is impossible to sign long-term contracts under these conditions.

The requirement that half of the foreign currency earned on new export and investment contracts must be brought into Turkey at the conclusion of the contract is truly a heavy liability. While it is necessary to establish criteria to distinguish between the good and the bad in order to prevent the abuse of export credits and to encourage only those who can do the job, the strict application of this requirement on firms entering into contracts in new fields is stifling new enterprises.

We can say that the export drive in 1984 will be more successful if the flexibilities required in trade are introduced and the incentives are determined according to the nature of work.

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CSO: 3554/191

## GIRITLIGIL ON PLIGHT OF AGGREGATE CORPORATIONS

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 17 Mar 84 p 3

[Interview with Dr Safer Giritligil, Administrator of Multipartner Companies Fund]

[Text] Eskisehir--Dr Safer Giritligil, the Administrator of the Multipartner Companies Fund, said: "If multipartner companies are being mismanaged, then the government shares the blame in that."

Following Industry and Technology Minister Cahit Aral's interview with DUNYA on the launching of an inquiry on multipartner companies, Dr Safer Giritligil also made a statement to DUNYA. Stating that if multipartner companies are being mismanaged the government institution giving them incentive documents must also share the blame, Giritligil stated that the problem must be resolved through an approach aimed at reviving the multipartner company concept and not one aimed at killing it. The Administrator of the Multipartner Companies Fund gave the following answers to DUNYA's questions:

DUNYA: Dr Giritligil, do you share Industry and Technology Minister Cahit Aral's views on multipartner companies?

Giritligil: One can hardly disagree with Cahit Aral on this issue. However, I see merit in recalling certain facts to add to Aral's remarks on the issue of multipartner companies. Today, the total investment value of multipartner companies formed with contributions from farmers, workers, public servants and retirees in our country exceeds 2 trillion Turkish liras. This is an investment power that cannot be ignored. But what is more important is the preservation of the potential to increase this power by 10-fold or even 20 to 30-fold over the years. Unfortunately, no attention has been paid to this potential and it has been left untapped. If in order to set in motion an investment power of 50 to 60 trillion Turkish liras over the years it is necessary to prove to the partners that they were not wrong in investing 2 trillion Turkish liras, then we should not pinch pennies in area that has a high return potential.

DUNYA: Cahit Aral sees "management" as the most serious problem in multipartner companies. What is your view on this issue?

Giritligil: The multipartner company movement has been gaining momentum for the last 20 years. The 3d Five Year Plan made no reference to multipartner

companies even though they had long been established at the time it was published. Meanwhile, in the 4th Five Year Plan, no reference was made to multipartner companies in the discussion of the capital market, company shares and saving policies. Also, the Ministry of Corporations that was established at one time has served no useful purpose. While it is true that one or two representatives from financing institutions sit on the administrative boards of almost all multipartner companies, most of these representatives virtually have no industrial experience and are generally clerical-type officers who are unaware of the parameters of industry. The need to pay attention to the management issue was felt not too long ago at DESIYAB [State Industry and Worker Investment Bank], but no solutions have yet been found. When government institutions themselves have been too late in realizing that they have management problems and have not been able to bring about the slightest improvement, it is extremely unfair for the government to accuse others of being "unable to manage." This simplistic approach, which is applied to every problem in Turkey, will never take us to the goals we envision.

DUNYA: What are your views regarding multipartner company problems that are under investigation?

Giritligil: The primary issues criticized in connection with multipartner companies are the errors in the companies' areas of specialization, the unsuitability or the inadequacy of their area of specialization to the country's raw materials and the market and the size of their capital. There is one important point that must be emphasized here. All these companies have been issued incentive documents by the Incentives and Implementation Department of the State Planning Organization. The Turkish Engineers' Chamber has confirmed the suitability of the areas of specialization, operational location, the capital and marketing scope of the companies that were reviewed. If there is a mistake, then the government institution that issued the incentive documents must share the blame for the mistake.

Furthermore, there are problems that these companies cannot solve on their own, such as the asset-credit balance that has been severely upset by inflation and currency exchange differentials which are also the result of inflation. These companies and their partners are not responsible for the high inflation rate Turkey experienced and is continuing to experience. The ones to blame for inflation are our so-called economists and former politicians who supposedly charted our economy for years.

DUNYA: What must be done to solve the problems of the multipartner companies?

Giritligil: If there are technological mistakes associated with the management of multipartner companies then we must change the technology; if there are mistakes in the areas of specialization then we must change their areas of specialization. We must even relocate them if they have been set up at the wrong locations, and the government must foot the bill for these changes.

The rescue of all firms which have been set up and which remain as multipartner companies--even if some of them are not economically viable--is an imperative socioeconomic move. Far-sighted governments would spend billions from their resources without hesitation in order to create an investment fervor and drive of this magnitude.

We must find short and long-term solutions to the management and other problems of these companies and we must set new directions through an approach aimed at reviving the concept of multipartner companies and not one aimed at killing them. The time has come--it may even be too late--for appropriate government institutions, DESIYAB and other finance organizations to be reorganized in collaboration with each other.

We must put aside the short-term and sterile financial concerns that have brought Turkey to the present economic dire straits and we must fulfill long-term socioeconomic imperatives.

The principle of the continuity of the state stems from its trustworthiness. The state must prove its trustworthiness in all the areas we mentioned.

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## UNAVAILABILITY OF CREDIT STYMIES HOUSING PROJECT

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 18 Mar 84 pp 1,11

[Text] It has been disclosed that 100 billion Turkish liras collected by housing cooperatives from 300,000 families has been sitting idle for the last 2 years because of unavailability of credit. Huseyin Yilmaz, the president of Konutbirlik, said in a speech in Istanbul yesterday that an additional sum of 3 trillion Turkish liras is needed to fill Turkey's housing shortage, that public housing funds are inadequate and that his organization opposes the use of existing funds for purposes other than housing construction.

The meeting of the Konutbirlik Consultative Assembly of the Marmara Region Construction Cooperatives Union began in Istanbul yesterday. Konutbirlik President Huseyin Yildiz delivered the opening speech of the meeting where the country's housing shortage and the Public Housing Law were discussed. Stating that the country's housing shortage of 2 million units cannot be filled without substantial assistance from the government, Yildiz asked for the transfer of 5 percent of the budget, all bank deposits and all taxes on real estate sales to the housing fund.

Stating that his organization opposes the use of housing funds for purposes other than housing construction, Yildiz said: "The [Public Housing] Law does not specify who can use public housing funds. Rumors to the effect that this uncertainty will lead to monopolization and that certain large holding corporations will scramble to get their share of the housing funds have caused concern among our cooperatives and the nearly 300,000 partners registered with those cooperatives."

Noting that 4,200 housing cooperatives had applied to the Ministry of Public Works and Resettlement as of 10 July 1982 as required by the defunct Law No. 2487, Yildiz disclosed that the amount of credit applied for by 300,000 prospective homeowners has reached 500 billion Turkish liras and that 100 billion Turkish liras collected by cooperatives from their partners has remained idle for the last 2 years as a result of unavailability of credit. Yildiz demanded that priority be given to these cooperatives for access to public housing funds.

Describing the provision of the newly enacted Law No. 2982 on Incentives exempting 100 to 150-square-meter homes from taxes and fees as a "wrong approach that encourages luxury homes", Yildiz also criticized the precedence given by

the Public Housing Law to governors on issues concerning urbanization and said that this provision "may lead to very serious drawbacks in the future and may provide means of political favoritism to governments."

Yildiz also proposed the formation of a "Public Housing Commission" made up of representatives from the State Planning Organization, the Turkish Confederation of Labor, some housing cooperative unions, universities and industry and commerce chambers to help in the preparation of the Public Housing Code and the determination of public housing areas.

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## BRIEFS

NEW THASOS OIL SEARCH--Kavala--All the petroleum deposits which were located between 1971 and 1978 in the Gulf of Kavala and more generally in the underseas area of the northern Aegean will be reevaluated by officials of the Public Petroleum Corporation (DEP). This work will begin following the revising of the agreement between the Greek State and the NAPC [Northern Aegean Petroleum Company], which went into effect with the change in government. It is anticipated that the revising and elaboration of the final text of the new agreement will be done in the spring, at which time our country is expected to enter into the consortium of the foreign companies as an equal partner. At present all the data on the petroleum explorations which were made by the foreigners in the northern Aegean are in the hands of the officers of the DEP, and these have already been evaluated. Thus on the basis of these data, 3-4 new exploratory drillings will be made by scientists of the DEP, since it is certain that greater quantities of petroleum and natural gas are "concealed" in the Kavala-Thasos gulf than the amounts which the "Prinos" and the "South Kavala" have produced. [Text] [Athens TA NEA in Greek 28 Feb 84 p 1] 12114

CS0: 3521/200

## FISHERMEN DEMAND GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF BALTIC WHITE ZONE

## Soviet Pressure Stopped Inspections

Stockholm GNISTAN in Swedish 8 Mar 84 p 1

/Article by Christer Lundgren: "After Pressure From Soviet? The White Zone Greyer and Greyer"

/Text In the middle of the hunt for the submarine in Karlskrona, the head of the political division of the State Department, Jan Eliasson, traveled to Moscow to discuss "current problems." It is not clear whether the question of boundaries in the Baltic will arise, but it cannot be denied that it is also current. Around the turn of the year, Sweden discontinued all inspections of Soviet fishing vessels in the so-called white zone.

Was Soviet pressure behind that decision?

The "white zone" is the disputed area west of the center line of the Baltic, to which the Soviet Union is laying claim. In spite of the fact that it is on the Swedish side of the center line, the Swedish authorities have, as of 1 January 1984, agreed to consider the area a kind of international zone. All Baltic states have a right to fish there and the quotas are decided in Gdansk every year.

In April of 1978, the Soviet Union, unilaterally, expanded its economic zone to the center line. Thus, Russian ships can fish on the Swedish side of the center line without special permits, whereas Swedish fishermen don't have the same rights on the Soviet side of the line.

The Soviet Union has suggested that the white zone is to become grey, that is the Soviet Union and Sweden are, jointly, going to administer the area and exclude other Baltic states. The Commerical Fishermen's Union has supported this suggestion, but so far, Sweden has rejected it on grounds of principle.

At the turn of the year, Sweden discontinued all inspections of Soviet fishing vessels in the so-called white zone without much notice from the media.

The Norwegian newspaper, the KLASSEKAMPEN, now reports that this happened after high level Soviet pressure.

"It is a question of some sort of informal agreement or a protocol addendum that Russian and Swedish negotiators agreed upon 2 or 3 years ago," says the head of the Coast Guard, Sven Uhler, in an interview.

"I have understood the explanation to be that the inspections were unnecessary as far as the fishing goes. The Soviets can look to their own as well as Sweden can, when it comes to regulations."

But the local head of the Coast Guard in Gotland, Gunnar Svensson, understood the matter differently. He only received the directive that the inspections were to cease without an explanation. He supposed that Sweden did not want any incidents in the zone in connection with the Stockholm conference, if measures for creating confidence in Europe are initiated.

#### Demand From the Soviet Union

"No, I have understood that that had nothing to do with this matter," is Sven Uhler's comment to the GNISTAN. "The explanation that I have received is, that the Soviet Union raised this question again with the Swedish delegation during the negotiation in Gdansk last fall. The Soviet Union then asked if the Swedes could not stop the inspections also, as the Russians had already done so."

"The next thing that happened was, that we received an inquiry from the State Department regarding the necessity for Sweden to continue the inspections. We could not see any reason for it and that is why this directive was issued."

Sources close to the Swedish State Department, however, give another explanation for the cessation of the inspections, according to the KLASSEKAMPEN. According to these reports, the decision was made after a request to the State Department by high level Soviet diplomats last fall. That meeting has not been mentioned in official documents and the Soviet representatives took the opportunity to criticize Sweden's aggressive posture regarding inspections in the white zone.

Secretary Lars Magnusson of the legal division of the State Department dismisses the report from the KLASSEKAMPEN as "speculative." However, he confirms that the question was raised during fishing negotiations in Gdansk last fall in connection with a discussion regarding fishing quotas.

#### White Breathing Hole

According to Lars Magnusson, inspections of Soviet fishing vessels by the Coast Guard have only occurred once or twice.

"Some time last summer, I know that the Coast Guard inspected the logbook of a Soviet ship that was close to the Swedish border. But that is fairly unusual."

"Some 10 inspections were made on the part of Sweden last year, mainly of Russian and Danish ships," he says.

"We check on the appearance of the equipment, the size of the fish, etc. If we find that the rules have been violated--for instance if the nets have too fine

a mesh--it is reported to the country in question. We have no other method of intervention, it is after all an open sea."

"No such reports were dispatched last year," says Per Olov Nutzman. He had not been informed that the inspections were discontinued.

The reports from the KLASSEKAMPEN were confirmed by Hans Gabrielsson in Visby, who has followed the development of the boundary dispute carefully and has sharply criticized Sweden's leniency.

"The decision was made after informal pressure from a high level Soviet diplomat, in connection with or shortly after the discussions in Gdansk," he says. "It was implemented at the end of December, at the latest at the turn of the year, and it means that Sweden and the Soviet Union now inspect the fishing vessels from other countries but not those of each other. It is a step towards changing the area into a grey zone through creeping jurisdiction."

#### Overfishing of Cod Cited

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 13 Mar 84 p 12

/Article by Peter Sandberg: "Demands From the Fishermen: Make a Decision About Gotland's "White Zone"/

/Text/ The fishermen again are demanding that Sweden must reach a settlement about the fixing of the boundary for the "white zone" east of Gotland.

"We don't want the Baltic to bleed to death, there has to be fish even in the future. The overfishing has to be stopped," says Jack Hultgren, chairman of the Blekinge Fishermen's Economical Association. The white zone is the area east of Gotland, where Sweden and the Soviet Union are not agreeing on the fixing of the boundary. As there are no treaties at all, it is considered open sea, that is, open to all fishermen regardless of country.

The South Coast fishermen now assert that fishing vessels from the Soviet Union, West Germany, Poland, East Germany, Denmark, the Faroes, Holland and Finland are swarming in the white zone.

"It can be as crowded as a subdivision. At the worst some 100 trawlers from various countries, mostly Danish and West German are trawling there," says Roy Svensson, a fishermen from Karlshamn.

The result of the crush in the white zone is that Swedish fishermen are seeking other waters.

Cod is Gold

The gold in the Baltic just now is cod, which is available in large numbers and fetches a good price. There is also lots of herring, but the marketing outlook for larger quantities is poor now and for some years to come.



The cod has two large spawning areas in the Baltic: in the area between Bornholm and the Gdansk Bay and also east and southeast of Gotland, an area that largely coincides with the white zone.

"Fishing was fairly good and gave decent prices until week seven. Then the German and Danish fishing fleet arrived and started to trawl the white zone. The prices fell directly, since the market was saturated," says Jack Hultgren.

The Swedish fishermen were, thereby, forced to use a quota, which means that they can only take a certain amount of cod for each boat, depending on the size of the boat.

"It is enough for 2½ days of fishing," states Roy Svensson.

#### An Unusual Amount

This is a yearly occurring phenomenon, but on the one hand that invasion is unusually massive this year, on the other the economic prognosis for the sale of herring, which is the main catch next to cod, is unusually dismal this year.

"But we are also concerned about the cod population of the Baltic. Overfishing, such as is being done today at the spawning grounds, will result in a smaller supply of fish. You have to remember that cod-fishing was very bad in the Baltic just 10-15 years ago."

Today the fishermen are demanding that the government first of all settles the boundary dispute, secondly that the area is changed into a grey zone (only open to Sweden and the Soviet Union). Even if that is impossible, they want quotas with reference to the fact that the number of fish is threatened. Sweden's National Association of Fishermen, SFR, previously has raised the question of making the white zone grey.


"We made another thrust about a month ago. According to estimates, about 20,000 metric tons of cod and 400 metric tons of salmon are caught in the white zone," says Jens Eriksson, chairman of SFR and a Moderate member of parliament.

#### The Future

In Jack Hultgren's opinion the number must be higher, perhaps 60,000 metric tons.

"But we have to see to it that there will also be fish in the future. You can not build a reasonable distribution and marketing chain for the future with the kind of "snip fishing" that is being carried on, primarily by West German and Danish fishermen (and to some extent by Swedish West Coast fishermen) today," asserts Jack Hultgren.

He himself has a license to fish in the Russian zone in the southern part of the spawning ground in the white zone. It is too crowded in the white zone for small Swedish trawlers.



Key:

- |                           |            |
|---------------------------|------------|
| 1. Territorial border     | 4. Sweden  |
| 2. Free fishing           | 5. Denmark |
| 3. Swedish fishing limits |            |

This is the area fishermen want to reserve for the Swedish and Soviet fishermen. The "white zone," where fishing is completely free, coincides with one of the most important Baltic spawning areas for cod.

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